Peer Review of Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment of Indonesia by Buehler, Michael
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAY 2013 
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for 
International Development. It was prepared by Tetra Tech ARD. 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
AND GOVERNANCE 
ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA  
FINAL REPORT 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International 
Development by Tetra Tech ARD, through Task Order 002 under the Analytical Services III 
Indefinite Quantity Contract. 
 
Team: 
• Yemile Mizrahi, Ph.D., Assessment Team Leader and Principal Author, Tetra Tech ARD 
• R. William Liddle, Ph.D., Senior Governance Expert, Consultant to Tetra Tech ARD 
• Sugianto Tandra, Local Governance Expert, Consultant to Tetra Tech  
• April Hahn, USAID/Washington 
• Christina Li, State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 
• Miranda Jolicoeur, USAID/Indonesia 
• Ining Nurani, USAID/Indonesia  
• Nurhayati, Logistics Coordinator, Consultant to Tetra Tech ARD 
 
This report was prepared by: 
Tetra Tech ARD 
159 Bank Street, Suite 300 
Burlington, Vermont 05401 USA 
Telephone: (802) 658-3890 
Fax: (802) 658-4247 
Tetra Tech ARD Contact: 
Kathy Stermer, Analytical Services III IQC Senior Project Manager 
Tel: (802) 658-3890 ext. 2272 
Email: kathy.stermer@tetratech.com
  
 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND 
GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT 
OF INDONESIA  
FINAL REPORT 
 
 
 
MAY 2013 
 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United 
States Government. 

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................... II 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................... IV 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
2.0 STEP ONE: DEFINING THE DRG PROBLEM ................................................... 2 
2.1 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS ..................................................................................................... 2 
2.2 FIVE KEY ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
GOVERNANCE .......................................................................................................................... 3 
2.2.1 Consensus........................................................................................................................ 3 
2.2.2 Rule of Law ...................................................................................................................... 6 
2.2.3 Competition and Political Accountability ................................................................ 8 
2.2.4 Inclusion ......................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.5 Government Effectiveness ......................................................................................... 13 
2.3 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 16 
3.0 STEP TWO: ANALYZING KEY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS ........................ 17 
3.1 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS .................................................................................................. 17 
3.2 KEY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS ................................................................................. 18 
3.2.1 The Executive ............................................................................................................... 18 
3.2.2 The Security Services .................................................................................................. 21 
3.2.3 The Legislature ............................................................................................................. 22 
3.2.4 The Judiciary and Legal Professionals ..................................................................... 26 
3.2.5 Local Government ....................................................................................................... 31 
3.2.6 Political Parties and Electoral Institutions ............................................................. 34 
3.2.7 Civil Society ................................................................................................................... 34 
3.2.8 Media ............................................................................................................................... 37 
3.2.9 Private Sector Business Interests............................................................................. 38 
3.2.10 Other Non-State Actors ........................................................................................... 39 
3.3 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................... 40 
4.0 STEP THREE: USAID INTERESTS AND U.S. GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES ......... 41 
4.1 U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND BROADER USAID DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS .. 41 
4.2 USAID’S CURRENT DRG PROGRAM ............................................................................... 42 
4.3 USAID’S RESOURCES ............................................................................................................. 42 
4.4 DONOR COORDINATION ................................................................................................ 43 
4.5 PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE RECIPIENT SIDE ........................................... 43 
5.0 STEP 4: OUTLINING THE PROPOSED STRATEGY ....................................... 45 
5.1 STRATEGIC GUIDELINES ..................................................................................................... 45 
5.2 STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS ........................ 45 
5.3 DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS ............................................................................................ 47 
5.3.1 Results Narrative ......................................................................................................... 49 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 54 
ANNEX 1. SUMMARY OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED ................................................. 59 
ANNEX 2. SUMMARY OF USAID/DRG PROGRAMS .............................................. 60 
ANNEX 3. OTHER USAID AND U.S. GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS ........................... 61 
ANNEX 4. RESULTS FRAMEWORK ..................................................................... 62 
ANNEX 5. PEER REVIEW OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE 
ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA ................................................................... 65  
ii DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA 
ACRONYMS AND 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AGO  Attorney General’s Office 
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APINDO Employers’ Association of Indonesia 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development 
BAPPENAS National Development Planning Agency 
BPK  State Audit Agency 
BPS  Central Bureau of Statistics 
CBO  Community-Based Organization 
CIDA  Canadian International Development Agency 
CIVETS  Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa 
COSO  Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
CSO  Civil Society Organization 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee  
DAK  Special Purpose Grants 
DPD  Regional Representative Council 
DPR  House of Representatives 
DRG  Democracy, Human Rights and Governance  
DRL  State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 
EU  European Union 
FPI  Islamic Defenders Front 
GAM  Acehnese Freedom Movement 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GIZ  German International Cooperation Agency 
GOI  Government of Indonesia 
HDI  Human Development Index 
ICW  Indonesian Corruption Watch 
IKAHI  Indonesian Judges’ Association 
IR  Intermediate Result 
JI  Islamic Community 
JPIP  Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi 
KADIN National Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
KPK  Corruption Eradication Commission 
KPU  National Election Commission 
LGBT  Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
LSI  Indonesian Survey Institute 
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation  
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA iii 
MOHA  Ministry of Home Affairs 
MP  Member of Parliament 
MPR  People’s Consultative Assembly 
NGO  Non-governmental Organization 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OPM  Papuan Freedom Movement 
PAN  National Mandate Party 
PDIP  Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (formerly PDI) 
PKB  People’s Awakening Party 
PKS  Prosperous Justice Party  
PMP  Performance Monitoring Plan 
PPP  United Development Party 
UKP4  Presidential Working Unit for Supervision and Management of Development 
UN  United Nations 
UNDP  UN Development Program 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
iv DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Fourteen years after President Suharto’s 32-year autocratic rule abruptly came to an end in May 1998, 
Indonesia has emerged as a stable and peaceful democracy and a regional economic powerhouse. Indonesia’s 
economy is today ranked as the 16th largest in the world and projected to be in the top 7 by 2030. The 
country is a strategic ally of the United States: it has extensive forest and natural resources that are critical to 
achieving global environmental and climate mitigation objectives; it also controls a large percentage of world 
trade transits, including the strategically important sea lanes that link the Middle East with East Asia. At the 
regional level, Indonesia is considered the geopolitical center of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), a critical actor in the political and economic dynamics of the larger Asia-Pacific region.  
Moreover, Indonesia is the third largest democracy, after India and the United States, and the world’s most 
populous Muslim nation, with a population of 240 million, 85 percent of which is Muslim. As the 
overwhelming majority of Muslim citizens subscribe to a moderate form of the religion, Indonesia has the 
potential to act as a counterbalance to more extreme expressions of Islam. Today, Indonesia is recognized as 
a shining example to the world that Islam, democracy, and modernity can actually be compatible and exist in 
harmony. Indeed, Indonesia is a model for other Muslim countries that have emerged from years of 
authoritarian rule.  
Despite the political and economic progress achieved thus far, Indonesia faces many challenges that if not 
adequately confronted may undermine the deepening of democracy and the progress achieved. Even though 
the country has maintained relatively high levels of economic growth averaging 5-6 percent per year, 
Indonesian social indicators lag behind other middle-income countries. The country is also becoming less 
competitive than China, Thailand, Vietnam, India, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Both the World Bank and 
the World Economic Forum conclude that low investments in health and education, crumbling infrastructure, 
and endemic corruption have increased the risks of doing business in the country and obstructed the 
country’s economic potential. Importantly, during the past five years the income gap has increased, with a 
Gini index now standing at 0.41 (compared to 0.33 in 2005).1  
Indonesia, by no means a poor country, has more than 30 million people who continue to live in poverty. 
The quality of public services remains low and certainly inadequate for a country that strives to become an 
emerging world power. These problems are not only economic in nature, they are also governance problems. 
They are related to how policy decisions are made; how public resources are allocated to different social 
needs—or lost due to waste and/or corruption; and to the technical capacity of public officials to deliver 
services and meet the demands of their citizens.  
In the end, democracies cannot be supported on a normative basis alone; they also need to deliver public 
goods. Democratic governments need to respond adequately to citizens’ needs and demands, they need to 
protect citizens’ rights, generate legal certainty and promote economic prosperity.2 Although strong 
consensus exists on the legitimacy of democratic rule, this consensus can begin to erode if the government is 
unable and/or unwilling to improve the quality of public services, increase citizens’ economic and social well-
being, generate private investment, and increase the opportunities to improve and prosper in the country. 
                                                     
1  One of the most important factors limiting adequate investments in education and health services is the fuel subsidy, the biggest 
expenditure in the national budget. Expenditures in education are insufficient to address the country’s needs and to comply with Indonesian 
constitutional and legal mandates. For example, the Law on National Education (No.20/2003) and Constitutional Amendment III emphasize 
that all Indonesian citizens have the right to education, government has an obligation to finance basic education without charging fees, and 
government is mandated to allocate 20 percent of its expenditure on education. 
2  Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, "The Quality of Democracy: An Overview, Journal of Democracy 15:4, October 2004.  
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Rising Islamic fundamentalism is only one warning sign of the challenges ahead. While the causes are 
complex, these movements often generate sympathy among those who have little to lose: the poor and 
unemployed, particularly if they are young.3 
The deepening of democracy in Indonesia will depend largely on the political will of top government officials 
to recognize the challenges they face and introduce substantive reforms even when that implies alienating 
important stakeholders with a vested interest in the status quo. As multiple examples of successful reform 
around the world demonstrate, political will for change depends in part on the existence of strong leadership 
from the top. But when political will is weak and/or lacking, it can be generated by strong, consistent, and 
well-organized pressure from below.4  
As demonstrated below, Indonesia has potential on both fronts: civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are vibrant and have proliferated during the past decade. In many cases, 
civil society has played a critical role in lobbying successfully in favor of important reforms, such as passing 
electoral legislation or allowing the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to proceed with its 
investigations of cases of corruption involving high-profile government officials. Yet CSOs and NGOs 
continue to suffer from internally weak organizational structures, donor dependency, and deficient technical 
capacities. Most are adversarial in their relationship with government authorities, a legacy they have inherited 
from years of resistance to authoritarian rule. Not surprisingly, government officials distrust these 
organizations, and for the most part, are still reluctant to work with them or welcome their participation.  
NGOs and CSOs could maximize their potential and become more effective as agents of change at the 
national and local levels if they strengthen their internal organizational structures and improve their advocacy 
and communication capacities—especially their ability to adopt more proactive, constructive, substantive, and 
participatory strategies to engage public officials on a more sustainable basis. Similarly, champions of reform 
exist at all levels of government, but are not well organized and often lack voice. USAID can leverage its 
resources most effectively if it supports champions of reform at the national and local levels and assists 
NGOs to strengthen their internal organizational structures and advocacy capacities, thereby contributing to 
the further development of Indonesia’s civil society.  
INDONESIA’S MAIN GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS 
Poor service delivery along with a weak and deeply corrupt justice system constitute the most 
important governance challenges in Indonesia today. That is, the main governance challenges are in the 
arena of government effectiveness and rule of law.  
Many of the problems of corruption, a compromised judiciary, and weak law enforcement were inherited 
from the Suharto regime. Indeed, the transition to democracy, for all its transformative power, did not 
                                                     
3  It is important to note that vulnerability to extremism is not caused by low levels of development. The recent USAID report, Violent 
Extremism and Insurgency in Indonesia: A Risk Assessment notes that while support can be engineered from poor and marginalized populations 
as a function of frustrated expectations, the impetus for and organizational skills to carry out mobilization nearly always comes from ranks 
of more privileged classes. Development is relevant as a part of a larger grievance-driven narrative on the part of extremisits that highlights 
factors such as corruption, lack of service delivery, perceptions of political neglect—and especially—a set of ideological grievances related 
to Islamization. Development inputs can respond to counter-extremism objectives but must be carefully programmed to address actual 
sources of grievance. (USAID, Violent Extremism and Insurgency in Indonesia: A Risk Assessment. Washington, DC. USAID and prepared by 
David Timberman from Management Systems International. 2013). 
4  The power of organized social movements as catalysts of change is well documented in scholarly research. Some examples include the 
importance of the women’s suffrage movement in the United States leading to the women’s right to vote (Leanor Flexner and Ellen 
Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle. The Women’s Right Movement in the United States. Harvard College, 1959); the enactment of stronger 
environmental regulations in the United States and many European countries as a result of the environmental movement (Alain Touraine, 
Anti-Nuclear Protest: The opposition to nuclear energy in France. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983); the power of social 
movements in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s in helping to pave the way for political change in the 1990s (Susan Eckstein, ed. 
Power and Popular Protest. Latin American Social Movements. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2001); the power of 
urban social movements in bringing about broader political change in their cities and successfully overcoming the resistance of dominant 
interests that resist change (Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1983); 
and the importance of the Solidarity labor movement in Poland in bringing about political change (Alain Touraine, Solidarity: The analysis of a 
social movement: Poland 1980-1981. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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effectively dismantle the structure of opportunities for engaging in corrupt behavior and maintaining what 
Indonesians call the “bureaucratic mind set.” In fact, many people interviewed for this assessment believe the 
incentives for corruption have actually increased, in large part as a result of a rapid decentralization process 
that delegated too much power to local governments coupled with an overall weakness of the systems of 
control and government accountability. Moreover, despite taking office with a strong pledge of anti-
corruption reform, the current administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has too often 
capitulated to powerful vested interests that benefit from the obstruction of substantive governance reforms. 
During the president’s second term, oversight agencies—election management bodies, the national audit 
agency, the judicial commission, the ombudsman, the police commission, etc.—have weakened.  
This assessment starts from the premise that institutions and rules—both formal and informal—shape 
behavior by structuring the set of opportunities and constraints stakeholders confront in different settings. 
Public officials are not necessarily “born” with good ethical standards and/or commitment to public service; 
they learn these qualities as they confront both rewards and negative consequences for unethical and/or 
inefficient behavior. Corrupt and unproductive officials are typically neither ignorant nor unaware that their 
actions are wrong and/or illicit. They continue to underperform and engage in corrupt practices primarily 
because the opportunities to profit from this pattern of behavior surpass the risks of being caught and 
sanctioned. In a system where corruption is systemic and endemic, and where few rewards exist for 
productivity, it is actually considered “foolish” or irrational to behave with integrity and greater diligence.  
To provide USAID with meaningful and realistic strategic and programmatic recommendations, the structure 
of opportunities and constraints for introducing substantive governance reforms in Indonesia were analyzed 
and potential champions of reform at different levels of government were identified. Following a political 
economic analytical perspective, this study examined different actors and institutions that play an important 
political and economic role in the country, assessing both their interests and the resources they wield to 
express and defend those interests.  
Introducing governance reform, like any other reform, implies creating winners and losers; those who stand 
to win need to have sufficient power and authority to push the reform forward and those who stand to lose 
have to be persuaded to support the reform. If this is not possible, it is important at least to mitigate the 
loser’s power and capacity to obstruct the reform process.  
In Indonesia, the “constituency of corruption” has not yet faced sufficient incentives to modify its behavior. 
The latter includes top public officials who benefit from opacity and unclear business deals, particularly those 
responsible for issuing regulations, granting permits, and procuring goods and services. Public surveys 
indicate that most citizens believe corrupt officials are more predominant among personnel at the national 
police, Attorney General’s Office, Supreme Court, and of course, parliament. Additionally, the constituency 
of corruption includes business people and political party leaders (often indistinguishable from one another) 
who are ready and willing (and sometimes forced) to strike deals with corrupt government officials. Finally, 
the constituency includes citizens who are disempowered and/or discouraged to confront corrupt public 
officials who refuse to offer public services if a bribe or other inducement is not paid. Although obviously the 
public, especially the poor, stand to lose the most from the system of corruption and government 
incompetence, so far they have not had sufficient capacity to exert greater and more sustained pressure to 
demand better services and greater integrity from government officials. 
The country’s Corruption Eradication Commission has without a doubt been successful in combatting 
corruption. It has removed some of “the rotten apples from the barrel.” Yet, by itself, the mostly punitive-
based strategy is not effective in altering the structure of incentives that generate or motivate corruption in 
the first place. The latter calls for a more structured and comprehensive strategy.  
Indonesia has good opportunities for moving forward and promoting significant change, particularly at the 
local level, even when the constituency of corruption remains strong and many legacies of the past continue 
to benefit a few powerful interest groups. First, in virtually every government agency at the central and local 
levels, champions of reform exist. While at the central level these champions are not typically empowered and 
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can easily become trapped in the complex bureaucratic web that resists the deepening of democratic 
governance reforms, at the local level, these champions have broader room to maneuver and can therefore 
play a more critical role in pushing forward the reform process. National-level leaders should be engaged, and 
if possible, supported through strategic partnerships and targeted technical assistance to promote greater buy-
in and minimize resistance to change. Second, the introduction of direct elections for mayors and district 
heads has generated powerful incentives for these officials to perform better and become more accountable 
to the electorate. Finally, NGOs have proliferated around the country and are playing an increasingly vital 
role in demanding good governance. Not surprisingly, the local level has become the “laboratory of 
democracy” in Indonesia, where a combination of highly motivated leaders and a strong and well-articulated 
civil society has been shown to make a difference.  
STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
In recent years, U.S. policy toward Indonesia has focused on cementing ties with a geopolitically important 
state that can play an active role in regional diplomacy and encourage Indonesia to combat terrorism and 
effectively counter the rise of violent Islamist extremism. The United States has sought to promote 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, and to further American trade and investment interests. 
Human rights concerns about the armed forces—particularly issues in Papua—have been an unresolved 
tension in the bilateral relationship. President Obama’s visit in November 2010 served to broaden the 
relationship. One key outcome included the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement. The partnership has five 
priority areas, including Democracy and Civil Society.  
Although USAID is not the largest donor in the country, it is in a unique position to leverage its resources 
and achieve maximum results. As was clear in most of our interviews, Indonesians admire the United States, 
even when they are highly nationalistic and proud of their country. They view the United States’ size, its 
highly decentralized governance structure, its active and robust civil society and its economic dynamism—
even today, when the U.S. economy is still struggling to deal with the aftereffects of a severe financial crisis—
as relevant to Indonesia’s realities.  
Moreover, Indonesia is not a poor country, even when an estimated 30 million people remain poor or live in 
conditions of extreme poverty. Donors play a supporting role, but Indonesia is not donor dependent. Almost 
all central government officials interviewed for this assessment acknowledged that Indonesia does not need 
U.S. resources. Indeed, when compared to Indonesia’s national budget, USAID’s total investments in the 
country represent “a drop in the bucket.” Yet, if they do not need U.S. resources, government officials are 
eager to be exposed to the good ideas, best practices, and effective solutions to complex problems that have 
been successfully implemented in such a large, rich, diverse, and decentralized country as the United States. 
Further, they view USAID’s experience and strategic approach to development challenges as highly relevant 
to Indonesia. 
For these reasons, USAID should refrain from investing in complex projects at the national level. Yet, 
engagement with national-level government authorities at the executive, legislative, and judicial sector levels is 
critical to maintain the U.S. partnership with the Indonesian government and to ensure its collaboration—and 
hopefully buy-in—in the implementation of USAID’s projects and programs. To that end, strategic 
partnerships with key national institutions and reform champions are encouraged through a combination of 
peer-to-peer policy dialogues, study tours, exchanges, and targeted technical assistance.5 National-level 
government officials in Indonesia welcome being treated as partners rather than donor recipients. They do 
not believe they need U.S. resources; they want good ideas. 
The proposed development hypothesis is that: 
                                                     
5  Such assistance may well be most efficiently provided through one or more USAID projects but the design of these should focus inputs on 
the type of strategic partnerships described here. 
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• If Indonesian government can better promote economic growth and deliver adequate public services 
to its citizens, and 
• If there is strengthened demand for greater justice sector performance and accountability, and 
• If there is increased effectiveness of electoral authorities to secure clean and fair elections,  
• Then the quality of governance in Indonesia will be strengthened. 
The development hypothesis is premised on the assumption that in Indonesia, as in most democracies, civil 
society’s demand is a critical driver of change. To the extent that civil society is well organized and articulated, 
it can generate sufficient pressure from below to mobilize political will for reform. Yet, political will is not 
enough. Government officials willing to introduce substantive reforms also require stronger technical capacity 
to plan strategically, manage personnel, administer public resources, monitor and evaluate government 
performance, learn from best practices, and comply with regulations. To the extent that public officials 
become more competent and motivated, they will be more ready to confront the expected challenges that 
await any effort to defy powerful vested interests with a stake in the status quo and to overcome the many 
legacies Indonesia has inherited from its past—such as corruption, lack of accountability, bureaucratic inertia, 
and weak commitment to service delivery.  
Poor service delivery (weak government effectiveness) and an inefficient and deeply corrupt justice system 
(weak rule of law) are the most important governance challenges in the country. Therefore, USAID’s overall 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) Objective should be to strengthen the quality 
of governance in Indonesia by increasing the effectiveness of government institutions to respond to 
citizens’ needs and demands, and by strengthening the capacity of CSOs and NGOs to demand greater 
integrity and accountability of government. 
More specifically, USAID should focus and concentrate its programs on improving government 
effectiveness at the local level, where public services are delivered, and on strengthening the demand for 
greater judicial performance and accountability. While weak rule of law is a major governance problem, 
strengthening the rule of law in Indonesia is a long-term objective and a result too ambitious and far beyond 
USAID’s manageable interests. Building stronger demand for greater judicial performance and legal 
accountability, on the other hand, is a more realistic and manageable result—and as argued in this report—a 
critical catalyst for change. Modest rule of law interventions to support the performance of legal professionals 
will have greater chances for impact as demand for access to justice rises. 
In the next few years, USAID plans to continue its electoral program, supporting both electoral authorities 
and CSOs to improve electoral administration and secure clean and fair elections in the future, which is 
particularly important in the upcoming presidential elections of 2014. These conclusions are the result of an 
electoral assessment conducted independently of this assessment, and are included in this report’s strategic 
recommendations. A graphic representation of these objectives and results is presented in Annex 4. 
At the local level, USAID should support projects aimed at increasing local government’s capacities to 
provide adequate public services and effectiveness in responding to citizens’ needs. Public services are 
defined broadly and may include health, education, land titling, environmental protection, a business enabling 
environment, emergency preparedness and response, and importantly, access to justice, among others. If 
opportunities exist, assistance can also be provided to mitigate corrupt practices in key government offices by 
reducing the incentives that drive corruption in the first place. Finally, projects should also be directed to 
enhance local CSOs’ and NGOs’ capacities to advocate for and demand better and more accountable 
government services.  
At the national level, USAID should continue to provide support to targeted CSOs, NGOs, and community-
based organizations (CBOs), particularly those that have the capacity to build strong coalitions, provide 
technical assistance to regional or local organizations, and advocate for the introduction and implementation 
of sound governance reforms. As noted before, USAID should also engage national leaders, through strategic 
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partnerships, peer-to-peer policy dialogues, exchanges, and targeted technical assistance. In the justice sector, 
in particular, these partnerships are essential because the justice system is centralized.  
As we argue in this assessment, direct elections of mayors and district heads have increased the opportunities 
for reform at the local level, and thus USAID has a better chance of achieving results in the short to medium 
term (five to 10 years). Moreover, it is at the local level where both civil society and government authorities 
confront the most serious weaknesses and therefore where donor support is most needed.  
USAID should mainstream governance approaches across sectors, ensuring that education, health, 
environment, and economic growth programs include good governance in their results frameworks. In 
designing anti-corruption interventions, USAID should identify the structure of incentives that drive corrupt 
practices in specific sectors, and support program interventions aimed at increasing the risks and reducing 
the opportunities for engaging in corrupt behavior. To ensure that anti-corruption interventions are 
effectively mainstreamed throughout USAID’s programs, it is critical to identify realistic and manageable 
results and to craft appropriate indicators in USAID’s Performance Management Plans (PMPs). The Kinerja 
project appears to be a good example of how to mainstream governance approaches and ensure collaboration 
across sectors. Moreover, gender, religious tolerance, and anti-corruption activities should also be 
mainstreamed across projects, ensuring that projects have special consideration for gender equality, 
transparency and accountability, and freedom of religion and expression.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this report is to summarize the findings of a Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance 
(DRG) Assessment carried out in Indonesia from October 1-19, 2012. The main objectives of the assessment 
are to identify the key problems of democracy, human rights, and governance in the country; analyze the 
structure of opportunities and constraints different actors and institutions face in advancing democratic 
reform; and provide a set of programmatic recommendations for the United States Agency for International 
Development’s Indonesia Mission (USAID/Indonesia) as the Agency prepares its next five-year strategy. 
Recommendations are based on a realistic evaluation of the most important opportunities for reform in the 
country and an assessment of the types of interventions that are within USAID’s manageable interests and 
have the potential for achieving the greatest impact. That will increase the effectiveness and sustainability of 
DRG programs in Indonesia. 
This DRG assessment has been based on USAID’s latest DRG Assessment Framework.6 The assessment 
methodology proceeds through four steps. The first identifies the key problems of democracy, human rights, 
and governance in the country; the second conducts a political economy analysis of the actors and institutions 
that are likely to support and/or obstruct the deepening of democratic reforms; the third considers the U.S. 
Government’s and USAID’s interests and resources. The final step then offers strategic and programmatic 
recommendations given the problems, actors, and institutional constraints identified.  
This report is based on more than 100 personal and focus group interviews conducted during the field work 
in Indonesia as well as an extensive review of documents, academic papers, opinion surveys, and news 
reports. For a summary of people interviewed, please see Annex 1. 
The assessment team was led by Yemile Mizrahi, Ph.D. from Tetra Tech ARD. R. William Liddle, Ph.D. was 
the Senior Governance Expert, and Sugianto Tandra the Local Governance Expert. Additionally, April Hahn 
from USAID/Washington; Christina Li from the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights 
and Labor (DRL); and Miranda Jolicoeur and Ining Nurani from USAID/Indonesia also participated in this 
assessment. Nurhayati assisted the team as Logistics Coordinator. 
In addition to Jakarta, the assessment team conducted field work in Banda Aceh, Aceh; Palangkaraya, Central 
Kalimantan; Surabaya and Probolinggo, East Java; Makassar, South Sulawesi; and Kupang, East Nusa 
Tenggara.  
The team wishes to thank the DRG office in USAID/Indonesia for facilitating the meetings with the 
Government of Indonesia’s (GOI’s) officials, providing valuable information and assisting the team in 
interviewing USAID and Embassy officials. 
                                                     
6  USAID, Conducting a Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development. (Washington, DC, 
2011). 
2 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA 
2.0 STEP ONE: DEFINING 
THE DRG PROBLEM 
2.1 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS  
Fourteen years after President Suharto’s 32-year autocratic rule abruptly came to an end in May 1998, 
Indonesia has emerged as a strong world power—ranked as the 16th largest economy in the world—and a 
case study of a successful and peaceful transition to democracy. Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast 
Asia and the third largest democracy in the world, after India and the United States. With a population of 240 
million and an overwhelming Muslim majority of more than 85 percent, the country is also the world’s most 
populous Muslim nation. Although many challenges remain, today Indonesia is recognized as a shining 
example to the world that Islam, democracy, and modernity can actually become compatible and live in 
harmony. Indeed, the Indonesian experience can become a model for other Muslim countries that have 
emerged from years of authoritarian rule.  
The turmoil surrounding the collapse of the Suharto regime made many observers fear that the country 
would turn down a perilous road of national disintegration. Yet, the Indonesian government managed to pull 
itself out of the crisis, preserve national integrity and political stability, and significantly sustain relatively high 
levels of economic growth. Compared to its Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia is an example of successful 
and stable transition to democracy.  
According to the World Bank, Indonesia today is home to over 130 million people who are willing and able 
to spend between U.S. $2 and $20 per day.7 These consumers are the economy’s most important drivers, 
whose consumption in 2011 accounted for 55 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (by 
comparison, China’s consumer spending was only 35 percent).  
With economic prosperity, members of the Indonesian middle class are emerging as a political class; they are 
becoming more interested in the social and political affairs taking place in their country and adopting a more 
critical position toward their government. Freedom of the press and the expansion of social media networks 
have played a significant role in this development. Indonesia is now the fourth largest user of Facebook in the 
world and Jakarta is the world’s most active Twitter city. Given that most users of social media networks are 
middle class citizens, it is not surprising that their voices are often aired through these channels.  
However, despite the political and economic progress achieved thus far, Indonesian social indicators are 
lagging behind other middle-income countries,8 and the country is becoming less competitive than China, 
Thailand, Vietnam, India, Malaysia and the Philippines. Both the World Bank and the World Economic 
Forum conclude that low investments in health and education, crumbling infrastructure, and endemic 
corruption have increased the risks of doing business in the country and obstructed Indonesia’s economic 
                                                     
7  World Bank, Indonesian Economic Quarterly, “ 2008 Again?,” pp. 38-41. (March 2011) http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/03/18/000333037_20110318015637/Rendered/PDF/601520revised
010IEQ1Mar20111english.pdf  
8  Anthony Saich et al. “From Reformasi to Institutional Transformation: A Strategic Assessment of Indonesia’s Prospects for Growth, Equity, 
and Democratic Governance,” (Ash Center for Governance and Innovation, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA, April 24, 2010) pp.v-vi. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN-DPADM/UNPAN042322.pdf.  
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potential.9 Importantly, during the past five years, the income gap has increased, with a Gini index now 
standing at 0.41 (compared to 0.33 in 2005).10  
Indonesia is by no means a poor country, yet more than 30 million people continue to live in poverty and the 
quality of public services remains low and certainly inadequate for a country that strives to become an 
emerging world power. These problems, as shown in this assessment, are not only economic in nature—they 
are governance problems. Confronting these challenges will involve not only the design of good and sound 
public policies, but significantly, the government’s political willingness to implement them, which entails 
confronting powerful vested interests that have a stake in the status quo and are likely to obstruct them.  
As multiple examples of successful reform around the world demonstrate, in democratic countries, political 
will for change often depends on the existence of a well-organized and articulated demand for change from 
below.11 When pressure from below is coupled with strong leadership at the top, significant change becomes 
possible. Political leaders become more willing to confront powerful interests and introduce substantive 
reforms when the risks of not addressing social demands become far too great, either in the form of 
intensification of social conflict or potential loss of power. Obviously, some governments resort to force and 
repression when confronted with strong social movements, but when they do that consistently, they lose 
legitimacy and undermine the most central elements of democracy.  
As we discuss in the next sub-sections, Indonesia has potential on both fronts: civil society organizations 
(CSOs) and particularly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are vibrant and have proliferated during 
the past decade, and champions of reform exist at all levels of government. USAID can leverage its resources 
most effectively if it supports champions of reform at the top and assists NGOs (including community-based 
organizations [CBOs]) to strengthen their technical capacities and internal organizational structure so that 
they become more sustainable and more effective in exerting pressure from below. 
2.2 FIVE KEY ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
GOVERNANCE 
2.2.1 CONSENSUS 
Indonesia is a young democracy, but strong consensus exists on the legitimacy of democratic rules and 
procedures. Public opinion surveys reveal that more than 77 percent of citizens believe democracy is the best 
form of government.12 Elections have been institutionalized as a mechanism to transfer power, and 
                                                     
9  World Bank, 2011; and World Economic Forum, “The Indonesia Competitiveness Report,” (2011) 
http://www.weforum.org/reports/indonesia-competitiveness-report-2011. 
10  Official information from the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). 
11  The power of organized social movements as catalysts of change is well documented in scholarly research. Some examples include the 
importance of the women’ suffrage movement in the United States leading to women’s right to vote (Leanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, 
Century of Struggle. The Women’s Right Movement in the United States. Harvard College, 1959); the enactment of stronger environmental 
regulations in the United States and many European countries as a result of the environmental movement (Alain Touraine, Anti-Nuclear 
Protest: The opposition to nuclear energy in France. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983); the power of social movements in Latin 
America during the 1960s and 1970s in helping to pave the way for political change in the 1990s (Susan Eckstein, ed. Power and Popular 
Protest. Latin American Social Movements. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2001); the power of urban social 
movements in bringing about broader political change in their cities and successfully overcoming the resistance of dominant interests that 
resist change (Manuel Castells, The City and the Grassroots. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1983); and the 
importance of the Solidarity labor movement in Poland to bring about political change (Alain Touraine, Solidarity: The analysis of a social 
movement: Poland 1980-1981. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
12  The Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) has conducted yearly surveys asking people whether they believe democracy is the best form of 
government. In 2011, the last available survey, 77.3 percent of people interviewed agreed with the statement that democracy is the best 
form of government. http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/403/Rilis%20LSI%2029%20Mei%202011.  
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Indonesians vote in large numbers.13 Even when many people interviewed for this assessment 
acknowledged—with a certain degree of nostalgia—that the business environment was more favorable under 
Suharto and that the national bureaucracy was technically more competent, there was no support for a return 
to authoritarian rule. The formal apparatus of Suharto’s New Order has been dismantled and democracy has 
become institutionalized. Indeed, as a recent report by the Ash Center at the Harvard Kennedy School 
recognizes, “Indonesians now enjoy one of the most open and democratic political systems in the region.”14 
In a country ruled for more than 30 years by a heavily centralized and repressive dictatorship, this political 
change is indeed remarkable. As Christian von Luebke argues, today Indonesia outshines its Southeast Asian 
neighbors such as Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines for maintaining democratic rule, political stability 
and high rates of economic growth.15 Indonesia is also remarkable for its speedy recovery after the financial 
collapse of the late 1990s. Moreover, for a country as fragmented and segmented as Indonesia, with more 
than 17,000 islands and hundreds of different ethnic groups, it has been able to keep a strong sense of 
national unity and integrity.  
Although the country has faced separatist movements for decades that threatened the integrity of the nation, 
most of these conflicts have been successfully resolved and it is safe to conclude that the country’s national 
identity has been reasserted. After a long period of conflict, the separatist movement in Aceh was resolved 
after the government negotiated a peace agreement with Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Acehnese Freedom 
Movement) in 2005. In the context of the aftermath of the devastating tsunami that hit the region in 2004 and 
the unprecedented flow of donor support, GAM agreed to stay within Indonesia but under conditions of 
special autonomy. The rebel movement in Papua, on the other hand, has not yet been resolved. Despite 
efforts by various governments since 1998, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Papuan Freedom Movement) 
has rejected a peace plan and many indigenous Papuans continue to support independence for Papua. This 
opposition movement does not appear to be comparable to GAM in Aceh; it is not sufficiently well 
organized or armed to constitute a major challenge to Jakarta. Yet, strategically (and symbolically) the 
persistence of the conflict in Papua will have repercussions on Indonesia’s credibility as a modern democracy 
engaged as a regional and global leader.  
The East Timorese, who also rebelled against Indonesia, were allowed to vote in a United Nations-sponsored 
referendum in 1999 and chose independence. Paradoxically, granting independence to East Timor reinforced 
Indonesian national identity, as a strong separatist movement was no longer a problem for the Indonesian 
state.16  
The Islamic challenge to the nation-state initially appears to have been resolved as well, but questions remain. 
Parties supporting an Islamic state have declined in support from 1999 to 2009. There are only two such 
parties in parliament today, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) and Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party). Nonetheless the Islamist movement, which includes several 
NGOs in addition to political parties, has applied pressure on the secular state in other ways, and appears to 
be growing stronger.  
                                                     
13  Turnout rates in legislative elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009 were 93.3 percent, 84.9 percent, and 70.99 percent, respectively. 
http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/403/Rilis%20LSI%2029%20Mei%202011. Turnout rates in presidential elections are also high, with 75.2 percent in 
the second round presidential election in 2004 and 82.5 percent in the presidential elections of 2009. See IFES election guide. 
http://www.electionguide.org/reports1.php?region=5&country=102&type=1&round_num=0&start_month=01&start_year=2000&end_mont
h=12&end_year=2012&submitted=1&submit.x=45&submit.y=16. 
14  Saich et al., 2010, p.2. 
15 Christian von Luebke, “Post-Suharto Indonesia: Democratic Consolidation and Continuing Challenges.” (Freeman Spogli Institute for 
International Studies, Stanford University, Fall 2009) http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/381/Post-Suharto.pdf. 
16  R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, “Indonesia’s Democracy: From Transition to Consolidation,” in Alfred Stepan and Mirjam Kunkler, eds., 
Indonesia, Islam and Democratic Consolidation. New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming.  
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Now that the process of democratic transition has been successfully completed,17 the real question becomes 
how strong and/or well consolidated this democracy is and how sustainable it will be in the long term. This in 
large part depends on the ability of the democratic government to deliver public services, create employment, 
reduce poverty and protect the rights of citizens.  
Suharto’s New Order, while obviously not democratic, was internationally recognized for its success in 
achieving high rates of growth and effectively reducing poverty. The World Bank, for example, singled out 
Indonesia for its accomplishment in poverty alleviation, reducing poverty levels from 60 percent of the total 
population in 1970 to 15 percent in 1990.18 The Suharto regime survived for many years not only because of 
its repressive and authoritarian structures, but also because it effectively delivered services and promoted 
economic growth. The regime did not come to an end until the deep financial crisis of 1998 undermined the 
capacity of the government to maintain this level of performance.  
The “pro-poor” commitment has survived the democratic transition, and continues to be a strong point of 
consensus between the government and civil society. All governments since Suharto have introduced anti-
poverty programs, albeit with different degrees of success, as shown below.  
In a country as fragmented and segmented as Indonesia, where multiple ethnic groups and religions live 
together, consensus exists that decentralization is the best system of governance under democratic rule. From 
the late 1950s to the late 1990s, Indonesia had a highly centralized government. Many of the country’s 
governance problems over the decades, including the violent reaction of groups in Aceh, East Timor and 
Papua, can be traced to excessive and heavy-handed centralization.  
President Habibie’s decision in 2001 to decentralize governmental decision-making authority and budgetary 
support to the districts and municipalities, which already had formally elected legislatures in place dating to 
the 1950s, was widely accepted at the time and continues to be strongly supported. Yet, there seems to be a 
weaker consensus on how to make the decentralized system work effectively, as consensus exists today that 
corruption and poor service delivery have intensified and become more visible as a result of decentralization.  
While the assessment team was in country, the executive was already discussing some reforms in the 
parliament to recentralize certain functions and give provinces more powers and responsibilities over their 
constituent districts. While decentralization is irreversible, many of the rules of the game are still being 
discussed.  
Whether the answer to the problem of corruption and poor service delivery is some form of recentralization 
or a different decentralized scheme, the consensus is that corruption and weak service delivery are the 
greatest enemies of democratic success.19 In the long term, sustained levels of economic growth—which 
averaged a rate of growth of 5.2 percent between 2000 and2010, and steadily improved during that period20—
are not enough to ensure the legitimacy of democratic governance. Democracies also need to deliver quality 
public services and improve citizens’ well-being. Here is where Indonesia’s democratic consolidation may face 
serious challenges. Since 1998, income inequality has increased, the quality of public services has deteriorated, 
a high number of people still lives in poverty and Indonesia is losing economic competitiveness vis-à-vis its 
                                                     
17  Ibid. 
18  Cited in Saich et al., 2010, p. 42.  
19  According to the World Economic Forum, corruption is considered one of the most serious obstacles for doing business in Indonesia. In a 
Gallup poll conducted in Indonesia in 2008, 91 percent of Indonesian citizens believed their political system is very corrupt. 
20 Between 2007 and 2011, the economy grew by an average rate of 5.9 percent. The Economist Intelligence Unit. August 2012. 
6 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA 
regional neighbors.21 An economic crisis or a prolonged period of stagnation could raise substantially the 
levels of dissatisfaction with democracy among Indonesians. 22 
Despite the seriousness of these problems, at the elite level, there is no apparent agreement on the need for 
reforms to address these problems. Although champions of reform exist in all ministries and at all levels of 
government, they are not strong or organized enough to challenge those who still benefit from the status quo. 
Furthermore, some local-level champions get caught in a dense bureaucratic web and seem to lose their 
reform drive once they are promoted to office at the central level. While a return to authoritarianism is not an 
option, general disenchantment with democratic rule, growing cynicism and political apathy, or worse, 
support for fundamentalist groups does constitute an important threat to democratic consolidation. The latter 
is particularly problematic considering it is often linked with violence, intolerance and discrimination toward 
religious minorities and women. 
2.2.2 RULE OF LAW 
Since the fall of the New Order, Indonesia has made significant progress toward the establishment of the rule 
of law. The legal foundations of a democratic system have been formally established. The revised 1945 
Constitution formally guarantees human rights and civil and political liberties. In addition to the Mahkamah 
Agung (the Supreme Court), the revised Constitution also provides for new autonomous judicial bodies: the 
Mahkamah Konstitusi (the Constitutional Court) with powers of judicial review, and the Komisi Yudisial (the 
Judicial Commission) to discipline judges and root out corruption in the judiciary. Indonesia is a signatory to 
the United Nations (UN) convention on human rights, and it has a long-established National Human Rights 
Commission to receive complaints on human rights abuses and an Ombudsman Commission to handle 
complaints about public services.  
The amendments to the 1945 Constitution also created the formal legal basis for a working presidential 
system in which the president and the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR, the parliament) are elected directly and 
separately every five years. The path to political power is through a competitive electoral system of which 
rules are for the most part, widely accepted.  
In addition to these constitutional amendments, since 1999, the country has introduced substantive political 
and institutional reforms protecting rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of expression and access to 
public information. The military has been stripped of its political power and restricted to defending the 
country against foreign enemies. The police were separated from the army and given the responsibility to 
protect domestic order. Since 2002, when terrorist groups linked to Al Qaeda attacked Westerners in Bali, 
killing 202 people, the police have effectively combatted terrorism and dismantled several terrorist cells.23 
Significantly, the government established an anti-corruption commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi [KPK], 
or Corruption Eradication Commission), endowing it with considerable powers to investigate and prosecute 
corrupt officials. Since its creation in 2004, this commission has prosecuted more than 100 cases of 
“extraordinary corruption” (grand corruption) including members of parliament (MPs), ministers, provincial 
governors, ambassadors and business executives.24  
Despite these extraordinary achievements, the country continues to confront daunting challenges in 
establishing a fair, impartial and equitable judicial system. Indeed, weakness in the rule of law constitutes one 
of the most serious governance problems in Indonesia today. The weaknesses stem from the lack of judicial 
                                                     
21  This is the most significant conclusion of the Ash Center report (Saich et al. 2010.).  
22  Data and analyses from the Indonesian Survey Institute show that there is a statistical link between perceptions of a positive national 
economic condition, on the one hand, and satisfaction with the government’s democratic performance. See Liddle and Mujani, forthcoming.  
23  According to a recent New York Times report, since 2003,the Indonesian police have “arrested more than 700 militants and killed about 
60”. NYT, October 29, 2012.  
24  http://www.article2.org/mainfile.php/0901/367/. 
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independence, a legacy of entrenched corruption and bureaucratic ineffectiveness, and the practice of 
constantly moving judges and prosecutors around the country, leading to lack of specialized skills and fewer 
incentives for lawyers to join the public sector.  
Since independence in 1945, with the partial exception of a brief democratic period in the 1950s, Indonesia’s 
judicial system has been subordinated to the executive branch. Decisions have largely been arbitrary, often at 
the behest of the president or his officials when not the result of bribes. The legal profession has been 
discredited and judicial institutions are distrusted. The best and brightest lawyers in the country have not been 
attracted to serve in the public sector. This culture of subordination, incompetence and lack of integrity 
within the judicial system continues today. 
Perhaps the single most important flaw in Indonesia’s current judicial system is that the institutional 
procedures designed to nominate judges to the Supreme Court continue to undermine judicial independence. 
Although new judicial institutions like the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Council have been established 
to strengthen the justice system, the system’s lack of independence has not been fully overcome. Supreme 
Court judges are selected by the House of Representatives (DPR) from a list of candidates submitted by the 
Judicial Commission. The selected candidates are then confirmed by the president. The problem is that the 
Judicial Commission presents the DPR with more candidates than there are positions available. The process 
becomes politicized as selection and nomination of judges becomes a matter of negotiation between different 
political parties. The process discourages an adequate vetting of the candidate’s record, as nominations are 
not based on merit but on special interests and political favoritism. 
The result, according to a prominent lawyer interviewed for this assessment is that “the House of 
Representatives ends up choosing the weakest and most corruption-prone candidates for the Supreme Court. 
Candidates also come from the worst law schools in the country, for the best lawyers do not want to work in 
the Supreme Court.” Judges for the lower courts are selected by the Judicial Commission, but as this lawyer 
also acknowledged, “the Judicial Commission lacks teeth; it is subordinated to the Supreme Court, which has 
already filed a judicial review to weaken the Commission’s ability to sanction and discipline judges.”  
The consequences of lack of judicial independence reverberate through the entire justice system as well as the 
legal profession, which suffers from the contempt of judges and the system’s overall lack of integrity. The 
Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and the national police, in particular, are some of the institutions frequently 
regarded as corrupt and distrusted by Indonesian citizens.25 A combination of poor salaries, weak internal 
controls and lack of political will at the top to strengthen the independence and performance of these 
institutions generates strong incentives for the perpetuation of incompetence and proliferation of corrupt 
practices.  
In a political system where money buys influence and justice, the most fundamental principle of the rule of 
law, namely that laws are equitably applied, is undermined. Legal certainty becomes compromised as judicial 
decisions can be bought and sold to the highest bidder. Not surprisingly, the World Bank ranks Indonesia as 
a low performer in its Doing Business Survey, particularly with regard to “the ease of enforcing contracts,” 
standing at 144 in the ranking of 185 economies.26 For all its merits, KPK is limited in its capacity to confront 
and combat corruption effectively, particularly considering its size and resources and most importantly, when 
                                                     
25  LSI, “Kepercayaan Publik pada Pemberantasan Korupsi [Public Trust in Corruption Eradication]” (2012). 
http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/409/Rilis_LSI_Korupsi. The police have been effective in combatting terrorism, but not in guaranteeing the rule of 
law in the country. They are regarded as highly corrupt, and with their recent success in combatting terrorism and drug trafficking, the 
police have actually been so empowered that the executive is hesitant to challenge police leadership and introduce reforms. Interview with 
members of Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan (UKP4, Presidential Working Unit for Supervision and 
Management of Development). Jakarta, October 16, 2012. 
26  See World Bank, Doing Business 2013. Indonesia. 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/giawb/doing%20business/documents/profiles/country/IDN.pdf. According to data collected by Doing 
Business, enforcing a contract takes 498 days, costs 139.4 percent of the value of the claim and requires 40 procedures. There has been no 
improvement since 2004.  
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the commitment from the top seems be weakening.27 Indeed, KPK’s success in prosecuting corrupt cases has 
unleashed strong reaction from top government authorities and political parties, and it is only through 
unprecedented popular support that the institution has been able to carry on with its tasks.  
The weakness of the rule of law negatively affects the business environment and undermines Indonesia’s 
economic competitiveness, but it particularly affects the poor and those without sufficient resources to buy 
justice and seek legal protection. Land tenure conflicts, perhaps the most predominant problem in the 
country, are not effectively resolved in the courts of law. The inability (and/or unwillingness) of the justice 
system to resolve these issues often results in evictions, violence and police abuse. The biggest cases of 
human rights abuses reported to the National Human Rights Commission are related to land disputes, as 
local communities are evicted from lands they traditionally claim as their own. Yet, as commissioners 
interviewed for this assessment reported, “human rights violations cases do not get prosecuted.”  
Cases of domestic violence and discrimination against religious minorities are also not effectively resolved by 
the judicial system. In those few cases where the courts intervene and resolve disputes, the court’s decisions 
are not enforced. More often than not, the central government and police stand by and refrain from taking 
appropriate action. The most prominent example is the Yasmin church dispute in Bogor, West Java, where 
the mayor, pressed by religious fundamentalists, revoked a permit obtained by Christians and endorsed by the 
Supreme Court to build a church while the police, following a “hands off” approach from the central 
government, refused to act.28 Local government officials face few consequences for defying national 
legislation, refusing to enforce national court rulings or violating the Constitution. As the International Crisis 
Group argues, “defying rulings from the country’s highest courts has never been defined as a crime. In fact, 
Indonesia does not have any specific legislation on contempt of court.”29 This individual case of impunity in 
Bogor reflects a bigger problem with the judicial system in Indonesia, namely, a system that remains corrupt, 
inefficient and incapable of applying the law fairly and impartially and protecting citizens’ rights.  
For several decades, indigenous peoples of Indonesia have engaged in a low-level struggle against the loss of 
their rights, including in some cases land and control over natural resources. Much of the problem stems 
from large-scale projects such as palm oil plantations and logging concessions that infringe upon ancestral 
lands. Activists focusing on the protection of indigenous rights have sought to raise their profile through both 
national and international coordination. 
2.2.3 COMPETITION AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Since 1998, Indonesia has successfully undertaken three national electoral cycles with relatively minor post-
electoral conflicts. The institutionalization of a peaceful transfer of power through democratic elections is in 
place. At the local level, Indonesian citizens have elected more than a thousand local executives. Although 
more evidence of fraud and electoral irregularities exist in local elections, voter turnout has remained high and 
post-electoral disputes have not resulted in violence and/or unmanageable conflict.  
During the past 14 years, Indonesia has emerged as an open and highly competitive democratic system. 
Indeed, compared to its neighbors, Indonesia is the country with the most vibrant, dynamic and open 
democratic system. Still, the electoral system and the structure of political accountability remain in need of 
improvement.30  
                                                     
27  In the process, it has developed broad support in the society but also many enemies in high places, including the political parties in 
parliament and many government agencies, which both resent its success and fear its spotlight. Please see the sections below for more 
detail on these points. 
28  International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Defying the State.” Asia Briefing N. 138. (2012c). 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/b138-indonesia-defying-the-state.pdf 
29  International Crisis Group, 2012c., p. 17. 
30  Saich et al., 2010, p. 2. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN-DPADM/UNPAN042322.pdf.  
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A recent electoral assessment conducted for USAID concluded that Indonesia’s electoral authorities confront 
serious administrative weaknesses that undermine their capacity to guarantee free and fair elections. Most 
significantly, the report states that the 2009 elections were “marred by significant failures of election 
administration, especially a chaotic voter list, poor voter education leading to a very high invalid vote rate of 
14 percent, and an electronic vote tabulation system that broke down and had to be abandoned.”31 The report 
concludes that a weak legal framework, including regulations on political finance and campaign expenditures, 
lack of capacity of election authorities and poor election administration, weak law enforcement, ineffective 
voter education and insufficient budget allocations to electoral authorities, constitute the most important 
threats to the integrity of the electoral system and the results of the 2014 elections.32 
Political competition is high, with 38 parties competing for office in the 2009 parliamentary election and nine 
parties with seats in the 2009-2014 DPR. The high number of political parties, however, is in fact a reflection 
of a sometimes dysfunctional and non-representative political system, where parties cease—for the most 
part—to articulate, aggregate and represent interests.33 Parties, as political institutions, are weak, non-
representative and highly dependent on those who fund them. In Indonesia, money is the main driver of 
politics—not ideology, programs or policies. Candidates are responsible for funding their political campaigns 
and use political parties only as a platform for gaining access to power. Candidates rely on patronage 
networks to curry electoral support and mobilize people on a clientelistic basis, rather than on programmatic 
principles.34  
In a system where political parties lack a programmatic platform and where parties have weak internal 
structures and few controls, it is the candidate—especially candidates for executive office—who choose the 
party and not the other way around. Although the party system does not formally discriminate on the basis of 
religion, gender, age or ethnicity, parties do not adequately represent different constituencies. As we discuss 
below, women’s participation in the electoral front has increased over the past decade, but women still face 
informal barriers for full inclusion (see next section) and they continue to be underrepresented in public 
office, particularly at the local level.  
A good indicator of the weakness of political parties as organizations is the extremely low percentage of 
people that identify with a particular political party. According to survey data collected by Lembaga Survei 
Indonesia (LSI, Indonesian Survey Institute), from 1999 to 2009, the percentage of people that said they 
identified or had a close affinity with a political party dropped from 86 percent in 1999 to 23 percent in 2009. 
The drop is quite dramatic and revealing.35  
Political parties are highly distrusted by Indonesian citizens. In fact, parties, along with the House of 
Representatives, are typically regarded as the fulcrum of corruption.36 Yet, to date, there are few incentives for 
parties to reach out to their constituents, articulate their interests and represent them more effectively, 
particularly in between elections. The introduction of an open party list electoral system in 2009 was indeed 
an attempt to make candidates more accountable to their constituencies, but without campaign finance 
                                                     
31  USAID. “Programming Assessment for Indonesia’s 2014 National Elections. Recommendations for USAID” (2012). 
32  Ibid. 
33  There are a few notable exceptions. In the anti-pornography law case, for example, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP, Indonesian 
Democracy Party of Struggle) effectively articulated and represented the interests of Christians and Muslim moderates, while Golkar and 
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PD, Indonesian Democracy Party) represented the interests of their more conservative Muslim constituencies.  
34  It is important to acknowledge that some reforms, like increasing the electoral threshold to register a party, have been introduced to 
reduce the level of political fragmentation. The number of parties has decreased since 1998, but nine parties is still a high number.  
35  Liddle and Mujani. The reason identification was high in 1999 was mostly identification with PDIP (Megawati’s party, the challenger to 
Suharto); plus PPP, the Muslim party from the Suharto years; PAN (Amien Rais’s party); and PKB (Abdurrahman Wahid’s party). Each of 
these parties had a social base and a high level of popular awareness and support. 
36  According to survey data, Indonesians regard the political party as the most corrupt institution in their country, followed by the House or 
Representatives. LSI, Dec 2012. Jan 2012. http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/409/Rilis_LSI_Korupsi. 
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reform, this objective remains unfeasible. What is more, the introduction of open lists in 2009 seems in fact 
to have weakened political parties; they are now less able to control the recruitment process and discipline 
their own candidates and elected officials.  
According to a prominent anti-corruption advocate, political party leaders have become increasingly 
concerned with political parties’ negative reputation and with the high level of distrust in which they are held 
by the majority of Indonesian citizenry. Party leaders recognize that parties face difficult problems, such as 
the loss of control over candidate recruitment and the parties’ virtual capitulation to those who have 
sufficient resources to fund their campaigns. In response to these problems, party leaders are beginning to 
discuss ways to reform their candidate recruitment systems. Transparency International has created a new 
movement to address these problems—the so-called Rumah Kebangsaan: Gerakan Indonesia Memilih (House of 
Nationhood: Indonesian Movement to Vote). The movement convenes prominent Indonesian intellectuals 
and political leaders to discuss alternative candidate selection mechanisms. To the extent it continues, this 
effort may indeed become an important political opening for reform. 
Besides political rivalry, competition among media outlets has significantly increased. The media have become 
an important watchdog of government affairs. Additionally, the growth of social media networks has 
provided middle class citizens with an unparalleled medium to express their concerns and articulate their 
demands. For instance, on October 2012, citizens expressed their rage against the national police—widely 
perceived as one of the most corrupt public institutions in the country—for obstructing an anti-corruption 
case against the police handled by the country’s Corruption Eradication Commission, KPK. The social 
pressure was so strong that it forced President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—who had heretofore been 
hesitant to take sides—to issue a statement supporting the efforts of KPK to investigate the case, which 
allegedly involved a police general and several other high-ranking officers within the police force. What this 
case reveals—beyond the importance of the high-level corruption case involved in this scandal—is that social 
pressure, when it is organized and well-articulated, can actually have a significant effect in mobilizing the 
political will for reform.37 
The quality of public debate on substantive policy issues in the written media, however, is weak. Debates are 
quite shallow and during elections are dominated by personality traits.  
In terms of competition between the different branches of government, Indonesia still suffers from 
dysfunctional checks and balances and weak horizontal and vertical systems of accountability. In contrast to 
the past, when the executive dominated the political landscape, today the legislative branch is more 
empowered to check and balance the executive. But the legislature is also regarded as a lever of corruption in 
the country. By controlling nominations to the Supreme Court, it also has gained power vis-à-vis the judicial 
system. In contrast, the Constitutional Court has indeed become an effective check on legislative and 
executive power and a final arbiter on constitutional disputes. For example, in 2009, it declared the closed list 
provision of the 2008 electoral law unconstitutional. More recently, in 2012, the court made an important 
ruling that opened the way for a more vigorous KPK oversight of regional governments.38  
With decentralization starting in 2001, local governments (districts and municipalities) have received 
significant financial resources and broad legislative and executive authority. The balance between central and 
local government authorities, however, has rendered the system highly unaccountable and dysfunctional. 
Overlapping and often contradictory regulations between the central and local governments seem to be 
                                                     
37  This was actually not an isolated case. Citizens have used social media to mobilize against the authorities several times. One of the most 
famous cases is the Internet-based protest movement of “geckos” in support of the KPK officials in 2009. See Saich et al., 2010,  p. 93. See 
also Budi Setiyono and Ross H. McLeod, “Civil Society Organizations’ Contribution to the Anti-corruption Movement in Indonesia,” 
(Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, November 2010) p. 355. The authors persuasively argue that the anti-corruption reform agenda 
derives mostly from civil society demanding change.  
38  The court ruled that a provision in the law on regional government that required presidential agreement for the KPK to bring criminal 
indictments against a sitting district head or mayor was unconstitutional.  
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commonplace, generating confusion among citizens and motivating the use of bribes as a way to get matters 
resolved. Financial controls exist to make local governments accountable for the resources they receive from 
the central government, but they are weak and ineffective. In the decentralization process, provincial 
governments were bypassed and play no significant role in controlling and balancing the power of local 
governments. Yet, the introduction of direct elections for mayor and district heads has strengthened the 
system of vertical accountability, for citizens are now more empowered to demand greater accountability 
from their governments. At least every five years, citizens can vote bad public officials out of office. 
Obviously, elections are neither sufficient nor the most effective mechanism to demand accountability, but in 
a country traditionally ruled by authoritarian and highly unaccountable politicians, this is an important step in 
the right direction. Nowhere is this clearer than in the recent election for governor of the capital city of 
Jakarta, where the candidate, Joko Widodo or “Jokowi,” made his reputation as a good and effective mayor of 
Surakarta (Solo) in central Java and was able to defeat the heavily funded incumbent. 
With regard to economic competition, Indonesia’s democracy has maintained economic growth and financial 
stability, allowing many small- and medium-sized businesses to proliferate. Several medium-sized cities 
outside Jakarta, like Medan, Bandung and Surabaya, have experienced dynamic growth, decreasing the level of 
economic concentration in the capital. Yet, compared to other countries in the region, Indonesia is not 
competitive enough. Indonesia was ranked 54 out of 133 countries in the 2009-2020 World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Report, which placed Indonesia considerably ahead of the Philippines (87) and 
Vietnam (75), but behind Malaysia (24), China (29), Thailand (36) and India (49).39 Low investments in 
infrastructure, health and education, and a bloated and corrupt bureaucracy have reduced the country’s 
economic competitiveness. 
2.2.4 INCLUSION 
Indonesia is a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, deeply fragmented and spread across more than 17,000 
islands. Yet, the country has one national language and Indonesians have a strong sense of national pride, 
believing they are emerging as a world power, notwithstanding development challenges the country still faces.  
Indonesia’s national identity was established during the 1945-1949 revolutionary period. The nationalist 
movement of that time, with roots in the pre-war colonial period, took power in the wake of the Japanese 
occupation. Their definition of the Indonesian nation-state was the people living in the territory which had 
been the Dutch East Indies until 1942. This was, in principle, very inclusive—not based on race, ethnicity or 
religion. In the 1950s up to 1965, there were attempts to separate on the basis of ethnicity/regionalism or 
turn Indonesia into an Islamic state, but none of these succeeded. 
During the 32 years of Suharto’s rule, issues of national identity were suppressed. GAM, the Aceh freedom 
movement, grew in opposition to this suppression and finally exploded in the late 1980s. Since 1963, there 
was also hostility and opposition to Indonesia in Papua, when the United Nations transferred administration 
to the Republic of Indonesia. A new problem was added in 1975 when Suharto’s government invaded and 
occupied East Timor, previously a Portuguese (not a Dutch) colony.  
In 1999, President Habibie, Suharto’s vice president and constitutional successor, offered the East Timorese a 
UN-supervised referendum. Pro-independence forces won a decisive victory, and after months of violence, the 
Indonesian government accepted the referendum results and Timor-Leste became an independent country. 
With the independence of East Timor, Indonesia’s integrity as a country was further challenged by two 
separatist movements living in the country’s most eastern and western outward provinces: Aceh and Papua. 
The conflict in Aceh was resolved in 2005 through negotiation, and Aceh is now included as part of 
                                                     
39  Saich et al., 2010, p. 16. 
12 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA 
Indonesia, although it enjoys special autonomy status. Papua remains in conflict, but as mentioned above, the 
rebel movement is not well organized and does not pose an immediate threat to the integrity of Indonesia.40 
Aside from the ethnic and cultural dimension of the separatist movement in Papua, the problem in Papua is 
one of exclusion. For generations, indigenous Papuans have been excluded from the benefits of the country’s 
economic growth. Despite living in a province richly endowed with natural resources, Papuans have been 
excluded from the benefits of the exploitation of these resources. According to data provided by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics and the United Nations Human Development Indicators, Papua is one of the Indonesian 
provinces with the highest rates of poverty, where more than 35 percent of the population lives below the 
poverty line (compared to an average 18 percent at the national level). In Papua, exclusion coupled with 
ethnic identity has led to separatism. 
Formally, of course, the Indonesian Constitution and legal system do not exclude anyone from political, 
social and/or economic rights. Yet, in practice, many citizens continue to be excluded on economic, religious 
and/or gender bases. Women, for example, face informal barriers to full inclusion, as they are still excluded 
from economic and political life, particularly at the regional level.41 The rising fundamentalism and religious 
conservatism has also empowered some districts, particularly in Tangerang (Banten province); Bulukumba 
(South Sulawesi province); and several other districts in West Sumatra province including Bukittinggi, Padang 
and Agam42 to introduce ordinances that discriminate against women. With the exception of Aceh, shari’a law 
is not formally recognized into the body of the law. Yet some districts have issued ordinances in the spirit of 
shari’a law, restricting the rights of women to walk alone after dark and mandating a dress code for all Muslim 
women.  
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights are still an issue, but even Indonesians have been 
surprised at how much progress has been made. For example, a prominent gay activist was nominated for 
Commissioner of Human Rights. He also made it through the fit and proper test, although in the end he did 
not obtain the position. Many noted that the fact that he was nominated and made it that far meant progress 
was being made in the area of human rights and inclusion. While this is progress for gay males in Indonesia, 
this is not indicative of other groups covered within the LGBT rights area. The Constitution recognizes 
freedom of religion, but religious freedom is in fact threatened. Only six religions are accepted—Islam, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Confucianism—as official religions. More importantly, 
state authorities determine what constitutes acceptable religious belief. In the case of Islam, this has 
increasingly meant that members of Ahmadiyah, a sect that recognizes a prophet after Muhammad, are 
excluded and marginalized. The Council of Ulamas and a Joint Ministerial Decree43 have in fact formally 
excluded Ahmadiyah and other Islamic sects as non-Muslims, which has led to intolerance and violent 
confrontation. 
On the positive side, the Sino-Indonesian population—an ethnic group that has historically been 
marginalized in Indonesian society—has been increasingly included into the mainstream of political and 
cultural life in Indonesia. Discrimination against the Chinese started in the Dutch colonial period, when 
Chinese were brought in as laborers and came as traders but were not allowed to own land. President Sukarno 
issued an order forcing them to move to large cities. He allowed them to conduct business—indeed, he relied 
on their business ability to develop the economy and enrich himself, his political party and his supporters in 
                                                     
40  See USAID’s Strategic Assessment of Papua. July, 17, 2012. This assessment team did not visit Papua precisely because a separate 
assessment on the situation of Papua had already been conducted.  
41  The National Commission on Women’s Rights has recorded a significant increase in the numbers of discriminatory policies at the local 
level from 2009-2012, from 154 to 282. Two hundred and seven of these policies have directly discriminated against women such as a 
dress code imposition, criminalization against women prostitutes and curfew against women. http://www.komnasperempuan.or.id/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Lembar-Fakta-Kasus-Putri.pdf (Accessed on 31 October 2012). 
42  http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/11/23/05393810/Komnas.Perempuan.Temukan.282.Perda.Diskriminatif.  
43  The decree was signed on 9 June 2008 by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Attorney General, 
ordering among other things that the Ahmadiyah followers stop holding activities that contradict Islam. 
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the military. But their identity cards continued to mark them as a separate group and they were denied the 
right to celebrate their holidays publicly. Chinese characters were also banned in public, including in 
newspapers. Indonesian became the language of instruction in all Sino-Indonesian schools, which forbade the 
teaching of Mandarin or other Chinese languages. All of these restrictions were lifted after the fall of Suharto. 
During the past 14 years, Indonesia has experienced more inclusionary economic development, with medium-
sized cities growing at a faster rate than Jakarta and decreasing the level of concentration of economic activity 
in Jakarta. Cities like Medan, Bandung and Surabaya have been growing at a rate of 6.4 percent since 2002, 
while Jakarta has grown at a rate of 5.8 percent.44 Yet, many citizens have been virtually excluded from the 
fruits of economic growth, as an estimated 18.7 percent of the population continues to live below the poverty 
line.45 The poverty line is itself a controversial issue, as many contend that it is deliberately set too low by the 
Indonesian government. If the level were raised slightly, millions more would be considered to be living in 
poverty.46  
Although separatism is no longer a national threat, in many parts of Indonesia exclusion has led to other 
forms of violence. Fundamentalist organizations often recruit young and unemployed people—especially if 
they come from poor families—to build their strongholds through intimidation and violence. With few 
alternatives available, the fundamentalist groups offer protection and a sense of identity to those who have 
nothing to lose.  
2.2.5 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
The Suharto regime was highly centralized, authoritarian and corrupt. Yet, in terms of government 
effectiveness, this regime had a startling record. For nearly 30 years, Suharto’s New Order managed to sustain 
economic growth rates averaging nearly eight percent per year and to substantially reduce poverty rates. 
Income inequality remained stable during this period and Indonesia compared favorably on this dimension to 
other countries in the region. As noted above, investments in infrastructure, particularly in agriculture and 
roads, and basic public services like health and education contributed to the success story. A well-educated 
and competent team of policymakers played a key role in designing and implementing the “pro-poor growth” 
strategy. Indeed, the economic policies implemented during the New Order gained international recognition 
and were held up as a model for other developing countries.47 The deep financial crisis of 1998 brought this 
regime and its policies to an abrupt end.  
Since the transition to democracy, economic growth has recovered, albeit not at the same high rate. Indonesia 
has achieved stable GDP growth of five to six percent per year.48 But executive and legislative actions are 
needed to address the shortcomings of the business environment—which as the World Economic Forum 
reveals, are related to crumbling infrastructure and high levels of corruption—and to improve the quality of 
public services. As C. Peter Timmer persuasively argues,  
Although democracy has probably increased the size and influence of the coalition concerned with poverty, 
it has greatly undermined the coalition supporting economic growth as the main mechanism for dealing 
                                                     
44  The McKinsey Global Institute. “The Archipelago economy: Unleashing Indonesian potential.” September 2012. 
45  UN, Human Development Indicators. 2011. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IDN.html. 
46  Saich et al. makes this argument. 2010, p. 42.  
47  C. Peter Timmer, “How Indonesia connected the poor to rapid economic growth.” In Timothy Besley and Louise J. Cord, eds. Delivering 
on the Promise of Pro-Poor Growth. Insights and Lessons from Country Experiences. (World Bank, 2007), p. 32 According to Timmer, 
income per capita increased by five percent per year between 1967 and 1996. 
48  Economist Intelligence Unit, August 27, 2012. 
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with poverty. The problem, of course, is not with democracy itself, but with lack of democratic institutions 
that provide real accountability of government to constituencies.49 
As a consequence, anti-poverty policy has centered on subsidies and conditional cash transfers, rather than on 
more structural and long-term policies that can promote new investments, create employment and expand the 
domestic market.50 Indeed, Indonesia seems to be trailing behind most of its neighbors with regard to Human 
Development Indicators. In 2011, Indonesia scored a rate of 0.617 in the Human Development Index (HDI), 
below the East Asia and Pacific average of 0.671.51  
With democratization, the Indonesian bureaucracy has become increasingly bloated and complex. Given that 
the transition to democracy came after the abdication of Suharto rather than a revolution from below, much 
of the bureaucratic infrastructure of the Suharto regime was never fully dismantled. For example, the civil 
service has not been substantially reformed since the transition to democracy. Civil servants continue to have 
few incentives to improve performance, for internal controls are weak and performance standards virtually 
nonexistent.  
To overcome deadlock and allow different governments to get things done, governments often create new 
agencies and commissions, endowed with parallel and overlapping functions and responsibilities with 
established bureaucratic agencies. The latter not only creates confusion, but has led to turf battles between 
agencies—for example, between the Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court, the police and KPK, and 
KPK and AGO.52 The result is a complex and confusing web of agencies, regulations and procedures that 
make bureaucratic processes cumbersome and obstruct the government’s capacity to implement serious and 
sustainable reforms. As one interviewee in AGO recognized, “the Attorney General’s Office has an 
enormous staff of more than 22,000 officials. Changing the institution is extremely difficult. It is like a big 
ship that takes a long time to make a turn”. 
To complicate matters, in 2001, the government introduced a sweeping decentralization reform in which the 
central government transferred resources and functions to district and municipality governments. Local 
governments became responsible for the provision of services, including education, health, agriculture, 
transportation and infrastructure.53 More than 2.5 million civil servants were transferred from Jakarta to the 
local level to facilitate this administration.54 The decentralization process was done in haste, after a short 
preparation period, and it was massive in scope, a reason why it was dubbed a “big bang.” Perhaps because of 
the rapid pace of this process, particularly considering the heavily centralized system that preceded it, 
decentralization has also increased confusion and engendered bureaucratic deadlock.  
Intergovernmental relations are characterized by lack of coherence and coordination between central and 
local authorities, unclear regulations if not outright contradictions between the local and central governments 
and new layers of bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, the majority of local governments lack the capacity and 
skills to undertake the new functions that have been transferred to them. Additionally, the system of internal 
and external controls to ensure quality of service delivery, integrity of public officials and accountability of 
resources were nonexistent, or weak at best.  
                                                     
49  Timmer, 2007, p. 52.  
50  The single largest budgetary expenditure in Indonesia is the fuel subsidy, totaling over U.S. $105 billion (2009-2013), and according to the 
Freedom House report, accounting for 18 percent of the annual budget. While this subsidy is popular, it by no means targets or benefits 
the poor. Big expenditures in paying for the fuel subsidy reduce the resources available for education, health and infrastructure.  
51  United Nations Human Development Indicators. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IDN.html. 
52  Saich et al., 2010, p. 93. 
53  USAID. Democratic Decentralization Strategic Assessment: Indonesia—Final Report (2009). 
54  von Luebke, 2009. 
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Civil society at the local level, on the other hand, has generally been too weak or too passive in demanding 
better service delivery. In fact, opinion polls reveal that most citizens are actually quite satisfied with the 
quality of health and education services they receive. In 2009, the last opinion survey available, 78 percent of 
citizens reported that government performance in health and education was good.55 Although the conclusions 
of this survey require further research, the results are nonetheless puzzling. The same survey reveals that 
citizens are by far less satisfied with government performance in poverty reduction (54 percent) and reduction 
of unemployment (51.3 percent). Furthermore, these results are consistent with opinions expressed in several 
interviews about the complacency of Indonesian citizens with the quality of education and health services 
they receive. For example, a representative of the central government’s Ministry of Education in Palangkaraya 
said in an interview “parents only care about the scores their children obtain in their exams. They do not care 
whether their children are educated. In Central Kalimantan the quality of education is very bad, but students 
still manage to do well on the national test.” Almost 10 years after decentralization, the results are mixed. 
With the introduction of direct elections for mayors and district heads, few local governments have 
responded satisfactorily to the new responsibilities and functions. There are a few success stories at the local 
level, however, that have been duly recognized by some civil society and media organizations which have 
been overseeing and evaluating local government performance and granting prizes to best performers.56 
However, most local governments still face enormous challenges of capacity and accountability, both to the 
central government and to the citizenry at large.  
Not surprisingly, the decentralization process has also brought the decentralization of corruption. Whether 
corruption has increased since the downfall of Suharto is hard to tell, but the collapse of the highly 
hierarchical structure of government has definitely distributed corrupt practices more evenly, and since the 
press is freer today, corruption scandals are more widely reported, which makes corruption more visible to 
the average citizen. According to a Gallup poll conducted in Indonesia in 2008, 91 percent of Indonesians 
perceived that corruption was widespread throughout the government. 
What is clear, however, is that the increasing authority of local governments along the multiple layers of 
bureaucracy and regulation that have been created as a result of decentralization have increased the costs of 
doing business in Indonesia. As one prominent businessman in Jakarta acknowledged, 
Democracy is here to stay, yet we seem to be suffering from ‘excessive democracy.’ Now there are too many 
processes, regulations, licenses which are often contradictory….With decentralization, everyone is now a ‘little 
king.’ During the Suharto years, corruption was widespread, but we only had to pay him and only once. 
More importantly, there was certainty on the deal. Today, we have to pay multiple times to different people 
and there is no certainty on the outcome of the deal. 
Compared to the Suharto regime, it is fair to conclude that government effectiveness has not improved and in 
fact, has deteriorated, particularly with regard to service delivery, infrastructure development and poverty 
alleviation. Compared to its neighbors, Indonesia is in fact underperforming in terms of basic social indicators 
and economic competitiveness. The problems Indonesia faces are complex; aside from the challenges of 
decentralization, a bloated bureaucracy largely inherited from the Suharto regime also militates against change, 
especially considering civil service has not been effectively reformed. In fact, although a serious civil service 
reform is now being discussed in parliament, there are many interests with a stake in the status quo and 
sufficient power to obstruct an initiative to make civil servants more accountable, efficient, responsible and 
less corrupt.  
                                                     
55  Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), Opinion Survey, 2009. 
56 The Jawa Pos Institute for Pro-Otonomi (JPIP), within the Jawa Pos (Java Post) newspaper, the largest circulation newspaper in East Java, has 
sponsored an annual best-practices competition among district and municipal governments in East Java for the past 11 years. Fajar (Dawn), 
a Jawa Pos-affiliated newspaper in Makassar, South Sulawesi, runs a similar competition in that province. 
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2.3 SUMMARY 
Fourteen years after the fall of Suharto, Indonesia has emerged as a competitive and decentralized democracy. 
It is the most vibrant, open and competitive democracy in the region. Considering the heavily centralized and 
authoritarian nature of the regime that preceded it, the transformation is indeed impressive. Yet, although the 
formal structures of democracy have been established, many legacies of the past remain and the country still 
confronts difficult developmental challenges that, if unsolved, will impede the country’s emergence as an 
economic world power. Low investments in infrastructure, health and education, coupled with systemic 
corruption and bureaucratic deadlock work against Indonesian’s competitiveness.  
While Indonesia outperforms its Southeast Asian neighbors in its electoral record political stability, in 
economic terms, Indonesia is falling behind. As the Ash Center persuasively argues, although the Indonesian 
economy is growing, “Indonesia is losing ground to China, India, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and the 
Philippines in foreign direct investment flows, manufacturing, infrastructure and education. Indonesia’s social 
indicators are also lagging behind other middle income countries.”57  
These problems are not only economic in nature, they are also governance problems. They are related to 
policy decisions on how resources are allocated to different social needs; to the technical capacity of public 
officials at different levels of government to deliver services; to the ability of the government to reduce the 
risks of doing business and attract greater private investments; to the strength of NGOs to demand better 
service delivery and greater accountability of government officials; and ultimately, to the political will of top 
government officials to recognize the challenges they face, and introduce substantive reforms even when that 
implies alienating important stakeholders with vested interests in preserving the status quo.  
Poor service delivery along with a weak and deeply corrupt justice system constitute the most 
important governance challenges in Indonesia today. That is, the main governance challenges are in the 
arena of government effectiveness and rule of law.58 
Many of the problems of corruption, a compromised judiciary and weak law enforcement were inherited 
from the Suharto regime. Indeed, the transition to democracy, for all its transformative power, has not 
changed what Indonesians call “the bureaucratic mind set” of public officials, or the traditional way of doing 
things. This is in large part the result of the failure of the Indonesian government to introduce stronger 
incentives to increase the performance and integrity of public officials. According to many people interviewed 
for this assessment, the government at the top, despite its strong pledge for anti-corruption reform, seems to 
have capitulated to powerful vested interests that benefit from the obstruction of reforms. As one reform-
minded official said, “The President campaigned as Robin Hood, but has ruled as Pinocchio.”59 
Unlike the Suharto regime, political stability and the legitimacy of democracy rely on the ability of the 
democratic government to deliver. Here is where Indonesia continues to face serious challenges. As 
demonstrated in this section, Indonesia is falling behind most of its neighbors in terms of investments in 
infrastructure development and in health and education; inequality rates are growing and a high number of 
people remain in poverty. To the extent that the government remains unable to address the needs and 
demands of citizens and improve living standards for the majority, the consolidation of democracy remains at 
stake.  
                                                     
57  Saich et al., 2010, p. v. 
58  These conclusions are similar to the previous democracy and governance assessment conducted in Indonesia in 2009. See USAID, 2009, p. 
6. 
59  Confidential interview, Jakarta, October 4, 2012. 
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3.0 STEP TWO: ANALYZING 
KEY ACTORS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
3.1 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Institutions and rules—both formal and informal—shape behavior by structuring the set of opportunities and 
constraints stakeholders confront in different settings. Public officials are not necessarily “born” with good 
ethical standards and/or commitment to public service; they learn these qualities as they confront both 
rewards and negative consequences for unethical and/or inefficient behavior. Corrupt and unproductive 
officials are neither ignorant nor unaware that their actions are wrong and/or illicit. They know it and in fact, 
this is why they do everything possible to hide their deals. They continue to underperform and engage in 
corrupt practices simply because the opportunities to profit from this pattern of behavior surpass the risks of 
being caught and sanctioned. In a system where corruption is systemic and endemic, and where no rewards 
exist for productivity, it is actually considered “foolish” to behave with integrity and greater diligence.  
In Indonesia, the transition to democracy did not effectively dismantle the structure of opportunities for 
engaging in corrupt behavior.  
Despite the many advances on the political front, the country’s “constituency of corruption” has remained 
relatively untouched. The latter includes top public officials who benefit from opacity and unclear business 
deals, particularly those responsible for issuing regulations and granting permits and officials who work in the 
national police, the AGO, the Supreme Court, and of course, parliament. Additionally, the constituency 
includes business people and political party leaders (often indistinguishable from one another) who are ready 
and willing (and some often forced) to strike deals with corrupt government officials. Finally, the constituency 
includes citizens who are disempowered and/or discouraged to confront corrupt public officials who refuse 
to offer public services if a bribe is not paid up front. Although the KPK has been successful in removing 
some of “the rotten apples from the barrel,” by itself, the punitive-based strategy is not effective in altering 
the structure of incentives that generate or motivate corruption in the first place.  
With the exception of the recently introduced electoral reforms that allow for direct elections of local 
government authorities, most accountability mechanisms in Indonesia remain extremely weak. Of course, in 
Indonesia’s enormously complex bureaucratic and institutional maze, there are many champions of reform at 
the local and national levels: public officials who believe that in the long term, the public interest suffers from 
entrenched corruption and inefficiency, and that the future success of Indonesia as a world economic power 
rests on its ability to curb and control corruption and increase service delivery. But these champions are not 
yet well organized or strong enough to challenge the status quo. 
In this context, it is at the local level where champions of reform have the best chance to succeed if they 
introduce reforms. First, powerful groups with a stake in the status quo are stronger at the national, not the 
local level. Consequently, local government officials have greater room to maneuver to introduce substantive 
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governance reforms. Second, direct elections certainly have strengthened government accountability, 
motivating some mayors and district heads to improve their performance in office.60  
CSOs can be more effectively organized at the local rather than national level, where they are more able to 
engage with local authorities and demand greater accountability. As we argue below, USAID could be most 
effective in leveraging the champions for reform and supporting CSOs at the local level, while engaging with 
key national-level actors and institutions that play a critical role in advancing—or at least not obstructing—
the most dynamic drivers of change in the country. 
3.2 KEY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS 
3.2.1 THE EXECUTIVE 
The executive branch at the national level has not been a major source of dynamism or effective leadership 
for many years. This is partly due to constitutional changes, partly to decentralization laws that empowered 
districts and municipalities at the expense of the national government and partly to the inertia of an 
overstaffed but underqualified bureaucracy. It is also due in part to specific qualities of national leaders, 
particularly the last three presidents, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono. Constitutional changes, decentralization laws and the bureaucratic inertias inherited from the 
past constitute powerful and relatively predictable constraints today. The quality of national leaders, on the 
other hand, is a less predictable factor because it changes with elections. The presidential elections in 2014 
will bring new leaders to the fore.  
During the authoritarian Suharto years (1966-1998), labeled the New Order, the executive branch dominated 
Indonesian political life, at both the central and local levels and across every sector of government. The New 
Order was both a personalistic regime, guided by Suharto’s will, and a military regime, in which the armed 
forces were Suharto’s main source of political support against possible opponents and his chief instrument of 
surveillance within the government and toward social forces outside it.  
Despite its high degree of centralization, personalization and military control, the New Order was not a 
totalitarian regime. Instead, it had broad support from many groups. The principal reason for this support 
was the regime’s successful promotion of economic growth, which in the late 1960s became a major source 
of political legitimacy and remained so until 1997. Upon taking power in 1966, Suharto confronted a major 
economic crisis, including runaway inflation and negative economic growth. He turned to a team of 
professional economists, led by the University of Indonesia’s Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, for policy 
guidance, beginning a long partnership that produced a quarter century of economic growth averaging nearly 
eight percent per year. On the negative side, the New Order was perceived as a time of growing corruption 
and economic inequality. In addition to its commitment to economic development, the New Order was 
widely supported from beginning to end for its hostility to communism (of particular importance to Islamic 
groups) and its strong commitment to national unity (e.g., opposition to separatist movements such as in 
Aceh and Papua). 
Reformasi, which began in 1998 with the resignation of Suharto and his replacement by his vice president, B.J. 
Habibie, has been an attempt to restore the democracy of the 1950s while avoiding its major pitfalls (i.e., 
political instability). In the economy, the goal is to restore the economic growth rate of the Suharto period 
(which at the depths of the East Asian economic crisis in 1998 was a negative 14 percent) while also tackling 
the major challenges of corruption and inequality. National leaders during the reformasi period have also been 
committed to the goal of national unity (preventing any region from becoming an independent state).  
                                                     
60  Of course, as the International Crisis Group reports, direct elections have also emboldened mayors and district heads to defy court rulings 
and national policy guidelines given the few institutional mechanisms the central government has for securing law enforcement or 
disciplining local authorities that defy the central government. 
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The constitutional amendments of 1999-2002 were designed to establish the foundations of a presidential 
democracy in which the president is vertically accountable to the voters through direct elections and 
horizontally accountable to the DPR or parliament through shared law-making and appointment powers. The 
result has been a much weaker presidency than that which characterized the authoritarian New Order. 
Indeed, something of a consensus has emerged that the president is now excessively constrained, to the point 
that he is unable to govern effectively.61 Apologists for President Yudhoyono, who has a reputation for 
inaction, have deployed this argument. Yet, the president himself seems to be at fault for weak leadership, 
refraining from taking action in situations when he could have clearly intervened and made a difference.62 
Decentralization was one of the major reform initiatives of President Habibie (1998-1999), who responded to 
demands for democratization at both the national level (holding genuinely democratic elections in 1999 for 
the first time since 1955) and the local level. The first decentralization laws, granting both significant 
regulatory authority and financial means to districts and municipalities, were passed in 2002. The 
district/municipality level was chosen to avoid giving resources to the much larger provinces, in which it was 
feared that separatist movements could develop. Another law was passed in 2004 limiting the extent of 
decentralization, and further legislation has now been proposed by the government and considered by the 
DPR. Legislative elections have been held in the provinces and the district/municipalities on two occasions 
(2004 and 2009) since decentralization; executive elections for governors, mayors and district heads have been 
held, on a rolling basis, twice in every province, district and municipality beginning in 2005. 
A major consequence of the passing of the decentralization laws was to sharply limit the authority of the 
central executive, particularly of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). While adjustments will continue to 
be made, it seems clear that the ministry will never again hold the powerful position it maintained during the 
Suharto era. It is also clear that MOHA officials and other central government actors are protagonists in a 
continuing drama to reestablish a measure of control over provincial and especially district and municipality 
governments. Many Indonesians, including some of the local officials and NGO actors interviewed for this 
assessment, believe that MOHA and other central officials are determined to reverse decentralization and 
return to a highly centralized government à la Suharto. Yet, the current decentralization debate may be more 
the result of an attempt to find the right central-local balance, and not part of a grand conspiracy to restore 
the New Order.  
Another major limitation on the executive is a bloated, poorly trained, ineffective bureaucracy recruited from 
an inadequately educated population. The roots of today’s ineffectiveness lie in the Dutch colonial period, 
when very few Indonesians received higher education or bureaucratic training. After independence, the 
bureaucracy was swollen with revolutionary fighters, most of whom did not have a high enough level of 
education for the jobs they received. From the beginning, salaries were low, which enabled the government to 
provide jobs to many more people than would otherwise have been the case. Low salaries encouraged, and to 
many, justified corruption. By 1965, most civil servants worked, at most, a few hours a day at their formal 
jobs, while moonlighting in the private or informal sector or engaging in corruption to make ends meet. 
The New Order constituted a long period of bureaucratic stability but one in which there was less change 
than there might have been if Suharto’s policies had been different. For the greatest number of civil servants 
at all levels, low salaries—and the political logic accompanying them—continued, together with the 
understanding that officials would not be held accountable for the number of hours worked or for integrity in 
the performance of their duties. There was also only marginal improvement in training of civil servants and in 
                                                     
61  See, for example, Hanti AR Yuda, Presidensialisme Setengah Hati: Dari Dilema ke Kompromi [Half-Hearted Presidentialism: From Dilemma to 
Compromise], (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2010). 
62  A recently completed doctoral dissertation by Djayadi Hanan, for example, argues against the conventional wisdom that President 
Yudhoyono has in fact been a decisive player in legislation and that he and the DPR have collaborated effectively on a number of crucial 
issues. Djayadi Hanan, Making Presidentialism Work: Legislative and Executive Interaction in Indonesian Democracy, (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio 
State University Department of Political Science, Ph.D. dissertation, 2012). A similar view on the president’s passivity was expressed by Mr. 
Jimly Asshiddiqie in an interview quoted in the International Crisis Group’s report, “Defying the State.” 2012c. p. 18. 
20 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA 
levels and quality of education in patterns of recruitment to the civil service. Among the top officials, 
however, the economic development success of the New Order made possible much more extensive and 
lucrative corruption, almost all of it under the supervision of President Suharto or his most trusted 
lieutenants. The major, perhaps the only, partial exception to this pattern was the behavior of the professional 
economists or technocrats under the leadership of Prof. Widjojo Nitisastro, first at BAPPENAS (the 
National Planning Board), and later at the Ministry of Finance. 
These patterns continue to the present, with two significant differences. First, national-level “big fish” 
corruption is no longer centrally controlled for a single purpose. What the Australian economist Ross 
McLeod has labeled the economy-wide Suharto “franchise—a system of government designed to redistribute 
income and wealth from the weak to the strong while maintaining rapid growth,” has disintegrated, “its 
various component parts now working at cross-purposes rather than in mutually reinforcing fashion. The 
result has been a significant decline in the security of property rights and, in turn, the continued 
postponement of a sustained economic rebound.”63 Second, and related, the redistribution of government 
resources to nearly 500 districts and municipalities, and to a lesser extent 33 provinces, has meant 
multiplication many times over of the difficulty of exercising central supervision over bureaucratic 
recruitment, training and performance. 
The final factor affecting the quality and performance of the executive is the individual characteristics of 
political leaders, particularly presidents. As in the United States, the political system and culture in democratic 
Indonesia expect, indeed demand, strong presidential leadership. Among the post-Suharto presidents, 
Habibie, even though he was not the product of a democratic election, has been perhaps the most effective. 
His successes, to be sure achieved during a period of great crisis and therefore great opportunity, include 
holding a genuinely democratic national election in 1999; achieving decentralization of significant regulatory 
and financial authority to the districts and municipalities; and enabling the people of East Timor, now Timor-
Leste, to become independent, thus removing a major irritant to democratic stability in the rest of the 
country. 
Indonesia’s current President Yudhoyono has a well-earned reputation for not making decisions on important 
issues of the day, or for making them only at the last moment under great political duress. In this sense, he 
may be regarded as contributing personally to the weakness of the executive in the democratic period. He is, 
for example, widely regarded as the biggest obstacle to firmer government action toward intolerant Islamist 
groups such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front). In the economy, he has not acted 
decisively to deal with the continuing threat from the government’s fuel subsidy, which today threatens, as it 
has several times during his presidency, to overwhelm the state budget.  
More generally, President Yudhoyono has failed to develop, let alone fight for, a comprehensive 
infrastructural development plan—called for by many domestic and foreign economists—that would lay a 
more solid foundation for future growth and make the Indonesian economy more competitive with China. 
According to Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan (UKP4, Presidential Working 
Unit for Supervision and Management of Development) staff interviewed for this assessment, this 
government unit has not received the full presidential support necessary to effectively coordinate government 
development programs.  
On the other hand, it is hard to call the Yudhoyono government a failure. One early success, though 
midwifed by then Vice President Jusuf Kalla, was the 2005 peace agreement with GAM, ending decades of 
rebellion in Aceh. As president, Yudhoyono has overseen the conduct of one national election and hundreds 
of provincial and district/municipality elections. He has provided critical political support, including very 
recently, to the important corruption-fighting agency KPK. The national police force, under his ultimate 
control, has one of the world’s best records in fighting Islamist terrorism. On a smaller scale, he has also 
                                                     
63  Ross McLeod, “The Struggle to Regain Effective Government under Democracy in Indonesia,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, (41:3 
2005), p. 367. 
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played a role in new legislation establishing a social security system and ending discrimination against children 
born of one Indonesian and one non-Indonesian parent. 
Finally, the economic growth rate has improved steadily during his presidency and is now at 6.2 percent, 
second in the world to China. In addition to maintenance of sound macroeconomic policies (an inheritance 
from the best of the Suharto years), the sheer political stability provided by a two-term presidency (with each 
term five years) compared to the brief tenures of his two democratic predecessors probably accounts for 
some part of that economic success. President Yudhoyono cannot be reelected and no strong potential 
successor has yet emerged from the large group of likely candidates.  
3.2.2 THE SECURITY SERVICES 
The security forces, including the army, play only a minimal role in politics today, compared to their extensive 
previous involvement. The most important actors, as in most democracies, are the police, whose 
responsibilities include, in addition to normal policing, anti-terrorism investigations and arrests and the 
suppression of mass violence by police troops. Their successes in the latter two areas have been much greater 
than in the first.  
The New Order was a military regime dominated by the army. Suharto was an army major-general, in 
command of strategic troops in Jakarta, when on October 1, 1965, six fellow senior army officers were 
kidnapped and murdered—probably at the direction of the communist party. The regime that Suharto 
subsequently created, which ruled Indonesia for more than three decades, was based primarily on army 
support. In return for that support, army officers and institutions were given opportunities for corruption and 
exercise of personal power not afforded to the other services: the navy, air force and police, which had only 
limited political power. 
At the time Suharto came to power, the army was already the dominant service. It is important to emphasize 
that this was an institutional pattern of dominance, rather than domination by a specific group of officers, 
from the beginning to the end of the New Order. Suharto became president because he led the army, the 
most powerful institution in the political system, at a crucial moment in 1965. But he quickly established his 
own legitimacy and control as president over other institutions, which he maintained to the end.  
Most army officers during much of the New Order accepted this arrangement, but were never entirely happy 
with the political role that Suharto assigned to them, particularly in connection with the quinquennial national 
elections. That role included highly partisan support for the campaigns of Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional 
Groups), the state party, and intervention when called upon by the president in the internal affairs of the 
other two political parties allowed to exist at the time, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, Indonesian Democracy 
Party) and PPP. To a growing number of officers, this demand conflicted with their desire to build a modern, 
professional army capable of defending the country against foreign adversaries. By the time of Suharto’s fall, 
the army as an institution had already formulated a new civil-military relations doctrine removing itself from 
domestic affairs.64  
This doctrine, including explicit separation of the domestic security responsibilities of the police from the 
foreign defense responsibilities of the army and other armed forces, was included in the 1999-2002 
amendments to the Constitution. Today, of its former perquisites, the army retains only its so-called 
“territorial system,” a hierarchical command structure reaching from the center to the villages. Once a 
powerful instrument of surveillance, partisan intervention and lucrative source of extra income for lower-
ranking officers, the territorial system has become a hollow shell without influence of any kind at any level of 
                                                     
64  Since Sukarno came to power in the late 1950s, Dutch-owned enterprises were taken over and given to the military to run. Suharto 
continued the practice of placing individual officers in charge of state-owned enterprises, mostly retired military officers. Since the downfall 
of Suharto and during the reformasi era, no new state-owned enterprises were created to take care of the military. This is certainly not a 
controversial issue in Indonesian politics today. 
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government. The army is no longer involved in politics at the local level. Papua is of course an exception to 
this general pattern. (See the recent USAID internal report on Papua.) 
Since independence, Indonesia has had a single national police force, with police stations in all provincial 
capitals, municipalities and district towns, and sub-districts, the lowest level to which most national 
government agencies reach. By international measures, the size of the police force has always been relatively 
small compared to the national population. One reason for this has been the dominant role long played in 
domestic security provision by the army, as described above. Now that the police have been constitutionally 
assigned the predominant role in provision of domestic security, it is probable that their numbers will expand, 
although this is not yet government policy. 
In addition to normal policing, the police have also been given additional responsibilities with regard to 
fighting terrorism and suppressing collective domestic violence. These responsibilities have been assigned 
primarily to Special Detachment 88 (Detasemen Khusus 88, Densus 88), a counterterrorism unit within the 
Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil or Brimob) police troops. While Special Detachment 88 was created after the 
2002 Bali bombings, Brimob’s history dates to the early revolutionary period, when its duties included 
disarming Japanese soldiers at the end of World War II and protecting the new Indonesian president and vice 
president. Densus 88 is funded, equipped and trained by the U.S. and Australian governments. Its successes 
include arrest and/or killing of most of the prominent leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic Community), the 
principal Islamist terrorist organization in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto.65  
The police are widely regarded as one of the most corrupt agencies of the Indonesian government, especially 
in terms of “little fish” corruption involving the day-to-day interactions of the police with the public. 
Ordinary Indonesians report that they have to pay bribes to get drivers’ licenses, vehicle license plates, or to 
avoid fines when stopped by the traffic police. Many citizens also avoid reporting crimes to the police, whose 
own behavior is often seen as criminal. In a recent report, the highly regarded International Crisis Group 
wrote that “community policing…is not working; the police are too quick to shoot, usually with live 
ammunition; and little progress has been made toward police accountability.”66  
Reform of these abuses is a perennial topic of national discussion. The International Crisis Group argues that 
“In the absence of urgent reforms and mechanisms to address local grievances, public hostility [towards the 
police] is likely to grow.”67 Indeed, while the assessment team was in country, there was mass public outcry 
against an attempt by the police to sabotage an investigation of police officers for corruption being conducted 
by KPK, the anti-corruption commission. On this occasion, President Yudhoyono intervened on the side of 
KPK investigators, which hopefully means that the police officers involved will ultimately be prosecuted if 
there is sufficient evidence against them.68 Despite this sign of progress, no significant champions of reform 
exist within the police force itself.  
3.2.3 THE LEGISLATURE 
Since the fall of Suharto, the legislature has emerged as one of the most powerful political players in the 
country. This contrasts sharply with the Suharto years, when the legislature was a “rubber stamp” of the 
executive. Together with the empowerment of local governments, the strengthening of the legislature is one 
of the most important hallmarks of democratization. Aside from balancing the power of the executive, the 
                                                     
65 International Crisis Group, “How Indonesian Extremists Regroup,” Asia Report No. 228, (2012a) (available online at www.crisisgroup.org). 
66  International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: The Deadly Cost of Poor Policing,” Asia Report No. 218, (2012b) (available online at 
www.crisisgroup.org). 
67  Ibid. 
68  Tempo, “Dibalik Pidato Presiden [Behind the President’s Speech], (21 October 2012), p. 38. Tempo is Indonesia’s leading newsweekly, and 
this was the cover story for this issue. 
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legislature has played an important role—albeit limited—in opening up debates about public issues that 
would have been unheard of in the past.69  
Before the 2009 elections, as Hazelia Margaretha reports in a recent publication, people had high expectations 
for the performance of the legislature, for members elected to the House of Representatives were on average 
better educated and younger than in previous years.70 Yet today, the legislature (along with political parties) 
continues to be the most distrusted political institution in Indonesia.71 
Indonesia’s national legislature, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) or the People’s Consultative 
Assembly is composed of the 560-member House of Representatives (DPR) and the 132-member Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah (DPD, Regional Representatives’ Council). The DPR has the primary role of passing 
legislation. The DPD, representing the 33 provinces in Indonesia, was only established in 2004, with limited 
functions as a consultative body. The MPR (DPD and DPR in joint session) is only responsible for passing 
constitutional amendments and conducting presidential impeachments.72 
The 560 members of the DPR are elected from party lists in multi-seat districts through a system of 
proportional representation. The number of seats allocated to each district varies in proportion to the 
population.73 Until 2009, party lists were closed; citizens chose between different party lists, without any 
possibility of selecting—or rejecting—particular candidates from the list. The number of seats allocated to 
each party was calculated according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, and thus candidates 
ranked at the top of the list were more likely to secure a seat. The placement of candidates in the list was an 
internal party affair and a process hidden from public view.  
DPD members are elected directly at the provincial level. Each province elects four members to the DPD. 
Until 2009, candidates were elected as independent individuals; they could not be affiliated with any political 
party.  
Before the elections of 2009, the DPR passed a package of electoral reforms. One of the most significant was 
the opening of party lists in legislative elections. The electoral reform was passed by parliament in 2008, but it 
included a quota provision that allowed parties to maintain control of the election of candidates by requiring 
that elected candidates obtain at least 30 percent of the vote. As we discuss below, this provision was 
challenged by civil society and taken to the Constitutional Court, which ruled that the quota provision was 
unconstitutional.  
In the 2009 elections, citizens for the first time had the option to vote for individual candidates or for a 
party.74 The total number of seats allocated to each party is calculated by a system of proportional 
representation. Candidates with the highest number of votes obtain a seat in DPR, regardless of their ranking 
within the party list. The objective behind this reform was to increase transparency and promote greater 
accountability of parties by strengthening the links between candidates and their constituencies. As we discuss 
below, the results of these reforms have been limited.  
                                                     
69  For example, parliament opened the investigation after the mud-flow disaster in Sidoarjo in East Java. This disaster was associated with the 
drilling activities of Lapindo, a company owned by Aburizal Bakrie. Many of the details of the case came through DPR investigations. See 
Stephen Sherlock, “The Parliament in Indonesia’s Decade of Democracy: People’s Forum or Chamber of Cronies?,” in Edward Aspinall and 
Marcus Mietzner, eds. Problems of Democratization in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). p. 13. 
70  Hazelia Margaretha, “Indonesia’s National Parliament: Assessing the DPR’s performance.” (March, 17, 2011). In 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/03/17/indonesias-national-parliament-assessing-the-dprs-performance/. 
71  Results obtained by LSI, which conducted its most recent public opinion survey in 2011. 
72 Bruce Vaughn, “Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Interests.” (Congressional Research Service, January 31, 2011). 
73  Sherlock, 2010,  p. 3.  
74  According to the USAID electoral assessment referred to above, the closeness of this reform to the legislative elections of 2009 in fact 
generated a lot of confusion both among the electorate and electoral officials. This in large part explains many of the electoral problems 
encountered by electoral authorities. USAID, 2012b, p. 2. 
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The electoral reforms of 2009 also allowed political parties to nominate candidates for the DPD. As a result, 
today’s DPD membership is mixed; some members are independent and others are affiliated with political 
parties. According to one DPD member, the quality of representation decreased after parties were allowed to 
participate in DPD elections. Before 2009, candidates elected to DPD were independent; they were neutral. 
They effectively represented the province. Now, party members who have seats in DPD represent their 
parties, not their provinces.75 In April 2008, the parliament established a quota of 30 percent for women’s 
participation as candidates and board members in all political parties. According to a study on the impact of 
this quota on women’s representation, the 2009 legislative elections increased female representation by 64 
percent. The percentage of women’s representation in DPR increased to 18 percent, surpassing the level of 
many of the world’s Asian and Muslim majority electoral democracies.76 Yet, as this study argues, the increase 
in women’s representation is not only due to the quota system. In the author’s words, “If the parties had 
simply complied with the law 28 female legislators would have been elected, yet 102 were actually elected in 
2009.”77 The reason, she argues, is that women actually were attractive as leaders, and citizens voted for them 
in larger numbers than expected.78 At the regional and local levels, however, many challenges still remain, for 
women are not being offered the same opportunities as at the national level. 
Although it is too early to assess the real impact of the 2009 electoral reforms, it is already evident that the 
open list system did not necessarily increase the accountability of DPR members toward their constituencies. 
Even when directly elected, DPR members have not increased their ties to their constituencies nor have they 
made greater efforts to establish constituent offices at the district level. In fact, a recent survey conducted by 
the USAID-funded “Program Representasi” revealed that only an extremely low percentage of citizens can 
actually identify their MPs. Moreover, as the Freedom House report argues, the open list system actually 
increased the cost of political campaigns,79 a factor that empowered both the individual candidates and their 
sponsors, vis-à-vis their own parties. Today, parties have fewer mechanisms to control the selection of their 
candidates and to discipline them once they are elected.  
The main problem, of course, is not the method of electing legislators, but the system of political party 
finance. MPs are accountable first and foremost to those who fund their campaigns, not to the citizens who 
elect them. Indeed, many people interviewed for this assessment believe that the first link in the corrupt chain 
is political party finance. Candidates are responsible for funding their campaigns with private resources and 
no limits exist on campaign expenditures. With few controls on private funding sources, candidates become 
heavily attached to those who fund them and once in power, reward them substantially. Government office 
becomes a mechanism to reward special interests and promote personal business deals. There needs to be 
mechanisms of transparency and accountability for elected officials to their constituents regarding the link 
between campaign promises and actual subsequent strategic planning and budgeting. 
For these reasons, obtaining a seat in the DPR is not necessarily considered prestigious, and most MPs do not 
have ambitions to stay in the legislature for long periods and build legislative careers. For the most part, 
legislators are there to serve particular interests and maybe escalate on the political ladder to more prestigious 
(or profitable) political positions. This is why some candidates are said to pay exorbitant amounts of money 
to get a party’s nomination.  
                                                     
75  DPD leaders have introduced a constitutional reform proposal to increase their institution’s power and authority, which would thereby 
give regions more power vis-à-vis the central state, and balance the authority of the DPR. This is not considered likely to be adopted, 
however. 
76  Sarah Shair-Rosenfeld, “The alternative incumbency effect: Electing women legislators in Indonesia.” Electoral Studies, 31, (2012).  
77  Ibid, p. 576.  
78  “Of the 102 women who won seats, 6 more than 85 percent were listed by their parties in positions #1 and 2, above the placement 
mandate requirement. Because voters tended to choose in relative list order, despite the ability to select any candidate from any party list 
in their district, the overwhelming majority of seats went to candidates listed in the top two positions on their list.” Ibid, p. 580. 
79  Freedom House, 2012. 
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A good indicator of the absence of a parliamentary career is the high rate of turnover in parliamentary 
elections, where more than 70 percent of MPs are not reelected. Citizens tend to vote MPs out because they 
consider MPs performed poorly during their term and because, in general, MPs maintain weak relationships 
with their constituencies. Citizens distrust MPs and believe they are highly corrupt. MPs also face fierce 
competition inside and outside their parties. As a result, every five years, most of DPR is filled with new and 
inexperienced candidates.  
Whether or not this high turnover trend in further elections will decrease remains to be seen. What is clear is 
that changing the electoral law is not enough; without a substantial change in the way parties and candidates 
are funded, the incentives for greater accountability and representation of parliament remain limited. 
The problem of political accountability also stems from flaws in the legislative branch’s institutional design. 
The DPD, the upper chamber which should function as a senate, has no power. It only serves as a 
consultative body, but it does not check and balance the power of DPR. DPR’s secretary general, on the 
other hand, is nominated by the executive. This is an institutional legacy from the Suharto years, when the 
legislative branch was subordinate to the president. While this subordination has ended, the “intrusion” of the 
executive in the legislative branch is problematic, for the secretary general still has power over the 
administrative affairs of parliament. Moreover, the Constitution does not explicitly recognize “representation” 
as one of the core functions of the legislative branch. The Constitution only mentions oversight of the 
executive, law making and passing the budget as the legislative’s core functions. Finally, parliamentary 
procedures establish that decisions are reached by consensus, not by majority vote. Legislators do not cast 
their votes individually and citizens therefore cannot track the records of individual legislators. Although 
some committees have begun to invite public hearings; for the most part, committees deliberate in closed 
meetings which are not recorded.80 
Political parties and legislatures are typically distrusted all over the world. The difference in Indonesia, 
however, is that parties and MPs have fewer incentives to become more accountable to their constituencies 
and become more responsive to their needs.  
An additional problem is the extremely high number of political parties with seats in the DPR, not to mention 
those that registered but failed to obtain a seat. Compared to the Suharto years, the high number of parties 
might seem like a sign of healthy competition, but in fact, such an elevated number of parties is quite 
dysfunctional for a good system of political representation. With the partial exception of the Islamist parties, 
political parties in Indonesia do not have strong programmatic and/or ideological positions. They are 
electoral machines (some of them not well organized) to elect candidates. Parties do not effectively articulate 
and aggregate interests; citizens cannot identify with a political party because they do not have strong 
principles on public issues. Moreover, parties rely on clientelistic and patronage networks to mobilize citizens 
during elections. After the election is over, the ties to the constituencies wane. Finally, with so many parties, 
negotiation and policy deliberation in DPR becomes cumbersome, and often, as we heard in several 
interviews, votes in parliament are given in exchange for bribes.81 Although some legislative committees have 
taken a more proactive role in inviting the public and releasing information on their deliberations, for the 
most part, parliamentarian debate and deliberation is conducted outside the public view. 
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81  According to the Freedom House Report, “a parliamentary internal performance-enhancement team concluded in a 2010 report that 
corruption was rampant during the budget process.” See “Indonesian Member of Parliament Speaks Out Against Corruption,” United 
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In April 2012, parliament passed the Legislative Election Law that raised the election threshold to 3.5 percent 
compared to 2.5 percent in the 2009 law. This new threshold is a move in the right direction, although some 
doubt whether it is high enough to effectively reduce the number of parties with seats in the DPR.82  
The high level of turnover and absence of a legislative career have negative effects on the professionalization 
of parliament. Parliament does not have a good research unit to inform policymaking. This is particularly 
problematic with regard to the budget; there is not a well-staffed unit within parliament in charge of budget 
analysis. The size and quality of staff is limited, and there are no professional drafting teams. While every 
draft bill needs to be backed by an academic paper, these papers tend to be too formal, and MPs generally do 
not consult them.  
At the local and provincial levels, problems including lack of accountability, weak professionalization and 
corruption are predominant, and women are still largely unrepresented. While parties are obliged to nominate 
at least 30 percent female candidates, they usually place them at the bottom of the list, a position that reduces 
their chances to get elected.83  
3.2.4 THE JUDICIARY AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 
The Indonesian Constitution follows the Western model which recognizes the judiciary as a separate and 
equal branch of government. Since the transition to democracy, political leaders have substantially amended 
the 1945 constitution four times between 1999 and 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Constitution, the 
Indonesian judicial system comprises several types of courts. Indonesia has a civil law system, based on the 
codes inherited from the Dutch. 
The Mahkamah Agung, the Supreme Court, has authority over the high courts and lower courts in the country. 
A reform in 2004 gave the Supreme Court control over the judiciary’s administration, personnel and finance. 
The reform also instituted the “one roof” system which brought the general, religious, military and 
administrative courts under the Supreme Court’s administrative authority. It also controls and supervises 
special courts, which have been more recently created, such as the Commercial Court, Human Rights Court, 
Corruption Court, Children’s Court, Fishery Court and Industrial Relations Court.84 In 2003, the parliament 
established the Constitutional Court as a separate institution, independent from the Supreme Court. The 
Constitutional Court is responsible for hearing matters directly related to the interpretation of the 
Constitution and laws created by the DPR. For example, it has been involved in disputes among different 
government institutions, and recently, the resolution of electoral disputes. 
In theory, the judiciary is independent, both institutionally and functionally. The judicial body is supposed to 
be free from intervention from other parties outside the judicial power and judges are supposed to make 
rulings based on facts and legal basis, and not to be influenced and/or pressured by external interests. In 
practice, however, the judiciary is often not independent; financially, it is strictly regulated by the Ministry of 
Finance, so it does not have budgetary independence. Functionally, the judiciary is also not considered to be 
independent from external influences; the nomination of Supreme Court judges is heavily politicized and the 
practice of constantly moving judges around the country militates against their specialization and discourages 
lawyers from joining the public sector in the first place. Judges in general are regarded as corrupt by many 
citizens.  
The Supreme Court. There are 50 justices on the Supreme Court, who are elected by the DPR from a list of 
candidates submitted by the Judicial Commission. The chief justice of the Supreme Court is elected internally 
by the Supreme Court judges. The problem with the nomination process is that the DPR is not presented 
                                                     
82  See Freedom House. 2012. 
83  While in principle the position in the list is now irrelevant, for the candidate who wins the most votes gets elected; however, when 
candidates are posted at the bottom of the list, citizens tend not to vote for them. 
84  Supreme Court of Indonesia. “Blueprint for Justice Reform, 2010-2035.” p. 4. 
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with one candidate who has to be vetted and then accepted or rejected. Rather, the Judicial Commission 
presents several candidates to the DPR. The selection mechanism then becomes a matter of negotiation 
between the different political parties represented in the DPR. According to a prominent lawyer interviewed 
for this assessment, the result is that legislators typically select the worst, not the best, candidate. That is, they 
select the candidates they think will be most likely to defend special interests in the courts. The process of 
selection, like most legislative decision making, is not open to the public. Citizens have no real mechanism to 
scrutinize the candidates’ record and voice concerns about candidates being nominated. 
The Supreme Court suffers from extreme case overload, poor administration and a reputation for corruption. 
According to the Supreme Court, the court received 7,468 cases in 2005 and this number increased to 11,338 
in 2008. These cases range from very simple to extremely complex.85 The problem is that almost all the cases 
(80 percent) reviewed by appeals courts are brought to the Supreme Court. Managing this high number of 
cases becomes even more problematic because the Supreme Court does not have a chamber system, where 
cases are reviewed by specialized justices. The result is that Supreme Court justices are asked to review all 
types of cases without necessarily having the expertise required for particular cases. This not only generates 
backlog but also reduces the quality and consistency of rulings. 
The Supreme Court is responsible for administering the country’s court system, which comprises more than 
1,000 separate court units at the provincial and district/municipal levels. According to the 2009 Assessment, 
the court has resisted attempts to increase the transparency and accountability of the court’s financial 
transactions. For example, “the State Audit Board sought to audit the funds obtained from fees collected 
from plaintiffs, but was not permitted to do so…[there is no accountability for these off-budget funds].”86 
Since 2010, the Supreme Court has made some progress in reducing its backlog through the adoption of 
improved case management systems. The court has also made progress in the way it communicates with the 
public and provides information about its activities. But, as we explain below, these improvements are not 
sufficient and may not be the most necessary ones to address the core problems of lack of judicial 
independence.  
Lower courts do not suffer from the same problem of case overload as the Supreme Court, but courts in 
Jakarta receive disproportionately more cases than courts in other provinces.87 The main problem in the lower 
courts is that judges have weak technical capacities to perform their functions; court fees are sometimes too 
high for poor people; and overall, judges are highly distrusted and regarded as corrupt by the general public.88  
Lower court judges are selected by the Judicial Commission, an institution established in 2005. Officials at 
the Judicial Commission are appointed by the executive and DPR. The commission’s main responsibilities are 
to select judges for the lower courts and supervise them. In 2009, the Judicial Commission formulated a Code 
of Ethics for judges, a document that was written in consultation with the Supreme Court and Ikatan Hakim 
Indonesia (IKAHI), the judges’ association.  
The main problem with the selection of judges for lower courts is that the Judicial Commission has 
difficulties in attracting well-qualified lawyers to apply for the position of judge. Since the justice system in 
general is distrusted, and judges in particular are believed to be dishonest, not many people want to become 
judges. Further, judges are constantly moved around the country, a factor that discourages lawyers to join the 
public sector. One individual interviewed claimed those who apply for the job “tend to come from the worst 
law schools in the country.” As a consequence, the capacity of judges is weak. Judges come from law schools 
that teach them to memorize, but they are not typically good at legal reasoning. Generalized standards for 
                                                     
85  Supreme Court of Indonesia,  p. 8. 
86  USAID, 2009, p. 10. 
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certification of lawyers do not exist, a matter that makes selection of judges even more difficult. Finally, and 
to complicate matters, the Judicial Commission, which is in charge of supervising and disciplining judges, has 
limited powers to sanction judges. In 2008, for example, the Judicial Commission received 1,556 reports of 
misconduct of judges. The commission investigated 212 cases and referred 27 cases to the Supreme Court. 
But the Supreme Court did not take action on any of these cases.89 More recently, the Supreme Court has 
been trying to limit the committee’s oversight functions even more.  
Judges’ perceived lack of integrity is perhaps one of the most important reasons for the generalized sense that 
the justice system is corrupt. According to Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), one of the most respected 
anti-corruption organizations in the country, career judges acquit in around 50 percent of corruption cases.90 
Officials at the Supreme Court recognize the low standing of the judiciary in citizens’ perceptions. According 
to the new Blueprint for Justice Reform (2010-2035), the Supreme Court is committed to creating a court 
system of “excellence” that imparts justice independently, effectively and fairly. It is also committed to the 
values of integrity, honesty, transparency and accountability. The blueprint contemplates reforms in case 
management, organizational structure, human resources, asset management, information technology and 
internal and external controls.91 To the extent that the reforms are effectively implemented, the court may 
improve its performance and citizens might increase their trust in the justice system. 
The problems, however, are manifold and complex. The blueprint, for example, does not discuss the method 
of selection of Supreme Court justices—a process that many allege is the central weakness of the system. 
Moreover, this blueprint was based on an earlier “Blueprint for Reform 2003.” Yet, as the document 
recognizes, “only 30 percent of the activities and programs planned in the earlier blueprint were actually 
implemented.”92 This new blueprint seems unlikely to enjoy better prospects of implementation. According 
to most interviewees for this assessment, there are few champions of reform in the Supreme Court. Having a 
document that acknowledges the weakness of the judiciary and lays out a plan for improvement is good, but 
if the political will to implement the plan is lacking, the risk of inaction vis-à-vis reform is high.  
The Attorney General’s Office is one of the most distrusted institutions in Indonesia. The AGO is 
responsible for bringing civil and criminal cases to the courts on behalf of the state. According to a recent 
opinion poll conducted by LSI in 2011, the AGO is regarded as the third most corrupt institution in the 
country, after political parties and the DPR.93 A combination of incompetence, pervasive corruption and what 
Indonesians call the bureaucratic “mindset” inherited from the authoritarian period, contribute to the 
negative perception. Decisions on whether or not to investigate and prosecute cases are allegedly influenced 
by money. One of the consequences is that the AGO ends up investigating and prosecuting petty crimes, 
while the big criminals are rarely brought to justice.  
The AGO suffers from similar recruitment problems as those of the courts; good and honest lawyers do not 
want to become prosecutors because the system is largely discredited. Moreover, according to one 
interviewee, “prosecutors and investigators are paid dismal salaries,” not sufficient to motivate them or 
incentivize excellence. While this official openly challenged the proposition that corruption is an endemic 
problem in the AGO, he recognized that the “Attorney General’s Office has a bad reputation and is generally 
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negatively perceived by most citizens.” Yet, according to him, this problem was more related to a poor 
communications and public relations policy than to lack of integrity of its personnel.  
Aside from the question of integrity, the AGO faces many other difficult challenges. Any institution with a 
staff of more than 22,000 public officials is difficult to reform, particularly when the structure of incentives 
still militates against change: low salaries, absence of performance standards, weak internal controls and few 
rewards for efficiency and/or integrity. Furthermore, in Indonesia, the AGO and police do not work in close 
coordination. Cases are said to go back and forth from one institution to the other, a process that inevitably 
delays prosecutions, often intentionally.  
The Constitutional Court, established in 2003, is one of the institutions with some credibility in Indonesia. 
This court consists of nine judges; three are nominated by DPR, three by the executive and three by the 
Supreme Court. The Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is to conduct judicial review, thus assuring that the 
majority rule in parliament does not violate the Constitution. The court also resolves disputes among 
different government institutions, and recently, was given the responsibility to resolve electoral disputes.  
The Constitutional Court is the first and final instance for matters under its jurisdiction. Citizens can bring 
cases directly to the Constitutional Court, and its rulings are binding; there is no possibility of appeal. The 
court has played a critical role in ensuring commitment to constitutional democracy and is one of the key 
institutions needed for guaranteeing the rule of law.  
For example, in 2009, the Constitutional Court declared a provision of the 2008 electoral law 
unconstitutional, opening a path for the implementation of an open-list proportional representation system in 
the 2009 parliamentary elections. That case was brought by a coalition of citizen groups that objected to a 
provision in the law that established a quota of 30 percent of the vote for candidates to be eligible for a seat 
in parliament. This was an attempt by the parties to control the candidate selection process, for if fewer 
candidates passed the threshold of 30 percent in a particular district, the party could fill the seats allocated to 
that party from the party list. The Constitutional Court struck down the 30 percent requirement, arguing that 
this quota was inconsistent with the open-list proportional representation system established in the new 
electoral law.94 Similarly, in 2012, the Constitutional Court made an important ruling that opened the way for 
a more vigorous KPK oversight of regional governments.  
The Constitutional Court has gained legitimacy and credibility among the public and its focus on transparency 
and ethics can serve as a model for other courts in the country. Yet some challenges remain. For all its 
legitimacy, some court decisions are not enforced by the appropriate authorities. For example, in July 2010, 
the Constitutional Court disqualified the winner of the election for district head in West Kotawaringin 
district, Central Kalimantan province, on vote-buying allegations, ruling that the defeated incumbent should 
get a second term. The local district council, however, defied the ruling and refused to comply with the 
court’s decision. As the International Crisis Group argues, “more than two years later, the bupati (district 
head) who was awarded the victory by the court still cannot govern because of local resistance…. The 
problem is that a clear policy is missing on how the rulings should be enforced or an obvious penalty for 
failing to comply.”95 The problem is also that in this and in similar cases, the president has refused to take a 
more assertive position, declining to use his powers to enforce court decisions.96 Clearly, without a strong 
commitment at the top to guarantee the rule of law, the Constitutional Court, for all its merits, is limited. 
The KPK, or the Corruption Eradication Commission, was established in 2003 with a mandate and strong 
powers to investigate and prosecute corruption cases and monitor the behavior of public officials throughout 
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the Indonesian state.97 While the KPK’s vision is too ambitious, namely, eradicating corruption,98 the 
commission has been effective in prosecuting high-level corruption cases, sometimes involving top 
government officials linked to the president. Like many of the new agencies created in Indonesia, KPK’s 
mandate duplicates the responsibilities of the police and the AGO, a condition that generates turf battles 
between these entities, especially since the latter are also besieged by corrupt practices.  
The KPK is officially responsible for five different tasks: 1) coordinating law enforcement agencies, 2) 
supervising the work of other agencies in charge of combatting corruption, 3) investigating and prosecuting 
cases of corruption, 4) preventing corruption through public education campaigns, and 5) monitoring how 
the government is advancing in controlling corruption.99 By far their most prominent task is in the field of 
investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. Coordination, supervision of other agencies and 
monitoring of the progress of government institutions has proven to be difficult, especially considering that 
most of the institutions the KPK is supposed to coordinate, supervise and monitor resist KPK’s 
investigations. On the prevention front, however, most efforts have focused on civic education campaigns. 
Although an evaluation of the impact of these campaigns has not been conducted, the effectiveness of these 
campaigns is questionable because as argued before in this report, corruption is driven mostly by incentives, 
rather than by lack of awareness or insufficient education about the illegal or immoral nature of corruption. 
The KPK receives complaints and conducts its own investigations. With only five commissioners (selected by 
a commission of representatives of different government offices but closely monitored by different anti-
corruption organizations)100 and a limited budget (which needs to be approved every year by the DPR), the 
KPK needs to select its cases carefully.101 Although the KPK has plans to open branches in five regions, until 
now, all its operations are based in Jakarta.102 The KPK’s prosecutors and investigators are seconded from the 
police and from the AGO through a competitive process.103  
According to one of KPK’s commissioners, the commission has a stellar record of a 100 percent conviction 
rate in cases they decide to prosecute. One of these cases involved Aulia Pohan, a member of President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono’s extended family.104 The KPK has also convicted 30 MPs and many other high-level 
officials.105  
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executive involved in corruption in the public sector. 
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The willingness and determination of the KPK to prosecute high-profile cases has earned this institution 
unparalleled legitimacy and credibility among the general public. A person interviewed for this assessment 
referred to the KPK as “the Indonesian people’s prince,” alluding to the popularity of this institution and the 
readiness of civil society to defend it as it has come increasingly under attack from powerful individuals 
within the power structure who feel threatened—most notably in the DPR, police, AGO and President’s 
Office.  
In 2009, the KPK’s investigation and prosecution of a high-level police official accused of bribery set off a 
fight between the KPK and police, popularly known as the fight between a “gecko and a crocodile.” In 
retaliation against the KPK, the police arrested two senior KPK officials on false charges. This set off a 
spontaneous citizen reaction—the geckos—who used social media to mobilize in support of the KPK. 
According to the Ash Center Report, “more than a million users of the social networking site Facebook 
joined an on-line protest group.”106 The conflict was finally resolved when the charges against the KPK were 
dropped and several high-ranking police officials and prosecutors were forced to resign. 
On October 2012, the second chapter of this episode was relived again, when the KPK investigated a high-
level police official in a bribery case involving the procurement of driver simulator machines. The police 
wanted to obstruct this investigation at all costs, alleging that they were responsible for investigating this case. 
After a strong popular mobilization on Twitter and Facebook in support of the KPK, the president finally 
broke the impasse in favor of the KPK, which was allowed to proceed with the investigation. But many 
people interviewed for this assessment believed that while the KPK won this battle, it has not really won the 
war against the police. The latter would require the president’s willingness to remove the head of the national 
police, a move he is still not willing to take.  
Without a doubt, the KPK has played a critical role in strengthening the rule of law in Indonesia. The ability 
of a single institution to go against the political establishment, however, is limited. For one thing, the KPK 
has limited resources and personnel, and its budget is constantly contested in the DPR. More importantly, 
KPK’s punitive approach, while important, is not sufficient to alter the structure of incentives that motivate 
corruption in the first place.  
3.2.5 LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
No aspect of the Indonesian political system has been transformed more thoroughly during the democratic 
transition than local government, especially at the district (kabupaten) and municipality (kota) levels. For the 
foreseeable future, districts and municipalities will be among the most important, if not the most important, 
sites of democratic decision making and governmental provision of public services. The role of provinces 
(provinsi), the intermediate level between districts and municipalities and the central government, has been 
much smaller but may become more prominent in the near future if parliament and the president pass new 
laws currently under consideration regulating regional government.107  
At the same time, government and politics at the local level suffer from all of the deficiencies described in 
other sections of this assessment. Like their counterparts in Jakarta, local bureaucracies are overstaffed and 
underqualified, corruption is alleged to be rampant, legislators are unresponsive to their constituents and 
political parties and CSOs are weak to nonexistent. On average, the situation is perhaps worse in the 
provinces than at the center and still worse in the districts and municipalities, not to mention the 
administrative levels further down.  
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Nonetheless, there are obvious differences in quality of governmental performance, with some provinces, 
districts and municipalities performing at a relatively high level. Some of this difference is undoubtedly 
attributable to variations in the socioeconomic level of the region, as the assessment team witnessed in 
visiting Surabaya, the dynamic capital of prosperous East Java, and Kupang, the capital of West Timor, one 
of Indonesia’s poorest provinces. But some of it is probably due to effective local leadership, as has been 
captured in a fine recent article by Christian von Luebke.108  
The initial statutes relevant to decentralization are Laws No. 22/1999 and 25/1999, proposed by transitional 
President Habibie, which devolved massive legislative and executive authority to the districts and 
municipalities. Moreover, after the constitutional reforms of 1999-2002, only foreign policy, defense 
(including both the military and the police), monetary policy, the administration of religious affairs and the 
rule of law (prosecutors and courts) remain the exclusive authority of the central government. Some of the 
most important challenges at the local level are in the areas of education (all public schools are now under the 
control of district and municipality governments), health care (an important focus is the hundreds of 
puskesmas, public health centers, created but inadequately staffed, funded, and supplied with medicines by the 
Suharto government), reform of local tax systems (to avoid excessive regulatory burdens on local businesses), 
and improving the quality of recruitment and training of local civil servants. Executive capacity building 
across the several substantive areas mentioned above is an important need, as is attention to the capacity of 
local legislators to participate in lawmaking and oversight, and to the role of CSOs as watchdogs to increase 
transparency of the policy process.  
The original decentralization statutes were subsequently modified by Laws No. 32/2004 and 33/2004, passed 
during Megawati Sukarnoputri’s presidency. Under these laws, 26 percent of the state budget is allotted in the 
form of block grants (Dana Alokasi Umum) to the provinces, districts and municipalities. Governmental 
Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 55/2005 further specifies that 90 percent of that 26 percent is allocated 
to the districts and municipalities, while only 10 percent is spent by provincial governments. 
Beginning in 1999, democratic legislatures at the district and municipality levels have been elected on three 
occasions—1999, 2004 and 2009—in conjunction with the national election for parliament, a pattern begun 
in the first democratic elections in 1955. In addition, governors, district heads and mayors have been directly 
elected twice in all 33 provinces and in nearly 500 districts and municipalities.  
Historically, Indonesians are familiar with and supportive of the district and municipality as important sites of 
democratic government. District, municipality and provincial legislatures were first elected throughout the 
country in 1955, coterminous with the one national election for parliament during Indonesia’s first 
democratic period (1949-1959). The district and municipality heads were indirectly elected by the legislatures. 
Below the district are purely administrative sub-districts (kecamatan). Below the sub-districts are several lower-
level units, some of whose heads are elected, some appointed. 
During Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998), elections were held six times, at roughly five-year intervals, 
between 1971 and 1997. As in 1955, legislative elections were held simultaneously for the national parliament 
and provincial, district and municipality legislatures. But these elections were not democratic; rather they were 
designed to demonstrate the government’s legitimacy to international audiences and potential domestic 
opponents. In all but the first of these elections, three parties were allowed to contest for legislative seats: the 
government’s own Golkar (Functional Groups), PDI (Indonesian Democracy Party) and PPP (United 
Development Party).  
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All New Order elections were heavily managed by the government to ensure that Golkar won at least 60 
percent of the vote, with the remaining 40 percent divided between PDI and PPP.109 Most Indonesians 
believe that the New Order elections were not democratic. Nonetheless, the New Order created a formal 
framework, with regular elections and party competition that constituted a simulacrum of democracy easily 
converted after 1998 to the genuine article, at both the national and local levels. To most citizens, the district 
and municipality were already understood to be the most important level of government geographically 
closest to them. They were also accustomed to the idea of a division between a legislative branch making laws 
and an executive branch both implementing laws and providing leadership in policy formulation. After 
decades of district and municipality executives being indirectly elected by the legislatures (actually a mask 
during the New Order for MOHA appointment behind the scenes) they were also eager to directly elect their 
bupati (district head) or walikota (mayor).  
Most Indonesians also appear to have eagerly accepted the devolution of the lion’s share of authority to the 
districts and municipalities rather than to the provinces, whose governments are less accessible to ordinary 
citizens. Throughout the New Order, citizens had grown increasingly restive, even hostile, toward the 
extreme centralization of the government. Central government officials were aware of this opposition and 
debated possible changes starting in the late 1980s. The Habibie government was the first to act, however, 
almost certainly because the new president was looking for popular support before the first post-New Order 
democratic election, held in 1999.  
Though denied by Habibie, most observers believe that the decision to decentralize to the districts and 
municipalities instead of the provinces was designed to minimize the possibility of secessionism. Though 
secessionist movements have not been a significant problem since the 1950s, except in Aceh and Papua, such 
movements are at least imaginable at the provincial level. There is virtually no possibility, however, of districts 
and municipalities attempting to secede from the Indonesian republic. 
Decentralization, at both the provincial and district/municipality levels, appears to be very popular today, 
because it does offer the prospect of government that is both accountable and close to the people. Local 
officials, journalists, party politicians, university intellectuals and NGO activists interviewed by the assessment 
team praised the new arrangements. Their support was the more convincing because most had directly 
experienced the New Order and could make direct comparisons with that highly centralized, and in their 
view, much less responsive government. In Probolinggo, for example, members of the assessment team 
witnessed a local government radio show, to which citizens call in complaints and the mayor’s office keeps a 
record of official responses and resolutions to the problems raised. According to a staff member, the program 
was started early in the mayor’s first term as part of his reelection campaign.  
In September, just before the assessment team began its work, the benefits of decentralization were also 
visible in the Jakarta gubernatorial election. Combining strong support from the middle class with appeals to 
the working class, challengers Joko Widodo and his running mate, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, soundly defeated 
a well-financed, establishment-supported incumbent. Joko Widodo, popularly called Jokowi, is a successful 
businessman and was the highly regarded mayor of the small city of Surakarta in Central Java before running 
for governor of Jakarta. He promised a hands-on government to improve public services and tackle some of 
Jakarta’s most pressing public transportation and infrastructure problems. Equally remarkable, running mate 
Basuki (called Ahok) is a Sino-Indonesian Christian in a heavily Muslim city.110  
                                                     
109  However, except in more remote regions outside Java, ballot boxes were rarely stuffed. Instead, pressure was applied more subtly and 
behind the scenes, for example, by territorial army commanders assigning Golkar vote quotas to village and hamlet officials in their area. If 
quotas were not met, local officials might be removed; roads, schools, markets and health centers not built; and so on. Local PDI and PPP, 
but not Golkar, leaders and candidates were also restricted in their campaigning and frequently removed from office if they displeased the 
territorial commander. 
110  Tempo, 30 September 2012, cover story. 
34 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA 
Another sign of decentralization’s popularity is the annual competition, now in its eleventh year, conducted 
by JPIP, whose current board members were interviewed in Surabaya by the assessment team. District and 
municipality officials in East Java province are awarded prizes for performance in such areas as provision of 
public services, accountability, clean government and environmental sustainability.111 The Jawa Pos is East 
Java’s largest circulation newspaper. Shortly after decentralization began, its editors, including then Editor-in-
Chief Dahlan Iskan (now a minister in President Yudhoyono’s cabinet), formed JPIP—as the current board 
told us—with an eye both to increasing circulation of the Jawa Pos and to performing a public service. JPIP’s 
motto, prominently displayed on its website, is “tiada kemajuan tanpa kompetisi [no progress without 
competition].” In Makassar, South Sulawesi, the daily Fajar (Dawn), part of the Jawa Pos group of newspapers, 
is planning a similar competition in that province.  
3.2.6 POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS 
After the transition to democracy, Indonesia reverted to a multi-party system. In 1955, when Indonesia held 
parliamentary elections, there were four major parties, with 16-22 percent of the vote each, and an additional 
24 parties with representation in parliament. During most of the Suharto New Order era, there were only 
three parties permitted to contest elections: Golkar, which is today’s Partai Golkar; PDI, the precursor to 
today’s PDIP (Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle); and PPP, still in existence.  
One of President Habibie’s first reforms in 1998 was to open the gates to the creation of new parties. In 
1999, 48 parties contested and 21 won enough votes to obtain seats in parliament; in 2004, there were 16 
parties in parliament, while in the current 2009-2014 parliament, where a 2.5 percent parliamentary threshold 
has been imposed, nine parties are represented. 
Among the current nine parties, most are internally weak, with poorly developed organizational structures and 
little accountability of the leadership to the membership or the voters. They are mostly non-ideological, with 
the exception of the split between secular and Islamist parties. The Democrat Party (PD), PDIP, Hanura 
(Hati Nurani Rakyat, People’s Conscience) and Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Greater Indonesia 
Movement) are secular parties dependent on strong individual leaders. The National Mandate Party (PAN) 
and People’s Awakening Party (PKB) are built on Indonesia’s two largest Muslim social and educational 
organizations—Muhammadiyah (Followers of Muhammad) and Nahdlatul Ulama (the Awakening of the 
Ulama), respectively—but define themselves as secular parties. Of the two Islamist parties, the Muslim 
Brothers-influenced Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) is the strongest organizationally, while the PPP is today a 
patron-client party. Partai Golkar, having inherited an elaborate structure and local leadership from the 
Suharto days, is also relatively strong organizationally. 
A recently conducted electoral assessment concluded that “lack of political will on the part of the parties to 
reform themselves is one of the major factors reducing the effectiveness of technical assistance to parties.”112 
This assessment team was explicitly instructed by USAID not to conduct further analysis of political parties 
and/or electoral institutions. Yet, we did include the electoral assessments’ recommendations in the suggested 
results framework discussed in the final section.  
3.2.7 CIVIL SOCIETY 
Civil society refers to “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to 
advance common interests.”113 CSOs vary extensively depending on many dimensions such as size, 
                                                     
111  See JPIP’s website: www.jpip.or.id. 
112  See USAID, 2012b, p. 20. 
113  This definition is used by CIVICUS, an international alliance of members and partners of CSOs and networks at the local, national, regional 
and international levels. CIVICUS includes in this definition of civil society the following: civil society networks and organizations, trade 
unions, faith-based organizations and networks, professional associations, NGO capacity development organizations, philanthropic 
foundations and CBOs. Business organizations and media outlets are excluded from this definition and they have a separate section in this 
report. For more information, see https://www.civicus.org/. 
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membership base, mission and objectives; target population or the community it seeks to serve or represent, 
or sources of funding, just to name a few. A recent analysis of civil society organizations in Indonesia focuses 
mostly on NGOs, and so does this report.114 Subsets of NGOs considered in this report include CSOs, the 
main mission of which is democracy and rights advocacy and CBOs, which operate at the grassroots level. 
Indonesia has a dense network of NGOs, both at the local and national levels. With the downfall of Suharto, 
civil society has played an ever-increasing role in political and social affairs. Indeed, NGOs—particularly 
student movements and faith-based organizations—were critical in organizing the mobilization that finally 
forced Suharto’s resignation in 1998. Yet, 14 years after the transition to democracy, NGOs continue to face 
serious organizational challenges, especially at the local level. 
Although organizations are highly committed to their cause and motivated to engage in political and civic 
affairs, with few exceptions, they have limited technical capacity to accomplish their goals. Most organizations 
face serious difficulties in attracting and retaining highly qualified professionals. As Megan Scanlon reports in 
her new assessment of NGOs in Indonesia, “there is a lot of good will, but little knowledge and skills to do 
the job.” 115 Furthermore, the majority of NGOs are ill staffed, and aside from women’s groups, most 
organizations resist hiring women. Finally, NGOs continue to be Jakarta-centric in the sense that local-level 
organizations rely on Jakarta-based organizations for funding, technical assistance and information.116  
For the most part, NGOs continue to be donor dependent, a factor that undermines their sustainability and 
often makes organizations fall out of synch with the needs and demands of citizens for whom they allegedly 
work. CIVICUS’ Civil Society Index for Indonesia—the most comprehensive report on civil society 
organizations to date—maintains that donor dependency is one of the reasons NGOs are generally distrusted 
by the general public. A public opinion survey conducted in 2006 revealed that only 37 percent of citizens 
trusted NGOs, a percentage that contrasts with the high level of trust conferred on religious organizations, 
which stands at around 80 percent.117 Aside from being perceived as “tools of foreign propaganda,” by 
responding to donors’ priorities and not necessarily to the community’s needs, such as job creation, public 
service delivery and the needs of marginalized populations, NGOs tend to lose touch with their bases as well 
as credibility among the public.  
According to the same survey, Indonesians are in general philanthropic about social causes, offering 
assistance in the form of money, goods and labor. But the monetary contributions are small and insufficient 
to support and maintain NGOs. More importantly, most contributions go to religious organizations rather 
than issue-based organizations, which as noted above, are generally not respected and/or trusted by the 
general public.118 
Another reason explaining Indonesians’ low level of trust in NGOs stems from the organizations’ centralized 
management structures and overall lack of transparency and accountability, if not outright corrupt practices at 
times. According to CIVICUS, many organizations do not provide information to the public about their 
objectives, funding mechanisms and internal organizational structure. Although NGOs demand transparency 
                                                     
114  Megan Scanlon, “STATT, NGO sector review. Findings Report: Draft, Revisions 1.” November 2012, Mimeo. Funded by Australian AID. 
NGOs are distinguished from the broad arena of civil society by “their relatively complex structures, reliance on paid or voluntary staff, 
minimum financial base and focus on servicing others through service delivery, community organizing and/or advocacy rather than engaging 
in self-help. Autonomous affiliated institutions of mass membership based organizations in Indonesia function as NGOs serving the wider 
community and not just members.” p. 4. The latter includes faith-based organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah.  
115  Ibid. 
116  Ibid.  
117  Indonesian citizens have had traditionally high levels of trust in religious organizations like NU, Muhammadiyah and some non-Muslim 
religious organizations. These organizations do provide social services in education, health and economic development. CIVICUS. Civil 
Society Index for Indonesia 2006. A Long Journey to A Civil Society, (2006). p.7; p. 18. These faith-based organizations have played a key 
role in mobilizing citizens against religious intolerance and radicalization.  
118  Ibid., p.39. 
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and accountability from government, they do not always practice these virtues themselves.119 The most recent 
report on civil society in Indonesia reached similar conclusions.120 Finally, with few exceptions, NGOs still 
adopt a predominantly confrontational approach vis-à-vis the government. This is a legacy from the Suharto 
regime, which repressed independent CSOs and obstructed their participation. Yet, the absence of effective 
strategies and advocacy skills limits their overall effectiveness. As one interviewer stated, “Indonesian NGOs 
are good at organizing against something; but they have serious limitations when it comes to articulating a 
policy objective and organizing around it.” 121 Not surprisingly, government officials often refuse to 
collaborate with them.122 
Indeed, during the past 14 years, NGOs have been most effective in organizing against particular initiatives or 
reforms, forcing the government to roll back and/or take corrective action. For example, civil society reacted 
strongly against a vote quota provision in the electoral law that undermined the open-list method of candidate 
selection. After different civil organizations joined forces to protest against this quota provision, and took the 
case to the Constitutional Court in 2008, the court struck it down, thus opening the path for the 
implementation of a full-fledged open-list proportional representation electoral system. More recently, civil 
society mobilized mostly through Twitter and Facebook against the national police’s attempt to curb an 
investigation against a high-level police official accused of corruption by attempting to arrest the KPK 
investigator in charge of the case. The president, faced with increased societal pressure and who until then 
had adopted a “hands-off” attitude, was forced to intervene, siding with the KPK and ordering the police 
chief to allow the KPK to proceed with the investigation.123  
In most democracies, demand and pressure from below is a powerful driver of change. As these examples 
illustrate, Indonesia is no exception. When civil society is well organized and articulated, it is effective in 
pushing reforms forward. The problem in Indonesia is that for all that has been accomplished thus far, 
NGOs are still short-term oriented, mostly reactive, confrontational and distrustful of government. 
Consequently, they have invested comparatively few resources in strengthening their lobbying and negotiation 
skills, and improving their capacity to influence public opinion on different policy fronts by articulating their 
messages more effectively.124 Donor dependency has also militated against the development of more 
sustainable organizational structures with a long-term strategic approach, as most organizations respond to 
short-term, project-based funding cycles.125 Lastly, and importantly, Indonesia still suffers from a shortage of 
high-quality think tanks, institutes and university research centers that can provide NGOs, policymakers and 
the public with original research and credible evidence for policymaking. Most research services are shells 
rather than effective bodies. Improved research could provide NGOs with more substantive and proactive 
policy alternatives. 
To the extent that NGOs acquire stronger organizational and advocacy skills, they can be expected to play a 
more critical role in building stronger demand for reform, thus deepening democratic consolidation in 
Indonesia. This is particularly true at the local level, where organizational and technical capacities are weaker, 
                                                     
119 Ibid., p.8 
120  Scanlon, 2012, p. 29. 
121  Interview with Mr. Achmad Sukarsono, International Crisis Group, Jakarta, October 6, 2012.  
122  There are attempts by the MOHA to control Indonesian NGOs and international NGOs working in Indonesia. Only BAPPENAS has shown 
greater understanding on collaborating with NGOs by including civil society strengthening as one of the issues in the government’s mid-
term planning.  
123  Jakarta Post, October 9, 2012; October 10, 2012. 
124  One good exception is women’s groups that have been effective in lobbying for greater gender equality. For example, women’s groups 
fought for the 1999 Amendment to the Indonesian Constitution recognizing equal rights for men and women. These groups have also been 
effective in ensuring the ratification of several international conventions, and for the establishment of the national commission against 
violence against women (Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan—Komnas Perempuan). CIVICUS, 2006, p. 72. 
125  Scanlon, 2012. p. 35. 
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but where opportunities for influencing policymaking and service delivery are greater. This is not only 
because with decentralization, local governments are playing a bigger role in decision making and service 
delivery, but also because local government authorities are closer to the average citizen than authorities at the 
central level.  
The existence of linkages and networks between local and the Jakarta-based organizations mentioned above 
can actually become a good entry point for donors to reach out to these local-level organizations and support 
them directly. More importantly, donors should consider funding options to promote NGOs’ greater 
sustainability and capacity to engage in long-term strategic planning by allowing organizations to use part of 
the grants to pay for operational costs. 
3.2.8 MEDIA 
According to Freedom House’s most recent report, Indonesia ranked as a “partly free” country with respect 
to media freedom.126 While Indonesian journalists still face important constraints, especially in the form of 
criminal lawsuits for defamation, libel and blasphemy, and in some cases, threats of violence, they generally 
face no major difficulties in getting access to information and reporting their news stories.  
In recent years, most of the threats for media freedom have come from the owners of the media companies. 
The owners usually have political interests and are linked to the big parties. Some of these individuals have 
shown their interest in running for presidential election in 2014. The control of the media by these media 
“moguls” directly affects the content of the news, violating the principles of a fair and impartial media. 
Nevertheless, it is virtually impossible not to see a corruption scandal reported in the written media every day. 
Today journalists have greater opportunities than in the previous authoritarian regime to communicate with 
the public. Moreover, the use of social media sites has enabled journalists to instantly disseminate information 
and interact directly with their audience.  
The rapid development of information and communication technology, which among other things has 
gradually lowered prices of smartphones, coupled with a robust competition among the eight cellular service 
providers in the country, has resulted in bundled telephone and Internet service packages that are offered 
from as low as U.S. $1 per week. This has earned Indonesia its place as one of the top five largest users of 
Facebook and Twitter in the world. One estimate put Indonesian Facebook users to be around 40 million 
strong, just a little less than a sixth of the country’s total population.127  
Taking full advantage of the increasing number of Indonesians joining Facebook and Twitter, all big players 
in the print and broadcast media business have their contents accessible through Facebook and Twitter. This 
provides the public greater and faster access to the latest developments in the country; it also gives the public 
a chance to comment on or participate in discussions over certain issues which are of interest to them. 
Indeed, social media sites have been used as means to raise awareness and form public opinion. The latter has 
been effective in building public pressure and strengthening the demand for change, as recent attempts by the 
police to curtail KPK’s investigative authority demonstrated. 
A now famous case in 2010 also demonstrates that social media is becoming an increasingly important tool 
for citizens to complain against poor service delivery and to demand greater accountability of government. 
An online support movement was critical in freeing a 32-year-old mother who was jailed after she complained 
about poor service delivery at a suburban Jakarta hospital. Prosecutors at that time charged her under a new 
law on electronic information and transactions because she had sent an e-mail message to friends detailing her 
complaints. A court eventually found her not guilty. 
                                                     
126  Freedom House Indonesia. http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/indonesia.  
127  http://www.socialbakers.com/blog/684-facebook-statistics-2012-top-growing-countries 
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Without a doubt, the media is playing a greater role in the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. Most 
people interviewed for this assessment recognized the power of social media in building stronger demand for 
change. Yet, for some conservative politicians and religious leaders, the “abuse” of social media raises 
concerns about possible mob rule and the loss of traditional and moral values.  
More challenging, however, was the opinion of journalists from one of the country’s largest Internet news 
portals. While they acknowledge the outreach potential of social media outlets, they also recognized that most 
journalists prefer to report “bad news” because as they said, “bad news is good news for their business.” Yet, 
“people get tired of an excessive coverage of corrupt scandals and other bad news. When citizens only read 
negative stories, they become disillusioned and lose hope in the possibility of change, of a better future. 
Citizens want to feel good about their country; they want to feel inspired by good stories. This is why we 
stress reporting on positive news.”128  
The media could play an even more important role as a builder of civic values if it adopts a more balanced 
approach and begins to investigate and report cases of success, rather than placing exclusive emphasis on 
negative stories which are written in a predominantly confrontational tone.  
3.2.9 PRIVATE SECTOR BUSINESS INTERESTS 
The Indonesian business community is not a uniform sector. Aside from their regional differences, 
businesspeople do not necessarily have common interests or equal resources to defend them. Owners and/or 
shareholders of large businesses and conglomerates do not necessarily have the same interests as owners of 
small- and medium-sized businesses, and obviously, small entrepreneurs have far fewer resources and power 
than big entrepreneurs to voice and defend their interests. 
Yet, for years, especially during the Suharto regime, the business community was regarded by most scholars, 
CSOs and development practitioners as a homogeneous bloc of powerful and corrupt business leaders who, 
in exchange for bribes, extracted lucrative rents from the government. Corruption was regarded as the name 
of the game for doing business in Indonesia.129 Although deplored as unethical and considered as a tax on 
business, many in the business community viewed corruption as a “necessary evil” for reducing the risks of 
doing business in the country. As Philip Keefer notes, “businesses believed that if they paid a $1,000,000 
bribe they would get a high return on their investment because the underlying agreement that they could 
enter a market, enjoy a monopoly, or be exempt from particular regulations was credible.”130  
With democratization, some of the rules maintaining the tight alliance between a few business conglomerates 
and central government officials were undermined. Although the conglomerates survived the transition to 
democracy and continue to do business in Indonesia, the number of players increased significantly and 
corruption ceased to generate the same level of certainty as before. Aside from the proliferation of new 
business groups, the decentralization process empowered local government officials and increased their 
opportunities to extract rents and demand bribes from businesses. Even when the value of individual bribes 
declined, corrupt deals became less binding. As the leader of one of Indonesia’s business organizations 
complained, “businesspeople often need to pay bribes several times to get things done. And there is no 
certainty that one gets things done after paying the bribe.” This largely explains why many in the business 
community perceive that corruption has increased under democratization. 
                                                     
128  This online newspaper has been active in promoting civic engagement. It has organized routine gatherings of bloggers (numbering in the 
thousands), where it provides technical support to bloggers and promotes interaction among bloggers. With a following close to one 
million, social media has an extraordinary potential, above and beyond the outreach of the written media, which has a much smaller 
audience.  
129  Vinay Bhargava and Emil Bolongaita, “The State of Corruption in Indonesia. The present impasse.” In Challenging Corruption in Asia. Case 
Studies and a Framework for Action. (World Bank, 2004).  
130  Philip Keefer, “The political economy of corruption in Indonesia.” Mimeo (October 2, 2002), p. 3. 
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In an environment where corruption remains systemic, it is not surprising that businesspeople continue to 
have a reputation for corruption. Yet, it is obvious that not all businesses benefit equally from the system of 
corruption. The largest businesses, especially those that operate in the extractive industry and banking sectors, 
benefit the most, for they have extraordinary financial and organizational resources to engage with 
government authorities compared to smaller businesses. First, owners of big enterprises continue to have 
unparalleled access to top government officials and therefore, have more opportunities to shape policy in 
their favor. Second, national business organizations like Kamar Dagang dan Industri (KADIN, the National 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry) and the Employer’s Association of Indonesia (APINDO) are led by 
the largest entrepreneurs in the country. Owners of small- and medium-sized businesses, although members 
of these organizations, do not have their own independent organizations and therefore lack institutional 
mechanisms to make their voices heard. Finally, although large businesses complain about the increasing 
costs and risks of doing business in Indonesia, corruption does not threaten their businesses’ existence. In 
contrast, small- and medium-sized businesses may find the costs of bribes too onerous to survive.  
It is conceivable that small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs, who are more vulnerable to public officials’ use 
of discretionary authority and abuse of power, may become allies of CSOs fighting for greater accountability, 
transparency and better service delivery. The linkages between business and CSOs are still weak and for the 
most part, citizens regard businesspeople as insensitive to social issues.131 But these linkages can be 
strengthened, especially if common interests can be identified.  
3.2.10 OTHER NON-STATE ACTORS 
“Almost ten years after the Bali bombing that brought terrorism in Indonesia to international attention, the 
country’s violent extremists are weak and divided but still active.” So concludes the most recent report by the 
International Crisis Group, by far the most authoritative chronicler of Indonesian Islamist terrorism since the 
Bali bombing.132 The report expresses strong concern that the police have been much more effective in 
identifying and arresting terrorists who have already committed crimes, but much less skilled in understanding 
why jihadi groups are still able to attract recruits. It calls for new government programs to “address the 
environment in which jihadi ideology continues to flourish.” 
On October 28, 2012, shortly after the assessment team had left the country, the New York Times reported 
that the Indonesian counterterrorism police, Densus 88, had arrested 11 people accused of planning terrorist 
attacks against the U.S. Consulate in Surabaya, the Jakarta headquarters of Freeport-McMoRan Copper and 
Gold, the U.S.-based mining company, among other targets. The accused were said to belong to a relatively 
new group, Hasmi (Harakah Sunni Untuk Masyarakat Indonesia [Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society]), 
about which little is known but, according to the police, was probably a splinter from Jemaah Islamiyah.133 The 
incident underlined the main finding of the International Crisis Group earlier in the year, that Islamist 
terrorism, though weakened, remains a significant threat in the world’s largest Muslim-majority country.  
                                                     
131  According to the CIVICUS survey, in 2006, 60 percent of citizens perceived that business sector is indifferent to CSOs. On the other hand, 
some sectors of the business community refrain from working with NGOs because the latter are too confrontational against the 
government. CIVICUS, 2006, p. 55. Businesses may fear an alliance with the NGO community will further increase the risks of being 
subjected to government arbitrariness.  
132  International Crisis Group. (2012a). The report describes the successful breakup in 2010 of a terrorist training camp in Aceh (not 
connected to the now-resolved separatist conflict in Aceh), “where an alliance of almost all major jihadi groups in the country had planned 
to establish a base,” and the arrest of some 200 individuals. It traces a subsequent wave of activity, including more than a dozen plots, by 
jihadis seeking revenge against the government and particularly the police. 
133  See also the account in the leading Jakarta daily Kompas, “Kelompok Teroris Baru Bernama ‘Hasmi’” [A New Terrorist Group Named 
‘Hasmi’], 27 October 2012. 
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3.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Indonesia is a segmented country, with more than 17,000 islands and hundreds of different ethnic groups. 
Governance in such a diverse and geographically fragmented country is a challenging and complex endeavor. 
Overall, Indonesia has been successful. The country has remained politically stable during the past 14 years, 
despite the introduction of significant reforms. Yet many challenges still remain.  
Unlike many other countries, the transition to democracy in Indonesia was relatively peaceful. It came about 
after President Suharto resigned from office. Democracy was not a product of a social revolution that 
dismantled the old bureaucratic structure. In fact, the legacy of the old bureaucratic “mind set” continues to 
militate against the deepening of democratic reforms. Rather than transforming and/or eliminating old 
government agencies, the government often creates new ones to avoid obstruction. The result is a bloated 
bureaucratic structure that generates confusion and increases complexity in government affairs.  
For a few years after the fall of Suharto, the central government enjoyed a favorable environment for the 
introduction of vast and substantive political reforms. Yet over the years, the government’s room for 
maneuver began to narrow, as those who had a stake in the status quo began to organize and consolidate. 
Furthermore, the implementation of reforms began to generate new adversaries, as reforms did not always 
produce the expected results. For example, the decentralization reforms were introduced in haste and without 
much planning. Local and district-level governments were suddenly confronted with new authority, resources 
and responsibilities for which they were not prepared and lacked technical capacity. Provinces were left with 
few responsibilities and resources, frustrating their coordination function. As a result, many government 
officials now believe that some government functions and responsibilities need to be recentralized. These 
officials are not necessarily conservative and/or supportive of authoritarianism; rather, they are concerned 
with the implications of introducing a reform which they now believe was poorly designed.  
Finally, many of the powerful interest groups that operated (and profited) during the Suharto regime continue 
to exist and still exert a strong influence on politics and policymaking. These groups have benefitted from the 
system of corruption and opacity that has characterized Indonesian politics for decades, and they are 
expected to use their power to obstruct reforms that significantly challenge the status quo, particularly those 
that seek to generate greater transparency and accountability of government. 
Despite the many challenges for the deepening of governance reforms, champions of reform exist in virtually 
every government agency at the central and local levels. At the central level, these champions are not well 
articulated and can easily become trapped in the complex bureaucratic web that resists the deepening of 
democratic governance reforms. At the local level, these champions have broader room to maneuver and can 
therefore play a more critical role in pushing forward the reform process. The introduction of direct elections 
for mayors and district heads generates a powerful incentive for these officials to perform better and become 
more accountable to the electorate. Not surprisingly, the local level has become the “laboratory of 
democracy” in Indonesia, where a combination of highly motivated leaders and a strong and well-articulated 
civil society can make a difference.  
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4.0 STEP THREE: USAID 
INTERESTS AND U.S. 
GOVERNMENT 
PRIORITIES 
4.1 U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND BROADER USAID DEVELOPMENT 
INTERESTS 
Indonesia has a large percentage of world trade transits, extensive natural resources and the strategically 
important sea lanes that link the Middle East with East Asia. Indonesia is also perceived by many as the 
geopolitical center of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is a critical actor in the 
geopolitical dynamics of the larger Asia-Pacific region. Future progress in Indonesia could reverberate around 
the region and so the Mission’s budget should reflect this importance. Yet a paradox remains in that while 
Indonesia faces increasing pressures from other countries—especially in the region—to assist, Indonesian 
democracy still remains subject to its own domestic fragility. 
As the overwhelming majority of Muslim citizens subscribe to a moderate form of the religion, Indonesia has 
the potential to act as a counterbalance to more extreme expressions of Islam. Nevertheless, radical Islamist 
and terrorist cells have operated in the country. Internal strife and social dislocation stemming from a variety 
of causes have undermined Indonesia in the past.  
In recent years, U.S. policy toward Indonesia has focused on cementing ties with a geopolitically important 
state that can play an active role in regional diplomacy and encourage Indonesia to combat terrorism and 
effectively counter the rise of violent Islamic militancy. The United States has sought to promote democracy, 
the rule of law and human rights, and to further American trade and investment interests. Human rights 
concerns about the armed forces and particularly issues in Papua have been an unresolved tension in the 
bilateral relationship. President Obama’s visit in November 2010 served to broaden the relationship between 
the United States and Indonesia. A key outcome included the Comprehensive Partnership Agreement, which 
has five priority areas, including “Democracy and Civil Society.”  
This partnership, similar to its pivotal role in ASEAN, is one of many indications that Indonesia is emerging 
as a leader in the region in terms of the promotion of regional integration, peace, and stability and democracy. 
This role is of key interest to the United States.  
Indonesia has a long legacy of South-South Cooperation, dating back to the 1955 Bandung Conference, Non-
Aligned Movement, G-77 and more recently, the G-20, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and 
ASEAN initiatives. Key milestones include the 2009 Jakarta Commitment (adoption of the Paris Declaration, 
including a commitment to strengthen Indonesia’s South-South Cooperation efforts), the 2010 integration of 
South-South Cooperation into Indonesia’s Medium- and Long-term Development Plans, the establishment of 
the National Coordination Team (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, BAPPENAS and State 
Secretariat) and the finalization of Indonesia’s South-South Cooperation Policy—the Grand Design and 
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Blueprint documents—pending approval by the president. More recently, Indonesia has provided 
development assistance to countries such as Afghanistan, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines. 
Indonesia has begun participating in various development forums, including the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), a committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).134 Indonesia is a member country of CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and 
South Africa), an acronym used for countries with emerging markets, diverse and dynamic economies and a 
growing youth population. Moreover, the country plays a critical role in triangular cooperation for the 
provision of aid and foreign assistance, in cooperation with the U.S. Government. Indonesia has begun to 
provide technical expertise in the areas of institution building and performance monitoring and 
accountability. 
USAID is still implementing its Forward objectives, many of which USAID/Indonesia has worked on, 
including local capacity development. The U.S. Government is also increasing development and diplomacy 
which has elevated the role of USAID throughout the Mission. 
4.2 USAID’S CURRENT DRG PROGRAM 
USAID partners with the GOI and independent institutions, civil society organizations and local 
communities to improve the ability of democratic governance to deliver tangible benefits to Indonesians. 
USAID invests in governance (anti-corruption, local governance and service delivery), rule of law, political 
representation (parliament, political parties and civil society) and support for peace and a democratic culture. 
USAID/Indonesia continues to implement cross-sectoral governance programs that collaborate with sectors 
such as education and health. USAID also facilitates a critical role for Indonesians, inside and outside of 
government, in sharing experiences, successes and lessons in the country’s democratic transition and efforts 
toward consolidation to assist other countries in these processes. Annex 2 briefly describes DRG programs. 
The Mission has gained a wide array of experience and lessons learned in DRG programming in Indonesia, 
including the importance of addressing both supply and demand in the governance arena. For example, DRG 
often tries to couple programs working to strengthen institutional capacity with NGO work to demand 
greater transparency and accountability. The Mission also focuses on finding and working with more reform-
minded individuals within the government.  
USAID also supports peer-to-peer engagement among GOI counterparts and U.S. Government counterparts 
to exchange learning experiences. They have also occasionally supported exchanges between key DRG-
related Indonesian government and/or independent institutions and those of other transitioning or 
consolidating countries in the region. See Annex 3 for a brief description of other USAID and U.S. assistance 
programs. 
4.3 USAID’S RESOURCES 
In 2009, the total Mission budget accounted for over $263 million in funding with about 51 percent 
discretionary funds, which are often used for DRG programming. The budget has steadily declined over the 
past three years with a total 2012 budget of $152 million. Of this budget, around 95 percent was reserved for 
earmarks and special initiatives, while only about 5 percent of the budget was discretionary. These special 
initiatives and earmarks are often for programming in technical areas like health, education and environment.  
While the 2012 USAID DRG budget is $20 million, and is the largest DRG budget in Asia, it has been scaled 
down as a result of the tight budget climate in 2011 and 2012. The USAID budget is a small fraction of the 
                                                     
134  DAC serves as a forum for OECD member states to discuss issues surrounding aid, development and poverty reduction in developing 
countries. 
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total GOI budget. USAID’s ability to influence systemic change in the country may be most likely by 
influencing policy, either on a peer-to-peer basis and/or by establishing models and best practices. 
While increased peer-to-peer work and USAID Forward objectives to develop capacity may require fewer 
resources compared to larger-scale contracts and managing units, they do require human resources. The team 
still manages several large contracts and a variety of smaller grants and cooperative agreements. 
The DRG Team has also taken initiatives with other technical teams (e.g., environment) to work within these 
earmarks to add a DRG component to this work and bring technical areas like environment within the 
purview of the DRG Team. 
4.4 DONOR COORDINATION 
The donor community is active in Indonesia. The role and influence of donors on democratic change in 
Indonesia is tempered by the fact that donor budgets are a modest proportion of the GOI budget and that 
Indonesia is a large, diverse, middle-income country, with prospects for continued growth and a rising 
position as a regional power. In this landscape, systemic, catalytic change is largely a function of influencing 
policy.  
The largest donors investing in the DRG arena in Indonesia include the World Bank and Australia through 
the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). The Asian Development Bank, Germany, 
German International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), UK, Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Netherlands are also investing in DRG 
programs. The key areas of focus have included elections, governance including a large focus on 
decentralization, rule of law and civil society. Donors do not coordinate their activities on a regular basis. 
Although a donor coordinating group was formed with the GOI, it was disbanded. As Megan Scanlon 
reports in her recent assessment of NGOs in Indonesia, “the existence of differing ‘home’ agendas works 
against coordination efforts as competition among donors and the divergence of agendas and procedures 
lower donors’ interests in working together.”135 
A snapshot of the largest donors follows: AusAID has announced a commitment to increase its development 
investment by one-third, from approximately $600 million for 2012/2013 to $900 million. On elections, 
AusAID supports strengthening electoral management bodies, electoral laws and targeted support for local 
elections. On rule of law, AusAID supports programs to improve transparency of court decisions and 
develop legal aid. On decentralization, AusAID invests in improving skills of local governments, 
strengthening administration, consultation, and transparent budgeting. AusAID is also investing in women’s 
leadership. The World Bank “Local Government and Decentralization Project for Indonesia” is a four-year 
$220 million investment (2010-2014) that aims to improve the accountability and reporting of the central 
government's Specific Purpose Grants (DAK) for the infrastructure sub-sectors within pilot local 
governments. The GOI also invests in this World Bank program. 
4.5 PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE RECIPIENT SIDE 
DRG works with several central and local government agencies in the consultation process and throughout a 
project to inform the GOI. While USAID often works with reformers in government, there are still many in 
government who lack political will and/or stand to gain from slowing down the pace of reform. In the central 
government, there is capital and human resources for reform agendas. 
                                                     
135  Scanlon, 2012, p.35. 
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Development assistance for DRG is coordinated by BAPPENAS. The DRG Team consults the GOI in its 
programming. DRG signs an Assistance Agreement with BAPPENAS, and then USAID works through 
BAPPENAS to implement DRG programming.  
The GOI has a sufficient national budget and in some offices, national budgets are not absorbed. However, 
closer to the local level this is not the case. Currently, donor budgets at the central level serve as 
complementary to the GOI national budget. The central government generally has sufficient funds; 
government officials seek technical assistance from USAID. Because the GOI does not rely on U.S. 
Government money, it often implements several rules and requirements for donor funding.  
There are still significant political commitment and capacity issues within the central and local government, 
especially at the local government level. USAID and other donors train individuals, for example, from local 
government and the AGO and then they are moved to another geographic location or technical area. This 
shows lack of political commitment to gain on these investments, which are lost when the transfer occurs. 
Furthermore, getting buy-in from local government takes time. For example, it takes time to gain political 
capital to convince local governments to match budget allocations with U.S. Government investments. In 
Papua, challenges are generally the same, but there is a lack of local resources to deal with geographic 
challenges to allow for effective coordination with donors, so this is an area where Indonesia needs to focus.  
The GOI is in principle open to donor assistance. It is increasingly requiring donor agencies to comply with 
aid effectiveness principles. However, the government’s guidelines are not always clear as to what information 
is required and the reasons why. To its credit, the GOI wants increased transparency in donor funds. 
Increasingly, local governments are also asking for Memoranda of Understanding for every program with 
local government. 
Indonesian civil society organizations are vibrant. They have played significant roles in transitional 
democracy. Elite civil society organizations (mostly at the national level) normally have better organizational 
capacity and internal governance. Civil society organizations outside of big cities, however, have lower 
capacity to manage and implement donor-funded programs.  
Most of the Indonesian civil society organizations are receptive of U.S. assistance. USAID incorporates civil 
society organizations in most of its DRG programming. However, many of these civil society organizations 
still have problems keeping up with USAID financial requirement. Because of this, USAID builds in the 
financial training, prior to a grant award, for its implementers/grantees. Capacity development takes a long 
time, but generally we have seen that financial training has improved capacity. Additionally, there is a serious 
concern for the future sustainability of civil society organizations, especially those DRG organizations that are 
completely reliant on foreign donor funding. 
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5.0 STEP 4: OUTLINING THE 
PROPOSED STRATEGY 
5.1 STRATEGIC GUIDELINES 
As discussed above, Indonesia is a strategic ally of the United States. Although USAID is not the largest 
donor in the country, it is in a unique position to leverage its resources and achieve maximum results. As was 
clear in most of our interviews, Indonesians admire the United States, even when they are highly nationalistic 
and proud of their country. They view the United States’ size, its highly decentralized governance structure, 
its active and robust civil society and its economic dynamism—even in this day and age, with a challenging 
financial crisis confronting the U.S. economy—as relevant to Indonesia’s realities.  
Moreover, Indonesia is not a poor country, even when an estimated 30 million people remain poor or live in 
extreme poverty conditions. Donors play a supporting role, but Indonesia is not a donor-dependent country. 
Almost all central government officials interviewed for this assessment acknowledged that Indonesia does not 
need U.S. resources. Indeed, when compared to Indonesia’s national budget, USAID’s total investments in the 
country represent “a drop in the bucket.” Yet, while they do not need U.S. resources, government officials are 
eager to be exposed to good ideas, best practices and effective solutions to complex problems which have been 
successfully implemented in such a large, rich, diverse and decentralized country as the United States. 
5.2 STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS 
The following recommendations on development objectives, intermediate results and sub-results take into 
consideration USAID’s manageable interests; that is, results that USAID together with its implementing 
partners can materially affect with its activities and programs and for which USAID could be held 
accountable during a five-year period.136 These recommendations take into consideration the country’s 
context as well as the expected level of USAID funding in the near future. They also take into account areas 
and sectors deemed to be most receptive to successful interventions. 
The assessment’s conclusions were that poor service delivery (weak government effectiveness) along with an 
inefficient and deeply corrupt justice system (weak rule of law) represented the most important governance 
challenges in the country. Therefore, the recommendations of this assessment are that USAID focus 
and concentrate its programs on improving government effectiveness at the local level, where public 
services are delivered, and on strengthening the demand for greater judicial performance and 
accountability. 
This assessment also integrates the recommendations of an independent electoral assessment conducted in 
Indonesia in April 2012. That assessment recommended that USAID continue its electoral program, 
supporting both electoral authorities and civil society organizations to improve electoral administration and 
secure clean and fair elections in the future. Ensuring that the next presidential elections of 2014 are fair and 
clean, and that results are accepted as valid and legitimate, is critical for democratic stability in the country. 
                                                     
136  USAID, ADS Chapter 201, p. 10. http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/201.pdf. 
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The overall DRG Objective should be to strengthen the quality of governance in Indonesia by 
increasing the effectiveness of government institutions to respond to citizens’ needs and demands and by 
strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations to demand greater integrity and accountability of 
government.  
In designing programs and projects for the next five years, USAID should continue to engage with central 
government officials at the executive, legislative and judicial sectors, particularly those highly committed to 
reform.137 Yet, it is recommended that USAID refrain from investing in complex programs with central 
government institutions and agencies. Following the Agency’s Forward principles, USAID should establish 
strategic partnerships with key government institutions and agencies through a combination of peer-to-peer 
policy dialogues, study tours and targeted technical assistance. National-level government officials in 
Indonesia welcome being treated as partners rather than donor recipients. They do not believe they need U.S. 
resources; they want good ideas. 
At the national and local levels, USAID should continue to support NGOs, particularly those working on the 
areas of governance reform and greater accountability of government. As we have contended in this 
assessment, civil society can become a powerful driver for reform when civil society organizations are strong 
and well organized, when they are able to articulate their message effectively, act proactively and learn to 
advocate effectively.  
At the local level, USAID should support projects aiming at increasing local government’s capacities to 
provide adequate public services and effectiveness in responding to citizens’ needs. Public services are 
defined broadly, including health, education, land titling, environmental protection, and importantly, access to 
justice.  
If opportunities exist, assistance can also be provided to mitigate corruption practices in key government 
offices, by supporting initiatives that directly affect the structure of incentives that drive corruption.  
Finally, projects should also be directed to enhance and strengthen local NGO capacities to demand 
better and more accountable government services. Increasing the demand for better service delivery and 
accountability depends in large part on the awareness of citizens’ rights and on a certain level of 
dissatisfaction with the quality of services citizens receive. As noted in this report, in Indonesia, citizens are 
still too complacent with regards to the quality of service delivery. Linking communities and their NGOs to 
local governance processes will not only allow for greater responsiveness and accountability, but enable 
greater sustainability. 
With decentralization and the introduction of direct elections of mayors and district heads, the opportunities 
for implementing reform at the local level have increased. This is one of the reasons for recommending that 
USAID concentrate most of its programs and projects at the local level, where its chances to achieve results 
in the short to medium term (five to ten years) are greater than at the national level. Moreover, it is at the 
local level where both civil society and government authorities confront the most serious weaknesses and 
where donor support is most needed.  
In a country as large and diverse as Indonesia, obviously USAID will need to prioritize the regions where it 
wants to intervene. To achieve maximum results and avoid the dispersion of programs, we recommend 
selecting a few priority districts and municipalities and concentrating most investments there. Some suggested 
criteria for identifying priority regions include:  
• Existence of champions of reform in local government;  
                                                     
137  In the justice sector, in particular, a sector that is centralized, USAID has made significant inroads into relationships with reformers. 
Continuing engagement with these stakeholders is important and should be maintained, especially if greater opportunities for reform open 
up at the national level in the future.  
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• Assessment of need (quality of public services, potential for conflict, rising levels of Islamic 
fundamentalism);  
• Potential for scaling up and demonstrating best practices;  
• Existence of other USAID programs where synergies can be created; and 
• Existence of other donors in the region.  
Obviously, USAID will have to balance different elements, for these factors may contradict one another. For 
example, a region regarded as critical because it has the most need may lack a strong local champion, or may 
not be the most adept at replicating successful experiences.138 In this context, and consistent with the 
conclusions of the Strategic Assessment of Papua conducted in June 2012, USAID could include specific 
districts and municipalities in Papua as one of its target regions.139 
Finally, to the extent possible, USAID should mainstream governance approaches across sectors, 
ensuring that education, health, environment and economic growth programs include good governance 
results in their results frameworks. In designing anti-corruption interventions, USAID should identify the 
structure of incentives that drive corrupt practices in specific sectors, and program interventions aimed at 
increasing the risks and reducing the opportunities for engaging in corrupt behavior. To ensure that 
anti-corruption interventions are effectively mainstreamed throughout USAID’s programs, it is critical to 
identify realistic and manageable results and to craft appropriate indicators in USAID’s Performance 
Management Plans. 
The KINERJA project appears to be a good example of how to mainstream governance approaches and 
ensure collaboration across sectors. Moreover, gender, religious tolerance and anti-corruption activities 
should also be mainstreamed across projects, ensuring as much as possible that projects have special 
consideration for gender equality, transparency and accountability and freedom of religion and expression.  
5.3 DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS  
Enhancing the quality of democratic governance in Indonesia is critical for the full consolidation of 
democratic institutions. The legitimacy of democratic regimes depends not only on their capacity to guarantee 
free and fair elections and protect citizens’ rights. Democracies also need to have the capacity to deliver 
public services effectively, respond to the demands and needs of citizens, protect citizens against abuse and 
injustice and bring about economic prosperity.140 On these accounts, Indonesian democracy still has a long 
way to go. Although consensus exists in Indonesia today that democracy is the best form of government, in 
the long run, if democracy cannot make a difference in people’s lives—if it cannot reduce poverty and 
inequality, improve the quality of public services, generate economic opportunities for its people, demonstrate 
greater effectiveness in curbing and controlling corruption and guarantee citizens access to fair and impartial 
justice—it might lose the credibility and legitimacy it currently enjoys.  
                                                     
138  In this discussion, we considered whether it is time to move out of Aceh, a province that has received significant donor support. Some 
good reasons to move out include achievement of major donor assistance goals, namely, peaceful resolution of conflict and completion of 
major infrastructure projects. Aceh is receiving significant resources from the central government as part of the province’s special 
autonomy status. There are currently no clear signs of political will to confront the province’s governance problems, particularly the 
proliferation of corruption. After Jakarta, Aceh is considered by the State Audit Agency (BPK) as the second most corrupt province in 
Indonesia. State Audit Agency, Report on “amount of state loses in provinces.” 2011. 
139  The USAID Mission in Indonesia believes that there is a strong argument for engagement in Papua from the perspective of assisting in 
community governance using multi-sectoral tools for improved stability. Papua plays a key strategic role, for the failure in Papua will have 
repercussions for Indonesia’s credibility as a modern democracy engaged as a regional and global leader.  
140  Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, "The Quality of Democracy: An Overview, Journal of Democracy (15:4, October 2004).  
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This assessment has elaborated a strategic approach through which USAID can support Indonesian attempts 
to improve its governance despite the constraints that remain. This strategic vision can be linked to 
programmatic recommendations through the following development hypothesis. 
Development Hypothesis  
• If Indonesian government can better promote economic growth and deliver adequate public services 
to its citizens, and 
• If there is strengthened demand for greater judicial performance and accountability, and 
• If there is increased effectiveness of electoral authorities to secure clean and fair elections,  
• Then the quality of governance in Indonesia will be strengthened. 
The development hypothesis is premised on the assumption that in Indonesia, as in most democracies, civil 
society’s demand is a critical driver of change. To the extent that civil society is well organized and articulated, 
it can generate sufficient pressure from below to mobilize political will for reform. Yet, political will is not 
enough. Government officials willing to introduce substantive reforms also require stronger technical capacity 
to plan strategically, manage personnel, administer public resources, monitor and evaluate government 
performance, learn from best practices and comply with regulations. To the extent that public officials 
become more competent and motivated, they will be readier to confront the expected challenges that await 
any effort to defy powerful vested interests with a stake in the status quo and to overcome the many legacies 
that Indonesia has inherited from its past—such as corruption, lack of accountability, bureaucratic inertia and 
weak commitment to service delivery.  
USAID is in a position to leverage resources effectively by engaging champions of reform at the national and 
local levels and investing strategically in projects that can make a difference in citizens’ lives. If successful, 
these projects can eventually be replicated and scaled up at the national level. 
As mentioned before, USAID should refrain from investing in costly projects at the national level. Yet, 
engagement with national-level government authorities at the executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
government is critical in maintaining the U.S. partnership with the Indonesian government and ensuring its 
collaboration—and hopefully buy-in—in implementation of USAID’s projects and programs. To that end, 
strategic partnerships with key national institutions and reform champions are encouraged through a 
combination of peer-to-peer policy dialogues, study tours, exchanges and targeted technical assistance. This is 
particularly critical in the justice sector, since the justice system is centralized. 
In deciding the most adequate and effective technical assistance, USAID might want to conduct a 
performance evaluation of programs it is currently implementing at the national level with the KPK, the 
Public Information Commission, the DPR, the Supreme Court and the AGO. These evaluations will shed 
light on the accomplishments of these projects, identify the most successful interventions and best practices, 
and make recommendations on the types of technical assistance and/or other targeted interventions that 
could be supported in the future.  
USAID will contribute to the enhancement of the quality of governance through three intermediate results 
(IRs): 1. Improved effectiveness of the Indonesian government to sustain economic growth and 
deliver adequate public services to its citizens; 2. Strengthened demand for greater judicial 
performance and legal accountability; and 3. Increased effectiveness of electoral authorities to secure 
fair and free elections—this sub-result is the recommendation of the electoral assessment recently 
conducted in Indonesia. For a graphic representation of these results please see the suggested Results 
Framework in Annex 4. 
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5.3.1 RESULTS NARRATIVE 
IR 1: IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO SUSTAIN ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND DELIVER ADEQUATE PUBLIC SERVICES TO ITS CITIZENS  
Most public services are delivered at the local level. As discussed before, public services are defined broadly, 
including health, education, housing, environmental protection, property rights and access to justice. 
Although citizens in general have a positive perception of the performance of government services, 
particularly in the areas of health and education, Indonesian social indicators reveal otherwise. As argued 
before, Indonesia is lagging behind other middle-income countries in terms of its social indicators, particularly 
in health and education. To improve the effectiveness of government, the assessment team has identified 
three sub-results.  
SUB-IR 1.1: TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN TARGETED AREAS 
IMPROVED  
In general, local government authorities have weak technical capacity to implement policy and deliver quality 
services. Furthermore, corruption is systemic throughout the government and negatively affects the quality of 
services. Finally, although local governments now face a more active citizenry during electoral periods, in 
between elections, local authorities are not pressed by a more assertive and demanding civil society to 
improve the quality of their services.  
Illustrative Activities  
• Conduct an evaluation of the KINERJA project to assess the results of this cross-sectoral initiative. 
Incorporate best practices and lessons learned into new programs. 
• Work through provincial universities and support capacity enhancement training programs for local 
government officials in areas such as performance-based management, financial management, 
monitoring and evaluation, internal control frameworks, regulatory compliance and conflict 
resolution. 
• Identify key local government offices in selected districts and municipalities (health, education, water 
and sanitation, environmental protection, local courts) and provide direct technical assistance in 
participatory planning, minimum quality standards in public service delivery, public outreach and 
communication strategies.  
• Assist local governments in complying with the law of access to public information—dissemination 
of information about government activities and response to information requests. 
• Conduct a needs assessment of district/municipalities treasurer’s office and provide training and 
technical assistance in financial planning, budgeting, accounting, etc. 
• Facilitate exchanges between government officials at different levels of government (national, 
provincial, local) to improve communication and coordination of functions and responsibilities.  
• Provide technical assistance for the introduction of alternative dispute mechanisms to resolve 
problems that affect the communities such as land tenure conflicts and domestic violence. 
• Support victims’ assistance programs, such as shelters for victims of domestic violence.  
SUB-IR 1.2: CIVIL SOCIETY EMPOWERED TO DEMAND BETTER SERVICES AND GREATER INTEGRITY  
The positive public perceptions of government performance are puzzling. Even considering the limitation on 
data collection and other methodological aspects of these surveys, the results are nonetheless revealing. Aside 
from lack of information on minimum quality standards, these perceptions demonstrate that citizens may not 
be aware of their rights. As noted in this assessment, citizens are relatively passive and too complacent with 
the quality of services they receive. Some level of dissatisfaction may be a good catalyst for action.  
As argued above, CSOs and NGOs are not too actively involved and/or well-articulated to demand better 
service delivery and greater integrity from government officials, especially at the local level. Moreover, the 
level of debate on public policy issues is scant and ineffective in fostering a more informed and persuasive 
dialogue with public officials. Although now that there are direct elections, citizens can reward or punish 
government officials with their vote; in between elections, citizens have few mechanisms to demand greater 
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accountability from government. Moreover, NGOs are, in general, donor-dependent and do not always 
become engaged in the issues that affect their communities directly. However, current capacity constraints 
facing civil society can be addressed to make them more effective advocates for better government 
performance and accountability. A key element in improving the effectiveness of Indonesian civil society is 
improving the NGO’s own internal democracy and lines of accountability. Such work is also consistent with 
Secretary Clinton’s guidance regarding the involvement of CSOs being done under the Comprehensive 
Partnership. Promoting CSO advocacy for minority rights is one way in which greater tolerance can be 
advanced by state-society collaboration. 
Civil society could be empowered and its potential to promote change from below maximized to the extent 
that three lower-level results are achieved: 
• 1.2.1: Civil Society’s Organizations Advocacy and Organizational Capacities are 
Strengthened 
• 1.2.2: Public Debate on Policy Issues Increased 
• 1.2.3: Increased Awareness of Civil Society on their Rights 
Illustrative Activities 
• Provide training and technical assistance to NGOs to enhance their internal organizational structures 
[focus particularly on strategic planning, financial administration, grant applications and reporting to 
donors, communication and outreach, membership participation and advocacy skills. This includes 
efforts to disseminate information about their mission, objectives and results in order to improve 
their image within their communities, gain greater public trust and attract greater public support.  
• Through training and technical assistance, strengthen NGO technical knowledge and professional 
competence of the substantive areas in which they operate (environment, education, health, justice, 
etc.). 
• Consider funding NGO operational costs so they can become more sustainable. 
• Promote diversification of funding opportunities. 
• Support CSOs and NGOs that are engaged in promoting greater religious tolerance. 
• Provide technical assistance to NGOs on using the law of access to public information to request 
information about government activities, such as procurement decisions, budget allocations, and 
public expenditures. 
• Promote a media campaign to inform citizens of minimum standards of public service provision and 
make them more aware of their rights. 
• Support think-tanks that produce good quality research and encourage analysis of key public policies 
that can inform policymakers and influence public opinion. 
• Support think-tanks and/or other research institutions to conduct analysis on public expenditure at 
the national and local levels. 
• Facilitate exchanges between local businesspeople and NGOs, and find topics of common interest 
where they can work together. 
• Support NGOs in the production of citizen scorecards or similar mechanisms to monitor and 
evaluate the performance of local governments in the provision of key services (education, health, 
environment, etc.). 
• Support the production of local radio talk shows, where local government representatives can hear 
and respond to citizen concerns. 
• Replicate the Jawa Pos Institute of Pro-Otonomi award for best local government performance. 
• The Mission might want to conduct a further civil society assessment to best prioritize and assess 
assistance flows in the future. 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA 51 
SUB-IR1.3: CORRUPTION IN TARGETED AREAS MITIGATED 
As mentioned in this report, champions of reform exist in many local government entities. To the extent that 
political will exists to improve the quality of service delivery by mitigating corrupt practices, USAID can 
become an important partner, assisting government and NGOs in introducing anti-corruption reforms. 
USAID has extensive experience in this field and can disseminate best practices learned from successful 
interventions around the world. The key to any successful anti-corruption program is to reduce the incentives 
that motivate corrupt behavior in the first place, without attempting to eliminate or eradicate the problem 
entirely and/or privileging punitive solutions. Examples include reducing red tape which encourages the use 
of bribes to expedite bureaucratic processes, providing clear and detailed information of necessary 
requirements for obtaining a public service, introducing electronic accounting systems to reduce 
opportunities for embezzling public funds and introducing internal controls to detect and prevent corrupt 
practices. Targeted interventions can be piloted in key government offices, such as offices responsible for 
issuing drivers’ licenses, birth certificates, and land titling. If successful, these interventions can be scaled up 
to other government offices.  
Based on international best practices, corruption can be mitigated if three lower-level results are 
accomplished:  
• 1.3.1: Bureaucratic Procedures Streamlined 
• 1.3.2: Internal Controls Improved 
• 1.3.3: Increased Citizen Oversight of Government Performance 
Illustrative Activities 
• Support key government offices in reducing red tape and improving the quality and efficiency of 
public service delivery. One-stop shop offices, like those supported by the KINERJA project, should 
be replicated if an evaluation demonstrates that this initiative contributes to enhancing quality of 
service delivery and reducing opportunities for corruption.  
• Assist local governments in introducing a comprehensive internal control framework following 
international standards such as the COSO model. Internal controls are essential for reducing the 
opportunities to engage in corrupt practices, as performance of government officials is more closely 
monitored and evaluated.  
• Promote the adoption of citizen charters in government offices, where government officials inform 
the public about their rights and provide detailed and clear information about the necessary 
requirements citizens need to comply with for obtaining a public service. 
• Support social auditing of key public services such as education, health, water and sanitation and 
local courts. Through the use of community scorecards, citizens can evaluate the quality of their 
services and provide feedback to government authorities, thus becoming more aware of their needs 
and rights and eventually increasing their demand for better public services. 
• Undertake an assessment of campaign financing to explore ways to increase transparency in this 
regard. 
IR 2: STRENGTHENED DEMAND FOR GREATER JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE AND LEGAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY  
Strengthening the rule of law in Indonesia is a long-term objective and a result too ambitious and far beyond 
USAID’s manageable interests. Building stronger demand for greater judicial performance and legal 
accountability, on the other hand, is a more realistic and manageable result. As we discussed above, strong 
demand from below is a critical catalyst of change. Access to justice from the community side may be viewed 
through a similar prism as the provision of other public services, with both demand and supply side elements 
contributing to the most effective performance. Demand for justice starts at the local level, where citizens 
have issues that need to be settled through a court of law. Of course, the justice sector is centralized and this 
is why the collaboration of central-level institutions is essential, if not to attain their full support, at least not 
to block major reform efforts or initiatives. The strength of demand for a fair, equitable and impartial justice 
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system will depend on the capacity of NGOs and the media to articulate their message, coordinate their 
actions and engage in a broad coalition for judicial reform. It will also depend on the enhancement of the 
legal profession’s performance, which as reported earlier, still has much room for improvement. Attracting 
good professionals and qualified lawyers to the public sector depends in large part on improving the prestige 
and salary pay of judges and prosecutors. An essential element in this regard is the introduction of minimum 
acceptable standards for certification as a legal practitioner.  
Obviously, at the national level, key governmental officials at the Supreme Court, the Attorney General’s 
Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) need to become fully engaged, and to the extent 
specialized technical assistance is required, USAID should be ready to provide it. But the bulk of USAID 
investments in the justice sector should be focused on strengthening demand from below. This will further 
emphasize access to justice issues as well as institutional-building efforts. 
This intermediate result in turn depends on the achievement of four sub-results: 
• Sub-IR 2.1: Increased Organizational and Advocacy Capacities of NGOs (human rights, 
religious tolerance, fair and equal access to justice, etc.) 
• Sub-IR 2.2: Increased Media Expertise to Analyze and Report Legal Affairs 
• Sub-IR 2.3: Enhanced Performance of Legal Professionals. 
The assessment team believes that two lower-level results are important for improvement the 
performance of the legal profession:  
– 2.3.1 Legal Training Improved 
– 2.3.2 Quality Standards for Legal Profession Developed 
• Sub-IR 2.4: Increased Citizen Awareness of Their Rights to Equal Access to Justice. 
Illustrative Activities 
• Support NGOs that work in the justice sector and offer training and technical assistance to improve 
their internal organizational structure.  
• Promote the integration of a broad social coalition advocating for greater access to justice and more 
integrity and accountability of justice sector officials. 
• Support journalists and other media outlets in investigating and reporting on cases involving the 
justice system. 
• Promote a civil awareness campaign to educate citizens about their rights to equitable and fair access 
to justice. 
• Continue to support training programs to improve the quality of legal education in Indonesia. The 
training should be linked to a certification program (like a bar exam). 
• Support the development of widely agreed standards for legal professionals and assist relevant 
institutions to develop an implementation plan to apply these standards. 
• Support the development of a certification system for legal professionals. 
• A deeper look into the justice sector is warranted as greater demand for access to justice brings more 
attention to the remaining rule of law deficits. Current justice programs will also be concluding 
evaluations that will provide the occasion for reconsideration of this portfolio. 
IR 3: INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITIES TO SECURE FAIR AND FREE 
ELECTIONS 
The assessment team included the recommendations derived from an independent electoral assessment 
conducted a few weeks before this DRG assessment. The electoral assessment concluded that “lack of 
political will on the part of parties to reform themselves is one of the major factors reducing the effectiveness 
of technical assistance to parties,” and therefore they recommended that USAID focus its political party 
assistance on targeted training to women’s candidates. In addition, they recommended assisting electoral 
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institutions in strengthening their institutional capacity to administer elections, thus reducing the threats to 
the integrity of electoral results, particularly in the upcoming elections of 2014.  
This intermediate result depends on the achievement of three sub-results: 
• Sub-IR 3.1: Strengthened Electoral Institutions 
• Sub-IR 3.2: Increased Citizens’ Understanding of and Confidence in Indonesia’s Electoral 
Processes 
• Sub-IR 3.3: Improved Women’s Representation in Political Parties and Enhanced 
Opportunities to be Elected to Office. 
Illustrative activities 
• Establish an appropriate system for voter registration, which may mean implementing the findings of 
the voter registration committee—if the new National Election Commission (KPU) decides to 
follow those recommendations.  
• Interpret and publicize changes to the electoral legal framework, including laws and regulations.  
• Strengthen outreach and public engagement capacity.  
• Develop and implement a new results tabulation system, whether manual or electronic. 
• Provide technical assistance and potentially some targeted training for stakeholders engaged in the 
electoral adjudication process including members of the Bawaslu and Panwaslu election oversight 
bodies, and election-focused members of the police, prosecutorial services and judiciary, to the 
extent they are created or can be identified. 
• Partner with local NGOs, universities, and/or other local entities on voter education to increase 
public understanding of the electoral process. 
• Provide support to local NGOs to monitor the entire electoral process, including pre-election, 
election-day and post-election monitoring. 
• Foster greater sustainability of NGOs working in the electoral field, to include those advocating 
access to the elections by persons with disabilities. 
• Provide targeted training to female candidates—to improve their campaign and political skills, 
thereby making them more electable. 
Additional activities not included in the electoral assessment 
• Simplify the ballot to avoid confusion and reduce percentage of null votes. 
• Foster policy dialogue on the convenience of introducing political party finance reform. 
• Participate in the current dialogue taking place among intellectuals and party officials on reforms of 
candidate recruitment policies. 
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ANNEX 1. SUMMARY OF 
PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 
 
City/Location Organization/People Contacted 
Jakarta 71 
Surabaya—E. Java 16 
Banda Aceh—Aceh 15 
Palangkaraya—C. Kalimantan 9 
Kupang—NTT 10 
Makassar—S. Sulawesi 17 
Total 138 
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ANNEX 2. SUMMARY OF 
USAID/DRG PROGRAMS 
Governance. To reduce corruption, USAID bolsters the capacity of government institutions to prevent, 
expose and punish corruption and other abuses of power and of the media, NGO and citizens “watchdog” 
groups to monitor and expose these abuses. To improve governance and service delivery, USAID assists 
national and local governments, local councils and civil society to improve incentives for better local 
government performance and adopt innovative service delivery approaches. USAID also supports local 
government efforts to increase access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation. 
Rule of Law. USAID assists the Supreme Court and Attorney General’s Office reforms in developing a 
more accountable and effective justice systems, as well as NGOs, think tanks and professional groups that 
monitor and advocate for justice sector reform. USAID also supports legal education through clinical 
education and policy-oriented legal research. 
Political Representation. USAID works to improve the policymaking capability of legislative bodies, CSOs, 
universities and think tanks and strengthen connections between representative institutions (legislatures, civil 
society and political parties) and Indonesian citizens. 
Elections. USAID conducted an elections assessment in February of 2012. It currently has programming in 
procurement to support Indonesia in the 2014 elections. 
Peace and Democratic Culture. USAID has supported CSOs and government institutions in promoting 
and protecting citizens’ rights and promoting conflict-sensitive approaches to development, technical capacity 
building, livelihood development and civil society through the conflict mitigation program scheduled to end 
in February 2013. USAID is currently considering a new engagement in Papua to address the drivers of 
vulnerability and marginalization. 
Sharing Indonesia’s DRG Experience. Through programs like the IKAT- U.S. program, USAID supports 
Indonesian civil society by fostering mutual collaboration on the democracy, good governance and human 
rights-related program. It thus recognizes both what Indonesia has to offer Southeast Asia as well as what the 
region can do to support such efforts in Indonesia.  
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ANNEX 3. OTHER USAID 
AND U.S. GOVERNMENT 
PROGRAMS 
The U.S. Government in Indonesia has been particularly concerned with corruption and has pushed for 
increased anti-corruption programming. Rule of law, including law enforcement and anti-terrorism activities 
have also been a priority. The human rights agenda has been important to the Mission particularly in the area 
of Islamic radicalism and human rights abuses in Papua. 
Other U.S. Government donors in the DRG sphere in Indonesia include the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and Bureau 
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Department of Justice (DOJ), and USAID.  
DRL. Over the past five years, DRL has invested in programs that support security service accountability, 
religious freedom, labor rights, and women’s empowerment. DRL leverages a grassroots approach that 
encourages innovation, creativity, and responsiveness to on-the-ground issues. Most of the funds support 
international organizations that either maintain in-country office(s) or partner with local civil society actors. 
The grants are small-scale, and thematic foci evolve depending on areas of opportunity, as informed by 
DRL’s Indonesia Report on Human Rights Practices (HRR) and International Religious Freedom (IRF) report.  
INL and DOJ. INL and DOJ are supporting rule of law related to building prosecutorial capacity in 
Indonesia. Much of the efforts also support countering violent extremism and terrorism. Indonesian 
counterparts for the INL and DOJ work include police, corrections and justice sector officials, and select 
executive officials. INL was establishing a new office. The International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training 
(OPDAT) have staff in country. At the time of the assessment, the Embassy was planning to draft a rule of 
law strategy that would outline more details on U.S. Government work in the area.  
MCC. In September of 2011, MCC signed a five-year $600 million compact. This compact includes a $50 
million Procurement Modernization Project which is designed to assist the Government of Indonesia in 
achieving significant government expenditure savings with no loss—or an increase—in the quality of 
procured goods and services. The project includes activities to build a career path for procurement civil 
servants, create an institutionalized role and structure for procurement professionals that provides sufficient 
authority to implement good practice, and strengthen controls such as procurement and financial audits to 
ensure improved institutional performance. 
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ANNEX 4. RESULTS 
FRAMEWORK 
OBJECTIVES AND INTERMEDIATE RESULTS 
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INTERMEDIATE RESULTS AND SUB-RESULTS (PRIORITY SECTORS) 
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ANNEX 5. PEER REVIEW OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE 
ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIA 
As part of the DRG Assessment process, USAID commissions an independent expert on the democratic transition in the 
subject country or region to undertake a peer review of the Final Report. The purpose of the peer review is to provide an external 
commentary on how well the DRG Assessment captures the essential political dynamics of the subject country and the soundness 
of its analysis and recommendations. The review offers an expert opinion on the overall quality of the report; it identifies any 
innovative findings that may have emerged in the up-to-date DRG Assessment; it points out any key gaps in the analysis as well 
as noting differences of political interpretation; it evaluates the extent to which the recommendations are logically derived from the 
analysis; and provides an occasion for the reviewer to comment on the overall appropriateness of USAID’s DRG methodology for 
elaborating a DRG strategic approach that is rooted in a clear and compelling understanding of a country’s political dynamic. 
Review submitted by Michael Buehler, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois 
University, April 8, 2013. 
INTRODUCTION 
I have thoroughly read the report Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment of Indonesia and found that 
it provides a good account of the considerable progress Indonesia has made in past years. Prognoses popular 
in 1998 about the looming ‘balkanization’ of Indonesia and the persistence of authoritarian institutions were 
wrong. Instead, the fundamentals of Indonesia’s democracy have been put in place and look stronger than 
anyone would have predicted 15 years ago. The regularly held elections are generally free and fair and various 
reform laws have established a formal framework for checks and balances between government branches. 
Indonesia has also made great strides in establishing a more inclusive political arena, as its vibrant civil society 
and media landscape show. Overall, Indonesia has become a “normal” democracy that faces challenges 
similar to other low-quality democracies.  
I also found that the report identified accurately the key challenges Indonesia is facing with regard to 
democratization, human rights, and governance. The main questions Indonesia is facing at present are how to 
improve the quality of democracy, as well as how to strengthen the rule of law and implement the various 
reform initiatives that have been adopted since 1998.  
There is also plenty to like about the authors’ recommendation to concentrate on improving “effectiveness of 
the Indonesian government to sustain economic growth and deliver adequate public services to its citizens; 
strengthen demand for greater judicial performance and legal accountability; increase effectiveness of electoral 
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authorities to secure free and fair elections.”141 The recommendation to focus future aid efforts on 
subnational politics is also valid and useful. 
However, I also found that the observations in the report are not particularly novel and therefore the 
recommendations for how to best support Indonesia’s democratization process not particularly original. In 
fact, the problems identified in the report, including lack of reform will, low civil society capacity and poor 
governance, as well as the remedies suggested are very similar to those outlined in the USAID democracy and 
governance assessment published in 2008.142 The overlap between the two assessments shows first and 
foremost how entrenched many of Indonesia’s key problems are. However, it also points to the failure of 
many development programs and needs assessments to problematize Indonesia’s many challenges in a way 
that would allow for recommendations conducive to change.  
Rather than understanding the contours of democratization and state-society relations shaped by the absolute 
capacity of individuals or government branches and the absence/presence of ‘reform-oriented’ behavior as in 
the report under review here, an understanding of Indonesian politics based on a relational sense of capacity 
and power that emphasizes the primacy of alliances, coalitions and networks driving change or facilitating 
stagnation, may offer some new insights and therefore lead to additional/different recommendations for how 
to address Indonesia’s main challenges. In other words, I mainly agree with the report as to what Indonesia’s 
key problems are. I do not entirely agree with how the report depicts the causes of these problems and 
therefore the solution suggested.  
The report identifies substandard service delivery along with a weak and deeply corrupt justice system as the 
most important governance challenges Indonesia is facing today. I will therefore concentrate on these two 
issues in my comments. 
1. GOVERNANCE 
To start out on a positive note, I believe it is testament to the considerable progress Indonesia has made since 
1998 that the discussion about whether the broad structures of democracy are under threat has shifted to a 
more specific debate as to how the various reform initiatives adopted over the past 15 years can be 
implemented to improve government services and strengthen the rule of law.  
Nevertheless, corruption in Indonesia remains systemic and therefore endemic. The report correctly points out 
that some progress has been made with regard to arresting corruptors and the important role the Corruption 
Eradication Commission has played in this development. It is important to emphasize, however, that many of 
the high-level bureaucrats convicted of corruption had their sentences reduced soon after being sent to jail. 
Furthermore, the amount of assets recovered is very low, and decisions about who is pursued for corruption 
and who is not continue to be mapped politically.143 Well-connected military and police personnel as well as 
civil servants and judges usually go unpunished for corruption crimes committed. Most importantly, the 
emphasis of Indonesia’s anti-corruption drive on punitive measures is addressing symptoms rather than causes.  
In this context, it is worth reiterating that positive incentive structures for bureaucrats remain completely 
absent 15 years after the collapse of the New Order regime. The hiring of new bureaucrats is not based on 
needs; bureaucrats continue to be underpaid while opaque salary structures that encourage abuse remain in 
place. Promotions continue to be based on seniority rather than performance. The authors are absolutely 
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correct that the demise of Suharto “did not effectively dismantle the structure of opportunities for engaging 
in corrupt behavior.”144  
However, it is worth emphasizing that many new reform laws that have been adopted since 1998 are also 
playing a role in Indonesia’s poor governance and service delivery. This is most visible, and most 
consequential, with regard to government expenditure at the subnational level. Transparency in central-local 
fiscal relations remains low, and the central government spends a considerable amount of national revenue in 
sectors that have officially been under the authority of subnational governments since 2001. Concretely, 
deconcentration funds (dana dekonsentrasi) and co-administered funds (tugas pembantuan) that are supposed to be 
used for national-level functions at the provincial and district levels, respectively, are mostly used for functions 
that have been devolved to the local level and therefore fall under subnational government authority. This 
practice is illegal according to decentralization laws but not necessarily according to sectoral laws.145 
In addition, legal inconsistencies have allowed local governments to draft their budgets in different ways. In 
the mid-2000s, for instance, some subnational governments used the guidelines outlined in Law No. 17/2003 
on State Finances while others followed the regulations stipulated in the Ministry of Home Affairs Decree 
No. 29/2002 on Regional Financial Management to draft their budgets.  
One of the main consequences of this contradictory legal environment and poor intergovernmental relations 
are unspent balances for public services at the local level. While spending varies at the subnational level,146 
unspent public funds have grown considerably across Indonesia since 2001.147 Indonesian districts have the 
financial means that would allow them to spend U$ 400 more per person per year than they currently do. 
This is a significant amount of money in a country in which 130 million citizens continue to live on less than 
U.S. $2 a day. Almost all these reserves are amassed inadvertently and in an ad-hoc fashion due to problems 
in national-local fiscal relations, inflexible budget rules, and a lack of clear rules and guidelines on the 
responsibilities and duties of local bureaucrats. This situation, in combination with a more aggressive anti-
corruption agenda, has increased the reluctance of local government officials to participate in tender 
committees.148 Local governments are also spending fewer funds than they ought to because they often do 
not understand that it is their responsibility to disperse such funds. Very often, they continue to lobby 
national level officials to disperse funds at the local level, much like during the New Order era.149  
In short, the causes of Indonesia’s poor governance record cannot simply be reduced to the continuity of New 
Order institutions and the “bureaucratic mindset” fostered during the New Order years.150 Many laws and 
regulations adopted after 1998 are poorly drafted and in direct contradiction to existing laws. This creates an 
environment that makes it difficult even for bureaucrats with the best intentions to deliver good services to the 
public. In addition, ambiguous relations between government layers rather than the absolute capacity of 
government branches are one of the main reasons behind the abysmal quality of public services in Indonesia. 
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2. RULE OF LAW 
There have been great efforts since 1998 to replace the rule by law characteristic of the Suharto years with the 
rule of law. The constitution has been revised to reconstitute the independence of the three government 
branches and various oversight bodies such as the Ombudsman office or the Judicial Commission have been 
established to facilitate civil society monitoring of the institutional framework on which Indonesia’s 
democracy rests. 
Yet, the rule of law remains a central problem as the report points out correctly.151 It is worth emphasizing 
that this does not mean that laws are absent. Rather, the law is enforced arbitrarily. Ordinary Indonesians 
have a high chance of going to jail for misdemeanors while well-connected bureaucrats and politicians usually 
walk free for much more serious crimes.152 I agree with the authors’ assessment that corruption within the 
judiciary remains rampant and that court rulings therefore demand little respect.  
However, I differ in several respects compared to the authors’ interpretation as to the origins of the problems 
in Indonesia’s judiciary. Most importantly, I do not agree with the authors’ claim that the main reason for 
stalled reforms in Indonesia’s judiciary is a “lack of independence.”153 Many of the indicators that the authors 
muster to support their argument are misleading or outright wrong.  
Due to confined space, I will concentrate on the two issues the authors see as the main problem. One, the 
authors state that “[p]erhaps the single most important flaw in Indonesia’s current judicial system is that the 
institutional procedures designed to nominate judges to the Supreme Court continue to undermine judicial 
independence.”154 The authors are confusing system and implementation issues. A system may be fine, but 
implementation may be bad, tarnishing the system’s reputation. As the system goes, and as a matter of 
principle, there hardly is a Supreme Court in the world or in any OECD countries, where the political 
institutions do not play a major role in determining its constitution. The reason is two-fold: first, political 
power wants to ensure that a (potentially) powerful agency such as the Supreme Court more or less reflects its 
own political priorities. Second, by running the appointments process through the political process, the court 
is invested with a democratic legitimacy that allows it to wield the powers it has—including striking down 
legislation, as the case may be. Consequently, whether in Germany, the United Kingdom or the United States, 
one finds that selection and appointment to the Supreme Court is done by the executive and parliament, with 
various constructs applying. Hence, the Indonesian system is absolutely normal. Where the Indonesia system 
differs somewhat from the United States, for instance, is that due to the judiciary’s independence during the 
New Order, where Supreme Court Justices were selected by the President, and submitted to approval to the 
parliament (which is the U.S. procedure), after 1998 a system was adopted in which the parliament selects the 
Justice and submits the name for final signature to the President. This addresses the real issue that Suharto 
had a rubber-stamp parliament, and fits in the broader limitation of executive power. There is nothing 
extraordinary about the Indonesian procedure. This appointments process, with its peculiar nuances from 
country to country, is the prevailing system throughout OECD countries, and one cannot say that the 
Indonesian system generates lack of independence. For all the theoretical merits of this system, and the way it 
complies with international standards, it does not work well. The root problem lies in the Indonesian 
parliament, which has become a corrupt market for anything, including the selection of judges. The way the 
parliament submits candidates to a proper ordeal during the mandatory ‘fit and proper test’, which is not 
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marked by competence or respect of any sort, makes people of real quality and caliber step back since they 
refuse to lower themselves to that level.155  
Two, the authors claim that the Indonesian judiciary is also not independent because “financially, [the 
judiciary] is strictly regulated by the Ministry of Finance, so it does not have budgetary independence.”156 This 
assessment, again, is simplistic, incorrect and misleading. Indonesia’s ‘one-roof system’ means that the 
judiciary manages its own budget once it has been allocated (in contrast to France or Germany, where the 
executive manages the budget after allocation). The argument of the authors is that as long as the budget 
allocation is in the hands of the Ministry of Finance (and therefore the executive branch of government), 
independence is not guaranteed. However, there are only very few countries, mainly in Latin America, where 
the percentage of the budget allocated to the judiciary is fixed in the constitution. These arrangements have 
been abject failures.157 In addition, it is certainly correct that the allocation process remains an instrument 
through which the judiciary might conceivably be throttled. However, the way budgets are allocated to the 
judiciary in Indonesia is how the system works in most countries, including the United States. Arbitrary cuts 
for judicial budgets in the United States in recent years have brought the court system in Massachusetts, for 
instance, to the “tipping point of dysfunction” according to the state’s Chief Justice, while his colleague in 
California stated that “the civil court system is collapsing” with “3200 court houses…physically eroding, 
which forced half of the state courts to stop hearing cases at one point.158 
In short, the judicial system in Indonesia is not any weaker, neither conceptually or operationally, than the 
court system in the USA, or any other OECD country, and does not somehow fall short on securing judicial 
independence. It is also worth reiterating that no player in Indonesian politics questions the independence of 
the judiciary, which is constitutionally enshrined and has been reiterated in a slew of statutes over the years.  
It is an entirely separate question whether judges are independent in reality. I felt that the report tends to 
portray judges as victims, while the situation on the ground is arguably more complex. Many judges are 
indeed at the receiving end of influence peddling and pressure exerted by major political and economic 
players. However, many judges voluntarily let themselves being recruited into patronage networks already 
during law school. In these networks, judges can then become very powerful players. Currently, “[t]here are at 
least three large competing networks in the [Indonesian] judiciary…with a nationwide spread, involving huge 
sums of money and assets, land, hotels and helicopters, tied in with both local and national politics and large 
entrepreneurs, able to mobilize senior power brokers, from parliament to the media…”159 Against this 
backdrop, the authors’ notion that Indonesian judges are not independent or are somewhat ‘second-rate’ 
players because they are law graduates from the country’s “worst law schools”160 and therefore lack the skills 
and talent, is naïve.  
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3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
I agree with the authors that future USAID projects should focus on the subnational level. Not only have 
most political and fiscal powers been shifted away from national politics since 1999 but the impetus for 
change in past years has been most pronounced in local politics.  
I am less convinced by the assumptions underlying the authors’ other recommendations. The report 
attributes Indonesia’s poor governance record and stalled judicial reforms to “weak leadership”161 and a “lack 
of political will”162 to address Indonesia’s most pressing problems. Reform failure, in other words, occurs at 
the individual level. Since individual agency is key, the authors conclude that support for “reform champions” 
who “exist in virtually every government agency at the central and local levels”163 have been the main “drivers 
of change” in past years.164  
I find such a view not very helpful for several reasons: One, many of Indonesia’s problems are rooted in the 
complexities of networks among bureaucrats and relations between government institutions, some of which I 
tried to sketch briefly above (e.g. financial relations between government layers; patronage networks within 
the judiciary; a lack of oversight between government branches). Two, there is neither a serious discussion 
nor a consensus in the scholarship on Indonesia as to what constitutes a “reform champion.” Not only does a 
“reformer” as defined by donor agencies not resonate with many Indonesians (which partly explains both the 
puzzle mentioned in the report that many Indonesians are quite content with their leaders, as well as the 
reason they frequently vote politicians convicted for corruption back into office), but also there are no criteria 
among donors either that would be needed to identify such “reform champions.” The difficulties of locating 
“reformers” is aptly shown by the fact that the USAID 2008 assessment described the Yudhoyono leadership 
as “stronger than any of its democratic predecessors…more committed to improving public services and 
tackling corruption.”165 Only a few years later, the USAID 2013 assessment under review here states that 
“Yudhoyono…has a reputation for inaction” and “the president himself seems to be at fault for weak 
leadership.”166 Many other politicians singled out as “reform champions” and “drivers of change” in recent 
years by donor agencies have also been leading figures behind the adoption of policies detrimental to the 
deepening of democratization and the rule of law. For instance, Gamawan Fauzi, who was appointed as 
Indonesia’s Minister of Home Affairs in 2009 not least because of his reputation as a “reform champion,” 
was also one of Indonesia’s leading local government heads in adopting shari’a regulations that restricted the 
democratic rights of women and minorities and were in direct violation of Indonesian law. In short, the 
complexities of politics in Indonesia (as anywhere else) make it difficult to establish criteria that allow aid 
agencies to single out “reform champions” and design development programs around them.  
To interpret Indonesia’s many achievements since the demise of Suharto as the result of individual agency, in 
my view, not only simplifies the country’s reform trajectory over the past 15 years but also does not resonate 
with the experience of other countries. Throughout history, changing relations among political elites have usually 
initiated civil service reform as countries as diverse as Italy, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the United 
States or Vietnam show.167  
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At the national level, such inter-elite competition has fluctuated greatly over the last decade, being most 
intense in the immediate aftermath of Suharto’s demise. During this time, fundamental reforms were adopted, 
including far-reaching electoral and constitutional changes and the devolution of political power to regional 
governments.168 This competition subsided after 2004. At the local level, the trend has been in the opposition 
direction. Various reform laws have steadily increased the competition among subnational political elites, 
culminating in the adoption of direct elections for governors, district heads and mayors in 2005.  
This intense competition among local elites in the context of local elections has increased local spending on 
service delivery.169 In addition, elite competition has opened up interstices for civil society organizations. 
While civil society representatives have failed to enter formal politics overall—most politicians winning local 
legislative and executive elections are rooted in the New Order bureaucracy—competition among these state 
elites has subsequently allowed civil society organizations to influence politics. The report mentions several 
examples of how civil society organizations managed to hold local governments accountable that became 
possible precisely as a result of more competitive elite relations.170  
In short, it is not so much the presence or absence of “reform champions” that has led to change across the 
archipelago and government layers but the fact that now competition exists among elites. By competing 
against each other, New Order elites have pushed state-society relations in more democratic directions—in 
spite of themselves.171 
Based on the assumption that it is the changing relations among elites rather than the potency of individual 
agency such as the personal character traits or the behavior of individual politicians that have been driving 
reform by opening up interstices for change across Indonesia after 1998, a somewhat different set of 
recommendations follows than the ones suggested in the report under review here.  
First, the framework that assures competition among political elites needs to be protected and strengthened. I 
agree with the report that development initiatives have the greatest impact at the local level. Coincidentally, it 
is also at the local level were the framework for competition among elites is most threatened. At the time of 
writing, a concerted effort led by the Ministry of Home Affairs was under way to abolish direct elections for 
governors. The national parliament is unlikely to pass the draft law in its current form but the executive has 
already drafted a new law that also wants to abolish the direct elections for district heads and mayors. Rather 
than supporting “reform champions” who are hard to identify for reasons listed above, USAID ought to 
ensure through its programs that the framework for competition remains in place and is strengthened. This 
necessitates broadly targeted programs rather than a focus on individual players.  
Second, USAID efforts should focus on improving the relations between government layers. Most 
importantly, programs should aim at improving the stringency of existing Public Financial Management 
(PFM) systems. At the moment, “[f]ormal processes…mask the real processes through which resources are 
raised, distributed, and spent.”172 This is particularly evident in national-local fiscal transfers as mentioned 
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above. Future support should therefore focus on improving budget formulation and execution, the 
procurement of public goods as well as a framework to strengthen audit mechanisms.  
Third, I believe that civil society capacity building has a lower priority. Ninety percent of Indonesia’s civil 
society organizations are, to some degree, foreign funded. Competition for donor support has greatly 
undermined the capacity of such organizations to mount a concerted and coordinated challenge to the 
government. Ironically, conservative pressure groups and Islamist movements that are not receiving funds 
from donor agencies are some of the best organized and therefore most influential non-state actors in 
demanding services from the government, as the plethora of shari’a local regulations adopted across the 
archipelago in recent years shows.173 Support for civil society organizations has also a lower priority because 
change of recent years has followed a certain sequence. Most civil society organizations have become influential 
only after competition among political elites increased. Ensuring elite competition is therefore paramount.  
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